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Abstract
A Fuzz test is an approach used to discover vulnerabilities by intentionally sending
invalid inputs to a system for the purpose of triggering some type of fault or unin-
tended effect that renders the system vulnerable to an exploit. Fuzz testing is an
important cyber-testing technique used to find and fix vulnerabilities before they are
exploited. The fuzzing of military data links presents a particular challenge because
existing fuzzing tools cannot be easily applied to these systems. As a result, the tools
and techniques used to fuzz these links vary widely in sophistication and effective-
ness. Because of the infinite, or nearly infinite, number of possible fuzzed messages
that can be sent on a military data link, measuring the coverage of a fuzz test is not
straightforward. This thesis proposes an understandable and meaningful metric for
protocol fuzz testing called ExCov. This metric computes the coverage of a fuzz test
set from a probabilistic model of vulnerability occurrence and defines coverage as the
expected percent of existing vulnerabilities discovered by a set of test cases. This
metric enables the acquisitions community to more succinctly write weapons system
requirements for cyber security. Furthermore, it quantifies the number of faults and
vulnerabilities that are expected to be found by a set of test cases, which provides
decision makers with valuable information to make more informed choices on whether
or not to perform additional testing. As a result, industry will be better equipped to
determine cost and effort when performing cyber vulnerability testing. In addition,
industry will also be able to more concretely represent the results of the cyber testing
they perform. ExCov was implemented in a suite of tools called ExFuzz, and these
tools were used to compare and contrast military data link fuzz testing techniques
that are in use today. By assessing these current methods using the ExCov metric,
iv
optimal bit flip probabilities for the mutative fuzzing of three custom protocols was
found. A generative fuzzer was also built based on the metric and was shown to
outperform mutative and manual generation strategies in nearly every case.
v
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EXPECTED COVERAGE (EXCOV): A PROPOSAL TO COMPUTE FUZZ
TEST COVERAGE WITHIN AN INFINITE INPUT SPACE
I. Introduction
Vulnerability discovery is a key task when securing any type of digital system.
When that system is a vehicle, aircraft, or missile, the implications of a malicious
actor discovering and exploiting a vulnerability are grave. Security researchers must
identify and fix these vulnerabilities before a bad actor finds and exploits them.
The development of effective and efficient methods of vulnerability discovery is an
important step in the effort to secure all types of embedded systems. One approach
to vulnerability discovery involves sending intentionally invalid inputs to a system in
the hopes of triggering some type of fault or unintended effect that may be render
the system vulnerable to an exploit. This type of invalid input testing is called fuzz
testing, or fuzzing.
1.1 Redefining the Air-gap for Our Weapon Systems
Effective negative testing is an important part of cyber defense. In embedded
weapon systems, data flows between many different sub-systems, using a myriad
of different protocols. Fuzz testing can be used to identify messages that, if sent
between these sub-systems, may impact a system’s performance or compromise a
system entirely. The following paper, [23], motivates the need more for negative
testing, including effective fuzz testing, from a deterrence policy perspective. The
paper was co-authored by Evan Swihart and Lt Col Mark Reith and was accepted to
the March 2018 International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security.
1
Redefining the Air-gap for Our Weapon Systems
Evan Swihart, Lt Col Mark Reith
1. The threat
There are many reasons the adversary may want to look beyond the traditional
battlefield of TCP/IP enterprise networks and target the cyberspace of our weapon
systems. Two major reasons are the low cost, both financial and political, and the
high impact of such an attack.
The cost to stand up programs to design, build, and deploy systems capable
of kinetically destroying air assets can easily be in the billions of dollars (National
Priorities Project, 2017). While it is difficult to estimate the cost of standing up
a cyber program capable of incapacitating our air systems, it is certainly orders
of magnitude less. Cyber exploits are also politically cheap. Since cyber-attack
attribution is difficult, perpetrators can hide behind a veil of plausible deniability.
When accused of an attack, the adversary can claim to have nothing to do with it
and avoid international and domestic political consequences for the action. Prominent
likely state sponsored cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet (Kushner, 2013), the Ukrainian
Power Plant hack (Zetter, 2016), and the Sony hack (Zetter, 2014), all have the
common theme of no state claiming responsibility. If a cyber-attack targets our
weapon systems, we can expect attribution to be difficult and any retaliation attempt
to be complicated. In contrast, attribution of a kinetic attack against our weapon
systems will be simple, and the perpetrators will likely face a kinetic response.
The scope of the damage that could be caused by a cyber-attack on our weapon
systems may also entice an adversary. A kinetic weapon is designed to destroy assets
one at a time, and destroying a single asset has little effect on the other assets. Cyber
weapons operate differently. They are designed to target a vulnerability that exists
2
in all systems of the same or similar configuration. Therefore, these weapons can be
targeted at a type of system rather than a single asset. They can be delivered in a
variety of ways including a supply chain attack (Shackleford, 2015), where modified
parts find their way into each asset, or the compromising of equipment on the flight
line which will touch many aircraft. Thus, a single cyber weapon could incapacitate
an entire type of weapon system.
2. Our weakness
We may not be prepared to treat our systems as contested cyberspace. Our current
approach to acquisitions and weapon system design assumes our systems are free of
adversarial interference. This assumption magnifies the effect a successfully delivered
cyber weapon would have on our systems. For example, when an avionics box is added
to a data bus on an aircraft, we design and test the box to function properly with
everything else on that bus. We often do not design for or test what would happen if
unexpected and invalid messages are sent to our new box. Should one terminal on a
data bus be compromised such that it sends invalid messages out on the bus, we may
have no idea how every receiving terminal would react. Similarly we often trust other
friendly systems external to our weapon systems such as navigational aids like GPS,
tactical data links, and mission and key loading equipment to be free of adversarial
interference. We often do not design or test for the case that they are not.
It is entirely understandable why this assumption of trust has prevailed in our
thinking thus far. It is a simple and logical conclusion that since these weapon
systems are not physically connected to the Internet or the DoD Information Network
(DoDIN), the adversary can not cause any cyber effects on a platform without physical
access. In fact, weapon systems are specifically excluded from the definition of the
DoDIN (Defense Acquisition University, 2017). This notion of security by air-gap
is flawed (Guri et al, 2014). Reliance on data and computer networks for weapon
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system operations means that exchanges of information across the air-gap are common
and even required for functionality. Information can reach an air-gapped weapon
system over RF, through maintenance and test equipment, through mission loads,
via attachable hardware like weapons and other pods, or even in counterfeit parts
slipped into the supply chain. Malicious information can find its way into a weapon
system through any of these channels.
Our requirements writing and testing practices reflect our misplaced trust in the
integrity of our systems. We write requirements for systems to correctly receive and
process valid inputs. We then test that the system that is delivered meets these
requirements. This is considered positive testing as it tests if the system handles
valid inputs as it should. Since we trust other systems to send only valid inputs,
there has been no reason to write requirements for systems to handle invalid inputs.
And since we only test that the delivered system meets its requirements, we generally
do not test invalid inputs. If we did test invalid inputs, we would call this testing
negative testing. Negative testing is crucial to understanding how a cyber-attack
would affect a weapon system. In conventional networks, input validation is a high
priority security control (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013); it
should be in embedded systems as well. Without any requirements or testing aimed
at preventing cyber effects from propagating throughout our systems, there is no way
we can defend this space.
3. Rethinking the air-gap
It is clear that the acquisitions process for our weapons systems will need to be
reformed to adapt to the threat of cyber warfare in our weapon systems. In response
to this threat, the Air Force Material Command has started the Air Force Cyber
Campaign Plan which aims to address this issue through seven lines of attack (LOAs)
(Gross, 2016). The recommendations in this paper can, and in some cases are, being
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implemented under LOAs 1, 2, 4 and 6.
We can deter the adversary from contesting the cyberspace of our weapon sys-
tems by designing and testing systems that make cyber exploitation very difficult,
unreliable and costly. This can be done by focusing on two key elements that make
cyber exploits possible, an access vector to the system and persistence and mobility
once inside the system. If we successfully deter the adversary from contesting the
cyberspace of our weapon systems, we can effectively consider these systems to be
air-gapped. That is, we can consider the cyber space of our weapon systems to be
distinctly separate and secure from the DoDIN and Internet.
3.1 Preventing access
There are two key actions we can take to prevent the adversary from accessing our
weapon systems. First, we can write requirements that require the proper handling
of invalid inputs from external sources, and test that these requirements have been
met. This will reduce the number of flaws in our systems that could be exploited
by an adversary to gain access. Many systems handle data coming and going from
a platform before during and after a mission. A key access vector is exploiting flaws
in the protocol or implementation of these data links to move malicious informa-
tion to the air platform. This can be countered by recognizing that, unlike in the
TCP/IP enterprise world, the adversary will have limited access to these peripheral
sub-systems to test their cyber weapons. Since we do have access to them, a small bit
of negative testing of the most vulnerable message types would reveal the most likely
exploits at a fraction of the investment the adversary would need to make to discover
them. For new and upgraded systems, requirements should be added to ensure that
such invalid inputs are gracefully handled by the system. Fixing these vulnerabilities
would vastly increase the sophistication of the cyber weapon the adversary would
need to compromise a weapon system. With limited access to the system, creating
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this weapon would prove a difficult task for the adversary.
It is worth pointing out that this argument relies heavily on the discredited idea
of security by obscurity (Open Web Application Security Project, 2017). The idea
of security by obscurity in computer networks is flawed because, as it turns out,
when more people look at a system and find flaws, many act responsibly and report
the flaws, thus a more secure system can be built. This logic does not apply to
weapon systems. The only people with the means and will to test these systems,
even if component designs were public, are nation states. For these reasons, only
our adversaries would benefit from the public release of our weapon systems designs.
Therefore, security by obscurity is a valid security method in this context.
Second, for other types of access to the platforms systems such as data loads,
attestation may make it far more difficult for the adversary to gain access to a system
(Seshadri et al, 2004). Attestation is a tool used to verify that data has not been
modified by comparing values in memory to a trusted copy. If we implement attes-
tation at key points where instructions to the weapon system are inputted, we may
be able to detect moderately sophisticated attempts to force the system to perform
in an unexpected way. Attestation can be used to verify that one of a discrete and
proven set of valid instructions is loaded to ensure no malicious instructions slip onto
our systems. It can also help prevent supply chain attacks by ensuring malicious
information is not present in a system before it is installed by cross checking software
loads against proven versions.
3.2 Preventing persistence and mobility
In addition to making access to our systems more difficult and expensive for
our adversaries, we can also mitigate the effects of their cyber weapons should they
gain access. This will not only reduce the effect of cyber weapons used against
our embedded weapon systems, but also reduce the incentive for adversarial action.
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Attestation can also be used for this purpose by preventing malicious code from
persisting in our weapon systems. By regularly comparing the software loaded in
systems on the aircraft with proven copies elsewhere, illegal modifications can be
detected. This will make it harder for the adversary to persist if they find a way to
access a weapon system.
One way of preventing malicious information from spreading through a weapon
system is to use simple data transfer schemes inside the platform that limit the
possible data each element in the system can transmit or receive. By limiting the
transferable data, the variety of inputs each system may receive is reduced. This
will make it much harder to transfer bad or malicious data throughout the system.
In TCP/IP Enterprise networks, computers are usually general purpose, so limiting
their ability to pass types of data would be detrimental to their performance. In
embedded systems however, the elements are specialized, and limiting their inputs
and outputs will not greatly affect their operation. There are a number of efforts to
standardize the information passed between components in a weapon system. They
include Open Mission Systems (Virtual Distributed Laboratory, 2017) and Future
Airborne Capability Environment (The Open Group, 2017).
Another way to prevent the spread of malicious information inside a weapon sys-
tem is to once again require systems to properly handle invalid inputs. This will
reduce the risk that an invalid message sent from one trusted, compromised subsys-
tem to another uncompromised system will cause the uncompromised system any
problems. Rigorous negative testing on data busses inside our systems can reveal
these types of vulnerabilities and correcting them will make it very difficult for cyber
effects to spread through our systems.
3.3 Preventing persistence and mobility
So far this paper has discussed security solutions that focus on improving our
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design, our testing and our verification of data before and after missions. A natural
question to ask is, Should we do more to actively detect cyber intrusions into our
weapon systems? In computer networks, intrusion detection systems (IDS) do just this
(Rowland, 2002). Research has been done that extends IDSs into embedded systems
with some success (Tabrizi and Pattabiraman, 2015). An IDS on an aircraft has
even been proposed (Buehler and Duffner, 2017). However there are two fundamental
requirements for IDSs to be effective that may be difficult to realize in the environment
of our embedded weapon systems. Even if we can support these requirements, the
nature of our weapon systems suggests that IDSs will not be very effective in this
domain.
First, IDSs require some space, physical or digital, to reside. A network based IDS
would need wired connections to all the different busses on an aircraft and a place
to reside that could accommodate the necessary data ports. Given the size weight
and power limitations on aircraft, this could prove challenging to accommodate. In
addition to this, unlike common lower layer protocols that make up computer net-
works like Ethernet and 802.11, military data busses may not easily accommodate
interloping devices. Busses running at different levels of classification also presents
a challenge to network based IDSs. An alternative to network based IDSs is host
based IDSs where the software resides on hosts instead of in its own space (Tabrizi
and Pattabiraman, 2015). This solves some of the problems of network IDSs, but
requires every piece of avionics to be updated with this new software. Surely it would
be easier and cheaper to update the avionics to simply not process any messages an
IDS would discover, rather than implement an IDS on top of the equipment.
The second requirement for an IDS is some sort of database that allows the soft-
ware to detect malicious traffic. To build this database, aircraft systems would need
to be studied in many different environments to construct a profile of valid and invalid
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traffic. If this study is completed, we might as well use the information to update
systems to accept and process data that meets the valid profile rather than implement
a separate IDS system. IDS in traditional computer networks makes sense because
traffic unusual for that specific network can be detected and stopped without compro-
mising the general purpose nature of the hosts. Nothing is general purpose in avionics
however, so it makes sense to limit what hosts receive instead of implementing an IDS.
4. Deterring the adversary
Implementation of these practices will not be cheap. Investments in additional
testing, the development and deployment of attestation, and new requirements on
input checking are sure to drive up the acquisition costs of our weapon systems.
However, making this investment will force the adversary to either invest more heav-
ily to defeat our cyber defenses, or to revert to opposing our weapons-systems by
conventional, kinetic means. The embedded system nature of our weapon systems
means that our investment in security would require a much larger investment by the
adversary to overcome.
Since these systems are often designed for use only by the DoD and trusted allies,
the cost to the adversary to acquire them to identify vulnerabilities is higher than our
cost to acquire them for testing. Also, since the data flowing on an aircrafts busses
can be completely specified and standardized, the aircrafts systems can be designed
to drop invalid messages and receive and transmit only valid information. This de-
grades the ability of the adversary to affect a secure subsystem from a compromised
subsystem and thus limits the affect an adversary can have.
With reduced ability to access the cyberspace of weapon systems, and virtually no
ability to spread malicious information once inside a weapon system, the cost benefit
calculation of the adversary would shift and incentivize vacating this cyber battlefield.
In effect, the concept of an air-gap would be restored and the weapon systems would
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be removed from contested cyberspace. With vigilance, good security practices, and
testing, we can prevent the adversary from deciding it will be worth their effort to
contest the cyber space of our weapon systems ever again.
5. Conclusion
Extending cyber war to the domain of our embedded weapon systems is a low-
risk high reward venture for our adversaries. We are currently at a disadvantage
while defending this terrain because our approach to weapon system acquisition and
design supposes these systems are free of adversarial interference. We risk losing our
ability to project conventional air power should an adversary sufficiently disrupt these
systems. However, due to the unique design of embedded weapon systems, there is an
opportunity to deter the adversary from contesting this space with key investments
in negative testing, requirements to block invalid and potentially malicious data, and
promising technologies such as attestation for embedded systems. These investments
would deter the adversary from contesting the cyberspace of our weapon systems,
providing the effect of an air-gap between them and the cyber battlefields of the DoD
Information Network and larger Internet.
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1.2 Motivation for Thesis
The preceding paper calls for rigorous negative testing. It states, “Rigorous neg-
ative testing on data busses inside our systems can reveal ... vulnerabilities and
correcting them will make it very difficult for cyber effects to spread through our
systems.” [23] This thesis advances the negative testing technique of fuzzing by pre-
senting a tool that improves test case selection compared to the tools and methods
in use by the Air Force today.
The paper also states that the Air Force must “Write requirements that require the
proper handling of invalid inputs” and “test that these requirements have been met”.
[23] To put such a requirement on contract, the Air Force needs to specify a testing
approach that can determine if invalid inputs are being handled properly. Every
possible invalid input cannot feasibly be tested, so it is important that the testing
approach provides high coverage to give testers confidence that if vulnerabilities exist,
they will be found.
Currently there is no way to quantitatively compare testing approaches, so it is
hard to say with confidence which approaches provide high coverage. This thesis
proposes a method for measuring the coverage of a fuzz test, thereby making it
possible to compare testing approaches. The proposed method also provides meaning
to the coverage metric, so that if a fuzz test provides 50% coverage, it can be said
that the test expects to uncover 50% of all existing vulnerabilities. This information
could allow for requirements that let the contractor decide the testing method and
instead require their system to be, for example, “fuzz tested to 90% coverage.” Not
only does this allow the contractor flexibility to meet the requirement, but it provides
risk managers with an indication of the probability that vulnerabilities remain in the
system.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
Broadly speaking, vulnerability discovery efforts can be placed into three cate-
gories based on the information available to the security tester: white box, gray box,
and black box testing. In white box testing, the tester has complete access to infor-
mation about the System Under Test (SUT). In black box testing the tester has little
or no information about the inner workings of the SUT, and can only observe the
outputs of the system for any applied input. Gray box testing is somewhere between
black and white box testing. Often gray box testing is associated with having access
to compiled binaries and some documentation and involves some reverse engineering
as well as black and white box testing techniques.
This thesis focuses on a technique used in black and gray box testing called fuzzing.
According to [22], “Fuzzing is the the process of sending intentionally invalid data to
a product in the hopes of triggering an error condition of fault.” More specifically,
this thesis focuses on protocol fuzzing as opposed to other types of fuzzing such as file
format fuzzing or web application fuzzing. Protocol fuzzing involves creating input
messages that do not meet the requirements of a protocol specification or standard,
injecting the bad messages onto a link, and then assessing the receiving system for
faults or unexpected behavior that may indicate a vulnerability is present.
The main focus of the thesis is the generation of input messages for this process.
It provides the following four contributions:
1. A coverage criterion and coverage calculator that quantitatively assess the ef-
fectiveness of a fuzz test. Section 1.5 introduces the basis for this criterion,
Chapter III is devoted to the development of this criterion and Section 4.2 dis-
cusses the implementation of the criterion in the form of a coverage calculator
application.
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2. A method of representing a protocol specification in an XML file called a data
model, and an application that converts this file to a C++ object for use by
other applications. Section 4.1 covers this method and application.
3. A generative fuzzing application that automatically generates a high coverage
test set based on a data model. This application is covered in Section 4.3.
4. A comparison of the coverage provided by a number of fuzz test sets that are
generated in a variety of ways. Chapter V is devoted to this topic.
1.4 Fuzzing Framework
A fuzz test consists of many different components. The tester needs a way to
create a set of fuzzed inputs, a method to assess the effectiveness of the test set, a
way to deliver the messages, and a means of assessing the messages’ impacts on the
SUT. A fuzzing framework can be used to encapsulate all of these aspects in a single
process. Figure 1 illustrates a general fuzzing framework and shows the input output
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Figure 1. An Overview of Protocol Fuzz Testing
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relations between components in the test. The figure was partially based on an image
found in [5]. The following list explains each component and its role in the thesis:
1. Protocol Recording: A recording of valid data being passed to the system
under test. These recordings can be mutated by a mutative fuzzer to generate
fuzz test cases. This thesis simulates protocol recordings by generating them in
specially designed spreadsheet tools. This method of fuzz testing is compared
to others in Chapter V.
2. Protocol Model: A model of the protocol specification that defines the mean-
ing of binary data in a data link. A generative fuzzer requires such a model to
build fuzz test cases. This model is also required to compute coverage. It is in
this model that a tester can convey knowledge of potentially vulnerable fields
or values. For this thesis, a protocol model is also called a data model and takes
the form of an XML document. The structure of this document is a modified
version of the Peach Pit format used by the fuzzing platform, Peach [10].
3. Mutative Fuzzer: A mutative fuzzer operates on a recording of valid traffic
of the protocol to be fuzzed. It mutates various aspects of these recordings
to make them invalid. The output of a mutative fuzzer is a set of test cases
to be tested against a system. If a data model for the protocol exists, the
coverage of these test cases can be calculated. In this thesis, the coverage of the
test sets generated by mutative fuzzers will be compared to those generated by
generative fuzzers in Chapter V.
4. Generative Fuzzer: A generative fuzzer takes the specification of the protocol,
or the data model, and builds test cases from it. This thesis involves building a
generative fuzzer, discussed in Section 4.3, that provides high coverage based on
the coverage criterion described in Chapter III. The generative fuzzing approach
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is compared to other approaches in Chapter V.
5. Test Set: A set of test cases to be applied to the system under test. These
messages can be generated by a mutative or generative fuzzer, or can even be
crafted manually. The coverage these test cases provide can be computed using
the coverage criterion described in Chapter III with knowledge of the protocol
model. Knowledge of the coverage of the test set can help the tester make
decisions about further testing and risk management.
6. System Under Test: The SUT is the hardware and software that is being
fuzzed in the fuzz test. In this thesis, the SUT primarily being considered is
a military data link radio and the other hardware and software systems that
process the data received from the link.
7. Agent: The agent is responsible for monitoring the SUT and detecting if a
vulnerability has been discovered. If so, the agent correlates the vulnerability
with the input that caused it. The agent can simply be a human monitoring
the system as the test progresses, but if the agent is automated, the test may
be able to run much faster. An automated agent also allows for a real-time
feedback loop from the agent to the test set generation element. This allows
for “smart fuzzing” where the test sets being applied are selected based on the
effect of previous tests. Unfortunately for the military data link systems under
consideration here, the creation of an automated agent is a major challenge.
Since this thesis focuses on the test set generation side of the framework, the
agent will not be discussed further in this thesis.
8. Coverage Calculator: The coverage calculator is an application that takes a
protocol model and a set of test cases and returns the coverage percentage of
those test cases based on the coverage criterion defined in Chapter III. For this
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thesis, a coverage calculator was created to demonstrate the feasibility of the
proposed coverage criterion. It is also used to compare different approaches to
test set generation in Chapter V.
Using this framework, at the conclusion of a fuzz test the tester will have not only
a list of potential vulnerabilities, but also a metric for the effectiveness of the test.
This metric will allow the tester and user of the system to understand the likelihood
that the test missed a vulnerability, and base further testing and operational decisions
on that knowledge. It is a definition of this metric that is the primary contribution
of this thesis.
1.5 Assessing Fuzz Tests
There is effectively an infinite number of test cases that can be applied to any
major system. Consider the navigation message of the Global Positioning System
— Standard Positioning Service (GPS-SPS). One sub-frame of this message is 300
bits long and takes 6 seconds to transmit [4]. This means that there are 2300 =
2.04 × 1090 possible sub-frames. At 6 seconds a piece it would take 1.22 × 1091
seconds or 3.87 × 1083 years to transmit every possibility. Considering the universe
is a mere 1.38× 1010 years old, such a test length is unacceptable. This is all before
considering that the GPS-SPS message consist of 5 sub-frames, some of which are
interpreted differently depending on when they are sent.
Since testing every possible input is not feasible, the tester must select a subset
of possible inputs to test. There is no obvious approach to selecting these inputs.
The tester, having some experience with the SUT, may have some inclinations about
inputs that could prove problimatic. And some inputs, like valid ones, would not
contribute to the fuzz test at all. The tester could manually create a test set based
on expertise with the system. This would be time consuming, but provide a short
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test that covers the most crucial inputs. A test set could also be generated randomly
by a computer. This method could quickly create many test cases, but their quality
wouldn’t be as good, relying on chance to generate the most suspicious inputs.
A further challenge is assessing the quality of a test set. The term “coverage” is
often used as an intuitive descriptor of the effectiveness of a test set, but this term has
yet to be precisely defined. A test set manually crafted by an expert with knowledge
of the protocol is bound to be more effective, and thus provide more coverage, than a
randomly generated set of the same size. But how would testers compare a manually
crafted set of 100 inputs to a randomly generated set of 10,000? Does the increased
number of randomly generated test cases make up for the lack of insight used in their
generation? What if the tester built a tool that automatically generated 1000 inputs
based on the most vulnerable areas of the protocol? How would its coverage compare?
The main reason these questions are difficult to answer is that there is no quan-
titative measure for the effectiveness, or coverage, of a fuzz test. In the literature,
the measure of effectiveness, or adequacy, of a test is called an adequacy criterion
or testing criterion [11], [29]. Colloquially, the effectiveness of a test as the test’s
coverage, and the method of measuring this coverage is reffered to as the coverage
criterion.
Software testing coverage criterion have been well researched and applied in the
past few decades, however these criterion are rarely applicable to fuzz testing. There
are two attempts to define a fuzzing coverage criterion in the literature. One, [14],
defines coverage based on state transitions, and the other [26], defines it based on
tester defined constraints extracted from the protocol specification. Both of these
approaches have advantages, but neither defines coverage in a way consistent with
what the term suggests. That is, if these criterions return a coverage of 100%, they
may still miss some vulnerabilities. Also, the meaning of any coverage value found
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based on these criterions requires an in depth understanding of what the criterion is
measuring exactly. They, and other coverage criterion approaches are discussed in
Chapter II.
In this thesis a new definition of coverage is proposed that is rooted in providing an
understandable metric that stands for something meaningful. By using such a metric,
a tester can make accurate assessments of the effectiveness of different methods of
fuzzed test set generation. Furthermore, a tester can make informed decisions about
how much to test, and can accurately assess the risk that a test missed vulnerability.
Since the goal of a fuzz test is to uncover vulnerabilities, it should be measured based
on its ability to do just that. Therefore this thesis proposes a coverage criterion with
the term coverage defined as the expected percent of existing vulnerabilities discovered
by a set of test cases.
This metric is not simple to calculate, but has real meaning if calculated success-
fully. For example, if a fuzz test is found to have a coverage of 90%, a tester can
say with confidence that, based on the information available, this test is expected to
uncover 90% of the existing vulnerabilities. Perhaps there is a more time consuming
and expensive test that could increase coverage to 95%. If the tester knows that the
first test found 9 vulnerabilities, it can be said that the second test expects to find
0.5 more vulnerabilities. Now the decision of whether or not to perform the more
expensive test can be made based on this quantitative information.
For this metric to be successful, it must be able to incorporate everything the tester
knows about a protocol and the nature of vulnerabilities in general. The metric cannot
possibly provide the exact number of vulnerabilities a test will uncover, that would
require knowing them ahead of the test, but it can provide a probabilistic estimate
based on all the information available. The more information about a protocol and
about how vulnerabilities manifest in protocols that is incorporated into the criterion,
20
the more accurate the criterion can be.
Chapter III derives the equations necessary to compute the coverage of a set of test
cases based on our definition of coverage. To do this, it makes some assumptions about
the nature of vulnerabilities, but it is designed to be adaptable to new information that
changes these assumptions. The method also allows for tester input about features of
the protocol that will influence the coverage metric. For example, known or suspected
vulnerable inputs can be supplied to the coverage calculator so that the increased
likelihood a vulnerability is present there is reflected in the metric.
In order to compute the coverage of any test set, a model for the associated
protocol must be created. The structure of this model, called a data model, is based
off the data model used in an existing commercial fuzzing framework. This model
carries all the information about the protocol structure and potentially vulnerable
inputs that the coverage calculator requires to compute an accurate coverage value.
The creation of this model is discussed in Chapter IV.
The newly created coverage criterion was implemented in a coverage calculator as
part of this thesis. The calculator demonstrates that the criterion is implementable,
and in Chapter V, the calculator is used to compare test set generation techniques and
to provide answers to some of the questions posed earlier such as: does 100 manually
crafted inputs or 1000 randomly generated cases provide more coverage?
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II. Related Work
In this chapter, the history of fuzzing will be briefly discussed as well as a snapshot
of the current state of the art in protocol fuzz testing. From there the chapter con-
siders two prominent fuzzing frameworks and explains how they influenced elements
of this thesis, and how they may or may not be applied to military data link systems.
The final section discusses the history of software test assessment and explains the
development of the coverage criterion concept. This section also considers, in-depth,
two coverage criterion for fuzz testing and explains why the criterion proposed in this
thesis is a necessary addition.
2.1 Fuzz Testing
2.1.1 In The Literature.
The first mention of fuzzing in the scientific literature dates back to 1990 when a
study sought to test the reliability of UNIX applications [18]. The researchers supplied
random character inputs to a number of applications and monitored for crashes. The
program they used to generate the random characters was called fuzz. Little more was
done in the decade until researchers at the university of Oulu began work on a test
suite called PROTOS in 1999 [13]. This set of tools was capable of delivering packets
that did not meet the proper protocol specifications. These malformed packets could
be used to test the robustness of network interfaces and expose implementation errors.
Shortly thereafter Dave Aitel introduced an open source fuzzer called SPIKE [8].
SPIKE allowed users to model network protocols with variable length data blocks,
making it easier to fuzz all levels of the protocol stack. SPIKE, and the block-based
approach to protocol modeling, became the foundation for the modern fuzzing tool
Sulley which is discussed later in this chapter.
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In the early 2000s the technique was extended from UNIX application fuzzing and
network protocol fuzzing to other types of application fuzzing. Web browser fuzzing
gained attention in 2004 when Michal Zalewski released a tool called mangleme [22],
[28]. The tool generated randomly mutated HTML pages to expose vulnerabilities
in web browsers. In 2005, Michael Sutton and Adam Greene from iDEFENSE labs
presented a variety of file fuzzing tools at Black Hat USA in 2005 [21]. These tools
allowed users to automatically generate corrupt files that could expose vulnerabilities
in the applications that use them.
In the 2010s protocol fuzzing research has focused on developing tools that lever-
age as much information as possible to generate fuzz sets that cover as much of a
protocol as they can, or are simple to implement and require little human effort to
operate. Despite tools tailored for many different applications and industries, little
or no published fuzzing research is tailored to military data link systems. This is not
surprising given the sensitive nature of such systems. There are however a variety of
tools that, while they may not be directly useful, illustrate that types of innovative
fuzzing implementations that are feasible in similar systems. It is important to have
a good understanding of the state of the art in this regard so that testers can envision
the types of tools that may be designed and employed for military data link systems.
Three such innovative tools are described here:
 AutoFuzz is a type of mutative fuzzer called an in-line fuzzer. This type of fuzzer
sits between two communicating entities and mutates some messages flowing
between them in real time. In the case of AutoFuzz, the fuzzer sits between
a server and client. The tool learns the syntax of the protocol automatically
by observing valid messages pass between the server and client for a period of
time. At some point it begins to apply mutations to packets passing through
the system, fuzzing either the server or the client. An illustration of this system
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is shown in Figure 2. This type of self-learning, plug and play fuzzing tool is
an intriguing concept that may also be implementable for military data link
systems. [12]
Figure 2. The set-up of the in-line fuzzer, AutoFuzz. This image was retrieved from
[12].
 T-Fuzz is a generative fuzzer designed for use in telecommunication networks.
The fuzzer is integrated into a conformance testing framework that is already
in use in the industry. This existing framework happens to include protocol
models; T-Fuzz leverages this fact by extracting these existing models and pro-
ducing fuzzed messages based on them. The fuzzer is also integrated with the
existing test delivery mechanism. A diagram of T-Fuzz and its interaction with
the conformance testing tool TTCN-3 is shown in Figure 3. The approach taken
by T-Fuzz shows how a fuzz testing tool can be integrated into an existing con-
formance testing tool. The approach also avoids the tedious task of protocol
modeling by extracting existing models from the testing framework. [16]
 Another fuzzing approach involves leveraging research into taint analysis to
direct fuzz testing towards the most vulnerable network data. Taint analysis is
a program analysis technique that tracks user input data throughout a program
and system; the idea being that this data is a likely source of unwanted inputs,
or taint. This fuzzing approach tracks tainted packets and data in a network
and fuzzes them. By targeting this type of data, the researchers hope to more
quickly identify vulnerabilities in a network. This type of targeted fuzzing
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Figure 3. The set-up of the generative fuzzer, T-Fuzz. This image was retrieved from
[16].
can be envisioned in military data link systems. For example, if information
from untrustworthy external sources could be tracked and exclusively fuzzed,
high risk susceptibilities may be found more quickly than if fuzzing is applied
uniformly. [9]
2.1.2 In Practice.
While fuzzing frameworks specific to military data links do not appear in the
literature, general purpose frameworks offer an opportunity to use existing tools to
fuzz such links. A good overview of general purpose tools can be found in a report
on securing critical infrastructure commissioned by the European Union. The report,
[5], is focused in part on the protocol fuzzing of industrial control systems, often
embedded systems.
Industrial control systems face some of the same challenges as military data link
systems when it comes to fuzz testing. First of all, both are predominantly embedded
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systems that a built for specific tasks. This means that they lack some of the general
purpose features of traditional computer networks. As a result, it is far more difficult
to apply traditional fuzzing tools and error monitoring applications to these systems.
Rather, system specific tools must be developed to fuzz test and observe the status
of these systems.
Secondly, these systems employ a large variety of complex, often proprietary,
protocols that are not found in conventional computer networks. Since these protocols
are less prevalent, existing fuzzing tools do not support them. These protocols have
less exposure in academia and to security researchers more broadly so vulnerability
testing is performed on them far less often.
In light of these challenges, the report highlights two fuzzing frameworks that are
widely used and may be adaptable to embedded system fuzzing. The preeminence
of these two frameworks is confirmed by their mention elsewhere in the literature,
including in the three aforementioned modern fuzzing applications, [9], [12], and [16],
and cyber-security researchers awareness of them in general. The two tools are Sulley,
[7], and Peach, [10].
2.1.2.1 Sulley.
Sulley is an open source, Python based, fuzzing framework that consists of many
components [7]. The framework provides tools to generate fuzzed messages, deliver
them, and monitor the network and receiving applications for adverse effects. To
generate fuzzed data, Sulley takes a block based approach like that of the original
open source fuzzer, SPIKE [8]. The user is able to model a protocol using simple or
complex field types that can then be individually mutated. The block based approach
also allows the user to model dependencies between fields like checksums.
Sulley natively supports delivering fuzzed messages via TCP, UDP and SSL. Other
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delivery mechanisms are possible but require the user to program a python module.
State modeling of the network protocols is also supported allowing the fuzzer to handle
more complex protocol interactions. Sulley places a large emphasis on monitoring
capabilities. These tend to focus on packet capture and analysis as well as application
fault detection tools.
The block based method for protocol modeling may be adaptable to military
data link protocols. If such a method was implemented, Sulley could be used to
automatically generate test cases based on a model. However, Sulley may not be very
helpful from that point onward. Since many data link protocols do not use TCP or
UDP, travel over common data link layer standards like Ethernet or IEEE 802.11,
or are even packet based; the delivery mechanisms native to Sulley are not of much
use. Similarly, Sulley’s monitoring capabilities focus on traditional packet switched
computer networks and would not be useful in the embedded systems like military
data links. For these reasons, Sulley was not pursued as a fuzzing framework for this
thesis.
2.1.2.2 Peach.
Peach is a fuzzing framework that has been in development since 2004 [10]. An
open source community version exists as well as a commercial version. Peach takes a
different approach to protocol modeling than Sulley. Its approach involves the devel-
opment of an XML document called a Peach Pit. A Peach Pit contains information
about the protocol to be fuzzed including information about the data fields as well
as state information for more dynamic protocols.
Peach contains a larger set of built in delivery mechanisms than Sulley, and custom
mechanisms can be written if necessary. Peach also has some monitoring capabilities,
called agents, that can attach debuggers to a target process or monitor for error
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messages or other signs that a target has been affected.
Like Sulley, the delivery and monitoring features of Peach are not particularly
applicable to military data link fuzzing, but modeling these protocols with Peach Pits
is feasible. The data model inside a Peach Pit is designed to be human readable and
is implemented in a flexible XML structure. For this reason, the Peach Pit was chosen
as a starting point for the protocol models developed in this thesis. More discussion
on this is found in Section 4.1.1. Unfortunately the fuzzing functions, called mutators,
that Peach applies to the data model to generate fuzz test sets are all designed with
traditional computer network protocols in mind. The Peach framework does allow
for the development of custom mutators; such a step would be necessary before using
Peach in a military data link fuzz test.
2.2 Adequacy Criterion
2.2.1 In Software Testing.
Software testing has been around as long as software has. As early as the 1970s,
researchers tried to identify the best methods for selecting test cases to test programs
for errors and bugs. The fundamental question arrived at by these efforts was “What
is the test criterion”, that is, what is measured to determine the adequacy of a test
[11]. In the 1990s a survey paper, [29], identified various test criterion that have been
proposed and how they can be used to demonstrate test adequacy. This paper further
uses the term coverage with regards to the idea of test adequacy. For example, if the
test adequacy criterion is to exercise every statement in a program, this criterion is
called the statement coverage criterion. A percentage can be used to describe how
many of the statements have been exercised in a test to indicate how adequately
testing has been performed.
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2.2.2 In Fuzzing.
Software testing criterion tend to focus on white-box testing, that is using infor-
mation about the source code of the software under test to develop test cases and
measure coverage [19]. There are not many definitions of adequacy criterion for the
black box case. It seems in most cases when black box fuzzing methods are developed,
their adequacy criterion is not defined, and the measure of effectiveness of their meth-
ods is based on how many new vulnerabilities they were able to find as in [17], [15]
and [25], or the fact that they can generate any possible input even though generating
every input would be infeasible as in [16].
In a couple of cases, the adequacy criterion and coverage measures were defined
for black box fuzzing. First, [14] represents network protocol specifications as finite
state machines and has an adequacy criterion of all transitions fuzzed. It also defines
the adequacy criterion of all message types fuzzed, but claims this is inferior to the
transition criterion because it ignores the state machine nature of the protocol. This
criterion hinges on the system under test being easily and sufficiently modelled using a
finite state machine which may be difficult due to the black box nature of the system.
Second, [26] defines semi-valid input coverage (SVCov) for fuzz testing and claims
that it is the first coverage criterion for fuzz testing. The core idea behind SVCov
is that the protocol specification can be written as a finite set of constraints on the
input messages. Since effective fuzzing requires inputs that at least vaguely resemble
valid messages so that they do not get immediately dropped by the receiving system,
SVCov only measures how many test cases break one and only one of the constraints
on the input set. This is why the method is named semi-valid input coverage.
This approach has many strengths. First of all, the method is straight forward;
once a set of constraints is derived from a protocol specification, the coverage compu-
tation is simply the number of constraints broken by the test set divided by the total
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number of constraints. Second, the method is generic enough to cover most types
of fuzzing including file fuzzing, software input fuzzing, as well as protocol fuzzing.
Finally, SVCov operates only a set of test cases; it is not tied to the method used to
generate them. This allows it to fit in the fuzzing framework described in Section 1.4.
The method takes two inputs: a protocol specification (used to derive the constraints)
and the set of test cases, and returns one output: the coverage value, a percentage
between 0% and 100%.
Despite these strengths, this coverage criterion has a few faults that may preclude
it from being considered a viable measure of test set effectiveness. First, the authors
acknowledge that the creation of a non-redundant set of constraints may be challeng-
ing for complex protocols. Since the method does not consider any test cases that
break two or more constraints, if two constraints are redundant so that neither can
be broken while the other is not, these constraints will never be covered. Data link
protocols are complex, and it is probably a non-trivial effort to derive non-redundant
constraints.
Second, the relation between the coverage value and the proportion of existing
vulnerabilities the test set should uncover is hard to discern. The tester would know
that a test set with an SVCov score of 90% can be expected to uncover more vulnera-
bilities than a test set with a score of 60%. But counter-intuitively, the test set scoring
90% by no means has tested 90% of the invalid inputs, nor is it expected to find 90%
of the vulnerabilities, nor has it a 90% chance of finding a vulnerability. The 90%
figure is instead based on an abstract representation of the protocol as constraints.
It may be hard to base further testing decisions on this figure.
Third, the authors also acknowledge that 100% coverage based on SVCov is in
no way a guarantee that all existing vulnerabilities existing in the protocol have
been exposed. Consider these two examples of invalid inputs that may trigger a
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vulnerability, but would not be covered by the SVCov metric.
1. A protocol has a constraint that says a message may be no more than 3 words
long and another constraint that says a command word may not appear more
than twice in a message. A vulnerability is triggered when four or more com-
mand words appear in the same message. Any test case that would discover this
vulnerability would break both constraints and therefore provide no coverage
under SVCov.
2. A protocol has a “second” field in which the second of the current minute is
reported. A constraint that says the value in this field may not exceed 59.
Another field rates the confidence in the value being reported in the first field.
Unbeknown to the tester that derived the constraints, the SUT only processes
the “second” field if the confidence level in the other field is high enough. A
test case that breaks the constraint and sends a second value of 62, but includes
a low confidence value, is not processed by the SUT, but is marked as covering
the broken constraint. Thus, a test set may break every constraint, but leave a
vulnerability undiscovered.
As the authors suggest, SVCov is best when paired with other coverage criterion
to accurately assess the effectiveness of a fuzz test. Unfortunately very few such
criterion exist. In [26], the authors go on to suggest a number of non-fuzzing specific
criterion that may apply, but these tend to focus on white box testing methods that
require access to source code.
2.2.3 Fundamental Axioms.
Eight fundamental axioms of software testing adequacy are laid out by [27] and
can be used as a basis for building a coverage criterion. Axioms one, three and four
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from this paper are applicable to fuzz testing (the other five are not) and [26] adds a
another axiom specific to fuzz testing. Together they are:
1. Applicability: There is at least one finite set of test cases that is adequate, that
is it provides 100% coverage.
2. Monotonicity: If a test set is enlarged its coverage may not decrease.
3. Inadequacy of the Empty Set: The empty test set provides zero coverage.
4. Fuzz-test coverage: A test set consisting of only valid inputs achieves zero cov-
erage
Any fuzzing coverage criterion must meet these fundamental axioms. This the-
sis presents a new approach that satisfies these fundamental axioms and provides
a coverage criterion designed to be an accurate reflection of the thoroughness of a
test set. Unlike the approach taken in [14], this approach does not use a finite state
model. Doing so would increase the robustness of the analysis, but would be diffi-
cult to achieve for the black-box case where state information is often unattainable.
This new approach does not require any constraints to be manually defined as in [26]
except a delineation between the valid and invalid inputs for each field.
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III. Creating the Criterion
In this chapter a coverage criterion for fuzz testing called ExCov is presented.
This thesis defines coverage as the expected percent of existing vulnerabilities discov-
ered by a set of test cases. To develop the criterion, this definition is unpacked and
implemented. In this chapter, a procedure is created that takes as inputs a set of test
cases and a data model and returns a value between 0% and 100%. This value is the
best estimate of the expected percentage of existing vulnerabilities that test set would
discover when applied to a SUT using the protocol in question. The equations and
procedures presented in this chapter are implemented in a comprehensive example in
Appendix C.
The approach taken in this chapter treats a protocol as a set of fields. A vulner-
ability in the protocol is assumed to manifest in either one field, or a combination of
fields. For example, if a SUT has a vulnerability where a value of 0xFFFF in field 6
triggers an error state; that vulnerability would be said to reside in field 6. If an error
state is only entered if field 5 has a value of 0x42 AND field 6 has a value of 0xFFFF,
then the vulnerability is said to reside in the field combination of fields 5 and 6.
This difference between fields and field combinations will be covered extensively
later in the chapter, but it is important to understand how vulnerabilities are classified
so the approach taken to compute coverage is clear. The ExCov procedure starts
with the idea of field coverage. That is, the coverage of each individual field can
be calculated in isolation. By limiting the scope of the coverage calculation to a
single field, the necessary equations and procedures to compute coverage are easier to
derive and explain. This is done in Section 3.1. Once the procedures and equations
for computing the coverage of each field are presented, the coverage values must be
combined to arrive at the coverage for all fields. This is done in Section 3.2.1.
Vulnerabilities are not necessarily restricted to only one field however. As in the
33
previous example, some vulnerabilities may span multiple fields. These vulnerabilities
are called multi-order vulnerabilities. More specifically, an N th order vulnerability
spans N fields. To handle these vulnerabilities, a procedure was created to measure
coverage for field combinations. Notationally, a field combination of N fields is said
to be an N th order field combination. Coverage of multi-order field combinations is
presented in Section 3.2.2, with special cases handled in Section 3.2.3. The coverage
values for fields and field combinations must be combined to reach a total coverage
value for the test set. This is done in Section 3.2.4.
An underpinning mechanic of this coverage calculation method is the modeling of
vulnerabilities in general. An approach to this task is shown in Section 3.3. Finally,
Section 3.4 synthesizes the information from the rest of the chapter into a step by
step procedure for calculating coverage.
3.1 Field Coverage
This thesis defines field coverage as the expected percentage of existing vulnerabil-
ities in a field discovered by a set of test cases. This definition needs to be unpacked.
First, the meaning of the term discovers needs to be clarified. A test case is said
to discover some vulnerability V if it is the first test case in a test set to test a value
that triggers V . For example, consider a field where a vulnerability V is triggered if
a 5, 6, or 7 is tested. A test set of three test cases is applied. The first test case tests
a value of 4, the second test case tests a value of 7, and the third test case tests a
value of 6. Test case 1 does not discover V because it does not test 5, 6, or 7. Test
case 3 does not discover V because V was already discovered when the test case was
applied. Test case 2 does discover V since it was the first test case to test 5, 6, or 7.
A vulnerability is discovered by a set of test cases if it is discovered by any test case
in the set of test cases.
34
Second, the term expected refers to the concept of probabilistic expectation. This
implies that there is some sort of randomness or unknown parameter in the fuzz test
over which an expectation can be found. Consider the contrary case of an omniscient
coverage calculator, that is, a calculator that knows all test case inputs and all vul-
nerabilities in the protocol. In this case, the number of vulnerabilities a set of test
cases discovers can be found directly, and therefore field coverage definition no longer
requires the expected qualifier. The percentage of existing vulnerabilities in a field
discovered by a set of test cases can be directly computed.
In Section 3.1.1 a field is considered where the vulnerabilities are known, but
the test cases are randomly selected. In this case, field coverage can be accurately
calculated with a random model for test case selection. Derived from this example
are the equations necessary to calculate field coverage for any number of random test
cases in a field with known vulnerabilities.
Of course, if the vulnerabilities are known, fuzz testing is unnecessary. Further,
this set-up for a coverage calculator is not the one presented in the fuzzing framework
in Section 1.4. In that framework, the test cases are known to the calculator, but
the vulnerabilities in a field are not. To account for these unknown vulnerabilities, a
probabilistic model for vulnerabilities in general is created in Section 3.3.
To find the equations that measure field coverage under this framework, the equa-
tions that compute field coverage in Section 3.1.1 are modified to shift from expecta-
tion over random test cases to expectation over the random model for vulnerabilities.
This is done in Section 3.1.2. The equations arrived at in Section 3.1.2 are sometimes
not directly applicable to special types of fields or fields where the tester has some
information about possible vulnerabilities. Three of these cases that arose during the
course of this thesis are described and accounted for in Section 3.1.3.
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3.1.1 Coverage With Known Vulnerabilities.
This section considers a made-up field where the vulnerabilities are known, but
the test cases are randomly selected. The primary purpose of this section is to derive
basic equations for field coverage, but it also serves as an introduction to many of
the terms created for this thesis and used throughout this chapter to describe the
abstract concepts behind crafting a fuzz testing criterion. A list of these terms and
their definitions can be found in Appendix A.
The field used in this section and its associated spaces are shown in Figure 4. The
field contains 5 bits, so there are 25 or 32 possible values this field can take. The
protocol standard for this field does not allow two ones to be adjacent to each other.
All values that satisfy the standard are considered elements in the field’s valid space.
If a value does not satisfy the standard, and is therefore not in the valid space, it is
in the invalid space
Notationally, any space associated with a field is a set with elements that are the
values the field can take on. In this field, the invalid space is set I where:
I = {00011, 00110, 00111, 01011, 01100, 01101, 01110, 01111, 10011, 10110,
10111, 11000, 11001, 11010, 11011, 11100, 11101, 11110, 11111}
Figure 4. An illustration of the spaces associated with a five bit field
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Usually in this thesis field values will be represented in decimal, not binary. This way
I can be more clearly defined as:
I = {3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31}
It is much more common in this chapter for the cardinality of I, denoted |I| to be
used than I alone. This simply means the number of elements in I. For this field
|I| = 19.
The invalid space of a field may contain zero, one or many vulnerabilities. In this
example, the vulnerabilities present in this field are known. Three vulnerabilities can
be triggered by values in this field:
Vulnerability 1: There are exactly three adjacent ones.
Vulnerability 2: All bits are ones.
Vulnerability 3: The last three bits are ones.
The set of values that trigger a specific vulnerability make up what is called the specific
vulnerability space of that vulnerability. For example, the specific vulnerability space
of vulnerability 1, call it V1 is:
V1 = {00111, 01110, 10111, 11100, 11101} = {7, 14, 23, 28, 29}
The cardinality of these spaces is also important. For this vulnerability, |V1| = 5.
The cardinality of a space will also be called the size of a space in this thesis. Note
that specific vulnerability spaces are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The value 7
is in both V1 and V3.
The vulnerability space is the set of all values that trigger a vulnerability. In
general, a vulnerability space is the union of all specific vulnerability spaces. For this
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field, vulnerability space V , is:
V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3 = {7, 14, 15, 23, 28, 29, 31}
In this section, field coverage for this field will be calculated for test sets with 1
to 19 randomly selected test cases. The values for the test cases will always be in
the invalid space of the field, with each invalid value having an equal probability of
selection. Since field coverage is defined as the expected percentage of vulnerabilities
discovered, probabilistic expectation will be incorporated into the calculation. This
will allow the randomness of the inputs to be handled theoretically and remove the
need for any simulation.
The calculation will begin by finding the coverage of only one random test case
in Section 3.1.1.1, then it will extend this to a test set of two random test cases in
Section 3.1.1.2. Finally the calculation will be extended to incorporate any number
of test cases in Section 3.1.1.3.
3.1.1.1 One Test Case.
Before starting the field coverage calculation some variables need be defined:
Ki: the number of vulnerabilities discovered by test case i
N : the number of vulnerabilities present in the field
P ij : the probability that test case i discovers exactly j vulnerabilities
From these definitions, the expected number of vulnerabilities discovered by test
case 1 can be simply denoted as E[K1]. Using the definition of expected value, the
expected number of vulnerabilities discovered by test case 1 can be calculated as:
E[K1] =
N∑
n=0
nP 1n (1)
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By examining Figure 4, the number of vulnerabilities each value in the invalid
space will discover can be easily found. Since each value is equally likely to be tested,
the probability the first test case will discover 0, 1, and 2 vulnerabilities can be found.
This is all shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Possible outcomes from the first test case broken down by number of vulner-
abilities discovered
Number of vulnerabilities
discovered
0 1 2
Test cases that discover
them
11000,11001,00011,
01011,11011,10011,
11010,00110,11110,
10110,01101,01100
01110,01111,11101,
11100
00111,11111,10111
Probability of discovering
that many vulnerabilities
P 10 = 12/19 P
1
1 = 4/19 P
1
2 = 3/19
Applying (1) to the example, the expected number of vulnerabilities discovered
by one test case can be found.
E[K1] =
N∑
n=0
nP 1n = 0 (12/19) + 1 (4/19) + 2 (3/19) + 3 (0) = 10/19 (2)
From the definition of field coverage, the coverage of the first test case, call this
C1, is the expected percentage of vulnerabilities found by the first test case. There-
fore by dividing the number of discovered vulnerabilities, K1 by the total number of
vulnerabilities, N , the field coverage for one test case is found.
C1 = E
[
K1
N
]
=
E[K1]
N
=
10/19
3
= 17.5% (3)
There is another way to calculate coverage that is less straightforward but is easier
to implement than the previous approach. It involves looking at which vulnerabil-
ities a test case will uncover instead of how many. First, consider the expression
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j ) where Ti is a set of one value, test case i, and V˜j is undiscovered vul-
39
nerability j. This reads as the probability that the value of test case i is in the specific
vulnerability space of the so far undiscovered vulnerability j. Said more simply, the
probability test case i discovers Vj.
The probability the first test case discovers vulnerability j is simply:
Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜j) = |Vj||I| (4)
Using (4) and Figure 4, the probability each vulnerability is discovered for the
field is:
Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜1) = 5/19 Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜2) = 1/19 Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜3) = 4/19 (5)
Notice that the sum of these probabilities is also the expected number of vulner-
abilities found:
N∑
n=1
Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜n) = 5/19 + 1/19 + 4/19 = 10/19 = E [K1] (6)
The proof in Figure 5 shows that this new way to calculate the expected number
of vulnerabilities found in (6) is equivalent to the more straightforward way in (2).
That is:
E [Ki] =
N∑
n=0
nP in =
N∑
n=1
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n) (7)
3.1.1.2 Two Test Cases.
The coverage of the field for two test cases is a bit trickier to compute. First it must
realized that Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜j) depends on Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜j) because if test case 1 discovers
a vulnerability, test case 2 can’t discover that vulnerability. Therefore Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜j)
becomes:
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Let I be the set of all distinct values in the invalid space, and let Ti be a set of
cardinality 1 where Ti ⊆ I and Ti represtents the value tested by test case i.
Let V˜1, V˜2, . . . , V˜N be subsets of I, the specific vulnerability spaces that have yet
to be discovered.
Let V˜j = ∅ if Tk ⊆ V˜j for any 1 < k < i, and any 1 < j < N . That is, if
vulnerability j has been discovered by a previous test case, V˜j is the empty set
since V˜j represents specific vulnerability spaces not yet discovered.
Let the cardinality of the intersection between Ti and V˜j be denoted Xi,j:
Xi,j =
∣∣∣Ti ∩ V˜j∣∣∣
That is, Xi,j = 1 if test case i discovers vulnerability j, and Xi,j = 0 otherwise.
From this definition it follows that:
Pr (Xi,j = 1) = Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j)
It also follows that the number of vulnerabilities discovered by test case i, Ki, can
be represented as:
Ki =
N∑
n=1
Xi,n
The expected number of vulnerabilities discovered by test case i is therefore:
E [Ki] = E
[
N∑
n=1
Xi,n
]
By the linearity of the expectation operator:
E
[
N∑
n=1
Xi,n
]
=
N∑
n=1
E [Xi,n]
By the definition of expected value:
E [Xi,n] =
1∑
m=0
m · Pr (Xi,n = m) = 1 · Pr (Xi,n = 1) = Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n)
Therefore:
E [Ki] =
N∑
n=1
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n)
Figure 5. Proof for the alternate definition of expected number of vulnerabilities found
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Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜j) = Pr (Discovering Vj ∩ Vj not discovered yet) (8)
= Pr (Discovering Vj | Vj not discovered yet )Pr (Vj not discovered yet)
Pr (Discovering Vj | Vj not discovered yet ) is the probability test case 2 discov-
ers Vj, when test case 1 did not. This is simply the size of the vulnerability, |Vj|
divided by one less than the size of the invalid space, |I|, since there are one less
values to choose from for the second test case. Pr (Vj not discovered yet) is simply
1− Pr (Vj discovered already) = 1− Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜j)
So in general for test case 2:
Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜j) = |Vj||I| − 1
(
1− Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜j)
)
(9)
For the example:
Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜1) = 5
18
(
1− 5
19
)
= 0.20 (10)
Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜2) = 1
18
(
1− 1
19
)
= 0.05 (11)
Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜3) = 4
18
(
1− 4
19
)
= 0.18 (12)
Using (7):
E [K2] =
N∑
n=1
Pr(T2 ⊆ V˜n) = 0.20 + 0.05 + 0.18 = 0.43 (13)
Coverage of a field with two test cases is the expected number of vulnerabilities
discovered by either test case divided by the total number of vulnerabilities, therefore:
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C2 =
E [K1] + E [K2]
N
= 32.0% (14)
3.1.1.3 M Test Cases.
Using the same logic as above, these equations can be extended to any number of
test cases:
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) =

|Vj |
|I| , i = 1
|Vj |
|I|−i+1
(
1−∑i−1k=1 Pr(Tk ⊆ V˜j)) , i > 1 (15)
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
E [Ki] =
1
N
m∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n) (16)
Figure 6 shows the application of (15) and (16) to the field. The figure plots the
coverage of C1, C2, . . . , C|I|, or test sets of size 1, 2, . . ., 19. As expected, coverage only
increases as more test cases are added. Since later test cases have a higher chance of
having values in the specific vulnerability spaces of already discovered vulnerabilities,
they have less of a chance of discovering new vulnerabilities. This means that they
provide less marginal coverage. This can be seen in the figure as each successive test
set size produces smaller increases in coverage.
3.1.2 Estimating Coverage.
The field coverage equations (15) and (16) are of little direct use. Testers will not
have access to the underlying vulnerability space; if they did fuzz testing would be
unnecessary. Testers will not have any way of finding |Vj| or N , so (15) and (16) can
not be computed.
However by making some observations and assumptions about the nature of vul-
nerability spaces and, by extension, the values of |Vj| and N an estimate of coverage
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Figure 6. Coverage of the five bit example field
can be found. Research into real vulnerabilities in protocols can reveal information
about the general nature of vulnerability spaces and help focus these assumptions,
but this information is difficult to quickly aggregate. Working with the information
available, a best guess can be made for the underlying distribution of vulnerabilities,
and a coverage value can be computed from these estimates.
Looking at (15) and (16) it can be seen that the size of each vulnerability, |Vj|, and
the number of vulnerabilities, N , are the two variables that contain information about
the vulnerability space. Therefore, these are the two variables that a probabilistic
estimate of vulnerabilities must account for.
Further analysis reveals that coverage, Cm, depends on the distribution of vulner-
ability sizes alone and not the number of vulnerabilities, in other words, Cm depends
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on |Vj| but not directly on N . For example, fields where 50% of the vulnerabilities
are of size S1 and 50% of the vulnerabilities are of size S2 both tested with m test
cases, will always have the same coverage regardless of N .
This is shown in the following equations. First consider that, based on (15),
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) depends on the size of the vulnerability, |Vj|, but nothing else about Vj.
Therefore:
If |Va| = |Vb|, then Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜a) = Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜b) (17)
Next, let half of the vulnerabilities be of size S1, call them Vodd, so that |Vodd| = S1.
Let the rest be of size S2, call them Veven, so that |Veven| = S2.. Then (16) can be
simplified to remove its dependence on N .
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
( ∑
j is odd
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) +
∑
j is even
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j)
)
(18)
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
(
N
2
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜1) + N
2
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜2)
)
(19)
Cm =
m∑
i=1
(
1
2
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜1) + 1
2
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜2)
)
(20)
Coverage therefore depends on the distribution of vulnerability sizes and not char-
acteristics of the individual vulnerabilities or the number of total vulnerabilities. A
probabilistic model of these vulnerability sizes can be built that allows coverage to
be calculated based on what is known about vulnerabilities in general instead of the
specific vulnerabilities of the field in question.
That model can come in the form of a Probability Mass Function (PMF) which
describes the probability a vulnerability has a certain size. Formally, let X be a
random variable that maps specific vulnerability spaces to their cardinality, |Vj|. Due
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to the definition of specific vulnerability spaces, X must take on a value between 1 and
|I|. The distribution of this PMF is determined by the nature of all vulnerabilities
as well as any specific information the tester has about the fields in question.
Using this PMF the approach taken to find equations (15) and (16) can be re-
assessed. Instead of random test cases with known vulnerabilities, lets assume that
each vulnerability size, |Vj| is a random draw from the distribution described by the
PMF. Then the probability test case i discovers vulnerability j becomes:
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) =
|I|∑
x=1
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j AND x = |Vj|) (21)
=
|I|∑
x=1
Pr(|Vj| = x)Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j | x = |Vj|) (22)
=
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j | x = |Vj|) (23)
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j | x = |Vj|) is simply (15) with x replacing every |Vj|. It can be
rewritten as a new function R (x, i) that is a substitution into (15). This function is
shown in (24).
R (x, i) =

x
|I| i = 1
x
|I|−i+1
(
1−∑i−1k=1 R (x, k)) i > 1 (24)
Using this function in (23):
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) =
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (25)
Once this is substituted into (16), there is no longer any dependence on the index
of the vulnerability (j in (15) and n in (16) ). This makes sense because the vulnera-
bilities are modeled using the PMF instead of finding coverage for N specific known
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vulnerabilities. This allows for the following simplification:
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (26)
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
N
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (27)
Cm =
m∑
i=1
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (28)
With the dependence on N removed, there is no longer any dependence on un-
knowable values. This allows the field coverage calculation shown in (29) to be applied
to any field that does not require special modifications discussed later in this chapter.
Cm =
m∑
i=1
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (29)
Figure 7. Coverage of a field with |I| = 100 for all possible test set sizes using the
vulnerability model described by (30)
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As an example to illustrate how to compute field coverage using a model for
vulnerability sizes, consider a field which has an invalid space with |I| = 100. Nothing
about the vulnerabilities present in this specific field are known, but a model for
vulnerabilities in general says, simply, 25% of vulnerabilities have a size of 1, 25%
have a size of 5, and 50% cover the entire invalid space. This model for vulnerability
sizes would look like:
fX(x) = 0.25δ(x− 1) + 0.25δ(x− 5) + 0.5δ(x− |I|) (30)
where δ(x) is the discrete unit impulse function. When applied to the estimated
coverage equations, (24) and (29), the curve in Figure 7 is produced.
A much better model for vulnerability sizes is described in Section 3.3. Using
that model, and equations (24) and (29), field coverage for a set of test cases can be
calculated for fields that are not considered special cases.
3.1.3 Special Cases.
3.1.3.1 Structure Fields.
Fields that contain information about how a message is structured or interpreted
are defined as structure fields in this thesis. Sometimes these fields have valid and
invalid spaces that can not be simply defined based on valid and invalid values. For
example, consider the 3 bit “Number of Words” field in the restaurant locator protocol
described in Table 12 on page 151. This field is a structure field because it is related
to the number of blocks of fields (called words for this protocol) to follow. A value
greater than five in this field is always invalid because there are only five words that
are allowed to follow the first word. A value of say, two, is only valid if two words
follow the first word. So if in one message the field has a value of two, but three
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words follow, the field is invalid. But the next message could have the same value of
two, with two words following and therefore be valid.
Clearly the field coverage calculation for basic fields, (24) and (29), cannot be
applied if values are valid or invalid depending on more than just the value itself. For
these fields, valid and invalid spaces will be computed differently. With an accurate
definition of these spaces, the same approach used previously to compute the coverage
of a basic field can be applied to a structure field as well.
For this thesis only one type of structure field, a repeating relation field, required
a special invalid space definition. Other structure fields can be defined using the data
model described in Chapter IV that would require a unique definition of their invalid
space, but due to time restraints and a lack of a direct need, these definitions were not
developed. Some examples of such a structure field types would be the total length
and checksum fields of the IPv4 protocol.
A repeating relation field is a field whose value dictates the number of times a
block of fields repeats. The “Number of Words” field in the Restaurant Locator
Protocol is an example of such a field. This type of field is defined in a data model
by using the “Relation” element with three attributes:
1. type: the type of relation; for a repeating relation field this is “count”, a
reference to the count of the number of times the linked block repeats. This
attribute comes from the Peach language.
2. of: the block that is repeating, also from the peach language [10].
3. adjustment: the difference between the number of times the related block
repeats and the value in the field. This attribute was added to handle cases
where this value is not zero.
The block that repeats has two attributes that are also necessary for determining
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the repeating relation field’s valid and invalid spaces. They are the “minOccur” and
“maxOccur” attributes, and describe the number of possible times a block can repeat.
It is important to note that this is not the mininum and maximum number of times
it is allowed to repeat per the standard, but the minimum and maximum times it
can repeat given testing, hardware and SUT parsing limitations. For example, the
Restaurant Locator protocol has a minOccurs of 1 and a maxOccurs of 8 for its
Outer Repeating Block. Any more than 6 repeats would be invalid, but it is known
or suspected that the SUT may accept as many words as any value in the “Number of
Words” field would allow. Perhaps the standard was written to allow for more words
to be added later as needed, and the SUT will try to process up to 8 words.
With knowledge of the relation’s set-up, the valid and invalid spaces can be cre-
ated. For repeating relation fields, a test case where the field has a value of two, and
the related block repeats 3 times, is distinctly different from the test case where the
field has a value of two and the related block repeats 4 times. Thus these two cases
are separate elements in the field’s valid or invalid space. Another possibility is that,
due to a choice somewhere in the data model, the related field is missing from the
test case. This type of occurrence is definitely invalid, and it is considered a unique
element of the invalid space for every possible number of times the related block can
repeat. Figure 8 shows the adjusted valid and invalid spaces for the repeating relation
field, Number of Words in the Restaurant Locator Protocol.
3.1.3.2 Numeric Fields.
Another unique type of field that is worth re-evaluating is a numeric field. In this
type of field, values have a numerical meaning defined by the protocol standard. For
example, consider a field in a protocol that represents the number of years since 2000
when the message is being sent. The field is 8 bits long so theoretically any year from
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Figure 8. The spaces associated with the Number of Words field from the Restaurant
Locator Protocol
2000 to 2255 can be represented. The system is designed to last until 2075, so a value
in this field above 75 is unexpected and therefore invalid. It could be imagined that
the system might combine this information with a day and a month from some other
fields and compute a day of the week. If the program that does this calculation uses
a lookup table and that table only goes to the year 2100, any number over 100 may
cause an issue in this system. A vulnerability that exploits this issue would have a
specific vulnerability space of all values between 101 and 255.
In fields like this, test cases can no longer be considered equally likely to discover
a vulnerability. In this example, some test cases that are larger, and further from the
valid space are more likely to discover a vulnerability. This violates the assumption
previously made that two different invalid inputs are equally likely to trigger a vul-
nerability. If it is known that a field is numeric, then some test cases are more likely
to discover vulnerabilities than others.
More extreme values are not necessarily more likely to uncover vulnerabilities
however. Consider the system previously described, and suppose the program com-
puting day of the week was well written to ignore any input with a year beyond 2100.
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However, this program sends the full date, with the year and day of the week to
another program that acts on it. If this second program is designed to only expect
years equal to or less than 2075, and it receives a date with the year 2090, it may
react poorly, revealing a vulnerability. In this case a vulnerability exists with a space
containing all values between 76 and 100.
These two examples shows another property of numeric spaces; vulnerabilities
are far more likely to lie in ranges of numbers rather than random numbers as the
previously discussed standard approach assumes. Under that approach, test cases of
189, 190 and 191 would provide the same coverage as test cases 80, 180, and 255. In
a numeric field, the latter set of test cases should provide more coverage since more
sections of the range are tested.
To properly account for numeric spaces in the coverage calculation, a new method
was developed that calculates the coverage of a numeric field. Some assumptions were
made to make analysis of this kind of space feasible. First, numeric field vulnerabilities
are assumed to have specific vulnerability spaces that are contiguous in the invalid
space. That is if the values 4 and 6 trigger a vulnerability, then a value of 5 will
also trigger that vulnerability. If a vulnerability does not meet this criteria, if it
is made up of a few disjoint sequences of values for example, it can be treated as
multiple contiguous vulnerabilities. Second, the invalid space itself is assumed to be
numerically contiguous. For example, if the value of 3 is invalid and the value of 8
is invalid, then the values 4, 5, 6, and 7 must all also be invalid. A space that does
not meet this criterion is said to be disjoint . Disjoint numeric field invalid spaces
can be handled by computing coverage for each disjoint section as if each were the
only invalid space in the field, and then averaging the coverage values to reach a field
coverage value for the field as a whole.
The estimated coverage curve equation derivation is very different for numeric
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fields than for the non-numeric fields assumed in the derivation of (24) and (29). In
the non-numeric case, the value of an arbitrary test case did not affect the coverage
calculation, all values had the same probability of discovering a vulnerability. In
numeric spaces, a value near a value already tested has a lower probability of dis-
covering a vulnerability than a test case removed from the previously tested values.
For this reason, the numeric coverage equation’s derivation has to start with a new
mathematical representation of a vulnerability.
Since numeric vulnerability spaces are contiguous in invalid space, they can be
defined by two values:
v: the lowest value that triggers the vulnerability
l: the length of the vulnerability (note that l = |V |).
The probability that a vulnerability exists with specific parameters v and l can there-
fore be defined by a two dimensional random variable, X. This random variable maps
numeric field specific vulnerability spaces to their defining values v and l. The PMF
of X, denoted fX(v, l), is a function that gives the probability a vulnerability has
characteristics v and l and can be best defined using research into real vulnerabilities.
A good approximation of this function is derived in Section 3.3.
A useful function G can be defined which returns a 1 if the value of a test case, ti
falls in the specific vulnerability space of a vulnerability defined by v and l:
G (v, l, ti) =
 1 v ≤ ti ≤ v + l0 otherwise (31)
With this function and the PMF defined, the probability of the first test case
discovering any arbitrary vulnerability, Vj, can be found by summing across the PMF
for the range that includes the test case.
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Pr(T1 ⊆ V˜j) =
∑
v,l
G (v, l, ti) fX (v, l) (32)
Note the subtle difference between ti and Ti. ti is the value of test case i, while
Ti is a set with only one value, ti. It would be correct to say Ti = {ti} or even that
T1 ⊆ V˜j is equivalent to t1 ∈ V˜j.
When a test case is not first, it will only discover the vulnerability if that vulner-
ability has not been discovered by a previous test case. To account for this a new
function, H, is defined that is 1 when test case i is not in the space of a vulnerability
defined by v and l, and 0 when it is in the vulnerabilities range.
H (v, l, ti) = 1−G (v, l, ti) (33)
If no prior test case has tested the space described by v and l, then the product of
this H function for all previous test cases will be 1. If any one of the prior test cases
did test this space, the product will be zero. This allows it to be incorporated with
the G function and fX to find the probability test case i, where i > 1, will discover
vulnerability Vj:
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜j) =
∑
v,l
(
G (v, l, ti)
(
i−1∏
k=1
H(v, l, tk)
)
fX (v, l)
)
(34)
Using (16) for coverage based on the probability each test case will discover a
vulnerability, coverage for a field with m test cases t1, t2, . . . , tm is:
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n) (35)
Notice that the right side of (34) does not depend on j. This is because no matter
the specific vulnerability’s number, it is still model by the same random variable X.
54
Therefore Pr(Ti ⊆ V˜n) can become some function Q(i) that depends on i but not j.
That is:
Q(i) =
∑
v,l
(
G (v, l, ti)
(
i−1∏
k=1
H(v, l, tk)
)
fX (v, l)
)
(36)
Using Q(i) in (35) allows for a simplification:
Cm =
1
N
m∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
Q(i) =
m∑
i=1
Q(i)
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
)
=
m∑
i=1
Q(i) (37)
Then the right side of (36) can be substituted into (37) to arrive at a complete
expression for the coverage, Cm. The limits on the sums are added here for complete-
ness. The only inputs needed to compute the coverage curve are the invalid space I,
and the input test cases ti, i = 1, . . . ,M where M is the number of test cases.
Cm =
m∑
i=1
max(I)∑
v=min(I)
|I|−v+min(I)∑
l=1
(
G (v, l, ti)
(
i−1∏
k=1
H(v, l, tk)
)
fX (v, l)
)
(38)
Equation (38) is computationally expensive as written due to the number of sums
and products, but it can be replaced by a simple algorithm that arrives at the same
result. To make this possible a two-dimensional boolean array is created. The el-
ements in this array represent if the corresponding v, l pair has been tested. The
domain of this array is the same as the domain of fX , that is all valid values of v and
l. This array will be denoted possibility tested(v, l). The algorithm is as follows:
For every test case i
For all possible v
For all possible l
if ti ∈ [v, v + l] and possibility tested(v, l) = false
then possibility tested(v, l) = true
end for
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end for
if last test case, i = m
then return
∑
v,l possibility tested(v, l)fX(v, l)
end for
3.1.3.3 Values Likely to Discover a Vulnerability.
In some cases it may be simple to identify specific values or ranges of values
in the invalid space of a field that appear more likely than the others to trigger a
vulnerability. Consider if a vulnerability has been discovered in some previous test of
the same protocol on a different system. The values that trigger this vulnerability in
that test, will likely also trigger a vulnerability in this new test. The tester can input
information about which values in a field are more likely to discover a vulnerability,
and an estimate of how much more likely. This way, the coverage calculation can
accurately reflect the information known by the tester.
To illustrate how this type of information can be incorporated into the coverage
calculation, consider a field with an invalid space of I = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10} so that |I| = 5.
The tester has a test set that tests each of these values sequentially so that t1 = 6,
t2 = 7, etc. The tester also suspects that a value of 8 is K times more likely to
discover a vulnerability than otherwise thought. The tester wants to know what the
coverage of the test set is after the applying each test case.
Without the suspicion of value 8, the coverage each test case provides can be found
using (29). This equation provides the cumulative coverage for each test case, but
the specific coverage each test case adds to the total can also be found by dropping
the leading summation. This value can be denoted ci where i is the test case index.
ci =
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (39)
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Using the PMF from Section 3.3, specifically equation (80), the individual coverage
contribution of each of the five test cases can be computed. This result is shown in
Figure 9. Like any complete set of coverage values, these five coverage values sum to
one because when every value in the invalid space has been tested, the space is 100%
covered.
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Figure 9. The specific coverage, ci, provided by each sequential test case for the example
field without value weighting
To incorporate the additional information about the value of 8 in test case 3, the
coverage of this test case, ci, needs to be increased relative to the other test cases.
The sum of all coverage values must remain at 1 however, so in order to add coverage
to test case 3, coverage provided by the rest of the test cases must be reduced. Since
the relationships between these test cases ought to be maintained, all of them must
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be reduced by some factor r, where 0 < r < 1. These new reduced coverage values
will be called c′i with the definition c′i = r · ci.
The coverage for test case 3, c3, undergoes the same reduction, but then the
additional information that this test case should provide K times the coverage than
it otherwise would can be applied so that c′3 = K · r · c3. As stated before, the
individual coverage values must sum to 1; this property allows r to be computed in
terms of the original coverage values as shown:
5∑
i=1
c′i = 1 (40)(
5∑
i=1
r · ci
)
+ (K − 1) · r · c3 = 1 (41)
r
((
5∑
i=1
ci
)
+ (K − 1) · c3
)
= 1 (42)
r (1 + (K − 1) · c3) = 1 (43)
r =
1
1 + (K − 1) · c3 (44)
This approach can be applied in general so that many values can provide more
coverage based on tester knowledge. To do this, every test case ti can have some
weight Ki. If the tester has no information about a value, a test case that takes
on this value receives a weight of 1. The reduction factor r can be calculated by
assuming some test set of |I| test cases that contains each value in the invalid space
once. Then, by the same method used in the previous example, an expression for
r can be found that depends on the value weights, Ki, and the coverage each value
provides without weighting, ci.
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|I|∑
i=1
c′i = 1 (45)
|I|∑
i=1
Ki · r · ci = 1 (46)
r =
1∑|I|
i=1Ki · ci
(47)
The new coverage values, c′i can be found simply as:
c′i = r ·Ki · ci (48)
Noting again the expression for ci shown in (39), a complete expression for c
′
i can
be found:
c′i = r ·Ki
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (49)
And applying this to the original field coverage equation, (29), a complete expres-
sion for standard coverage with weighting can be found:
Cm =
m∑
i=1
r ·Ki
|I|∑
x=1
fX(x)R (x, i) (50)
Returning to the example, the additional information about the test case of 8 can
be incorporated to reach a better specific coverage value contributed by each test
case. Using the equations just derived with a K3 = 5, r for this field is found to be
0.76. This leads to new, scaled specific coverage contributions of each case shown in
Figure 10 contrasted with the original specific coverage values shown in Figure 9.
For numeric fields, the same weighting approach can apply by noting that a dif-
ferent expression for ci can be extracted from (38):
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Figure 10. The specific coverage, ci, provided by each sequential test case for the
example field with and without value weighting
ci =
max(I)∑
v=min(I)
|I|−v+min(I)∑
l=1
(
G (v, l, ti)
(
i−1∏
k=1
H(v, l, tk)
)
fX (v, l)
)
(51)
This leads to the weighted numeric field coverage equation:
Cm =
m∑
i=1
r ·Ki
max(I)∑
v=min(I)
|I|−v+min(I)∑
l=1
(
G (v, l, ti)
(
i−1∏
k=1
H(v, l, tk)
)
fX (v, l)
)
(52)
Shortcomings of this Method. This method was implemented in ExFuzz
for any number of weighted inputs per field. During the implementation it was dis-
covered that the method presented was somewhat incomplete, requiring ExFuzz to
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add some additional procedures to the method. It was also found that a contradiction
arises with other assumptions about the coverage metric when this method is applied.
First, the calculation of r in (44) requires knowledge of all Ki and ci with i =
{1, 2, . . . , |I|}. Rarely in a coverage calculation is every one of these values computed.
In fact, the only time they are is when the test set contains a test case for every
value in the invalid space (in this case m = |I|). When this happens, field coverage
is always 100% regardless of any value weighting.
To calculate the missing ci and their associated Ki, ExFuzz completes the com-
putation of specific coverage values for all i. To do this it has to select the order in
which the remaining, untested, invalid values are incorporated into the calculation. It
selects the values with the highest weights first, with ties going to the lower decimal
value. This approach was selected because, of any approach, it assigned the smallest
coverage to any test set that did not include weighted values.
This addition to the method highlighted the second flaw. Since the sequence of the
test cases could be manipulated to provide more coverage, coverage was dependent
on the arrangement of the test cases in a test set. This meant that two identical
test sets could provided different amounts of coverage if test cases were arranged in a
different order. Nothing in this thesis’s definition of coverage implies that this should
be possible. The number of vulnerabilities a test set discovers should be independent
of the arrangement of the test cases in the stateless SUT model assumed.
Possible Solutions for Future Work. While there was not enough time to
implement a solution to these problems, use of the value weighting feature of ExFuzz
was avoided for all of the results in Chapter V. The tool would certainly be stronger
with this feature, so some time was spent thinking about how to address these issues.
Two possible solutions have come to mind.
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 Redefine Ki and ci so that their index, i, is not a representation of the test case
number, but of its placement based on weight. Consider the example field used
in this section, under the current method K3 = 5 while all other K’s are 1.
Instead, order the test cases and their accompanying K weights by weight so
that K1 = 5, t3 becomes t1 and the other test cases are assigned t2 to t5 in order
of their decimal value. This removes the dependence on test case order and
increases coverage for test cases that include weighted values over the current
method.
This approach doubles down on the solution implemented by ExFuzz to address
the incompleteness of the current method. It will be computationally expensive,
but addresses the contradiction with this thesis’s definition of coverage.
 Address weighted values earlier in the coverage calculation. Under the current
method, weighted values result in scaling the specific coverage contributions of
each test case, leaving the internals of the coverage calculation alone. Weighted
values could be incorporated earlier however. There is no obvious way to do
this, but one potential approach could involve expanding the notional invalid
space used in the calculation.
For example, the invalid value of 8 in the example can be treated as five different
invalid values. This would increase |I| from five to nine. When the value of 8
is tested, it would count as testing five values simultaneously. This approach
would bypass the modifications that led to the contradiction with the coverage
definition, and also move away from the current flawed method. However,
this method would distort the application of the PMF which is not based on
artificially enlarged invalid spaces.
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3.2 Test Set Coverage
This section discusses how to apply the field coverage metric derived in Section 3.1
to many test cases for many different fields to compute the coverage of a test set. First
the method to arrive at test set coverage for first order vulnerabilities will be discussed
in Section 3.2.1. Then method to define coverage for multi-order vulnerabilities will
be presented in Section 3.2.2, accompanied by a discussion on handling multi-order
structure field combinations in Section 3.2.3. This section concludes by showing how
to combine the coverage values of different orders into a single coverage value for the
fuzz test in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 First Order Coverage.
The coverage criterion presented in this chapter assumes that a protocol can be
represented as a finite set of fields. A method for modeling a protocol in such a
fashion has been developed and is based on the Peach Fuzzing Platform [10]. This
model, called a data model, is discussed in Chapter IV. According to the data model,
not every field must be present in a test case, but every bit in a test case must belong
to some field. A test case, one single message sent to the SUT, can be represented
by a data model as a series of fields with values. As shown in Chapter IV, a single
message may contain a field that is repeated multiple times, or it may not contain
certain fields at all. The rules of which fields can appear when and how many times
they may appear are all contained in the data model.
As an example, consider a protocol with three fields, A, B and C, each three bits
long. Field A is always first, and dictates how many fields will follow in the message.
Field B is optional and may be repeated up to 6 times. The value of 111, or decimal
7, is not allowed in field B. Field C is always the last field and is required to be 111,
or 7. Since at least field C is required, field A may not be 000.
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Consider the test case 000111010011. Field A contains the invalid value of 000,
while the actual number of fields following it is 3. Field B occurs twice, the first time
it is the invalid value of 111, but the second time it is the valid value 010. Field C
occurs once at the end and is invalid since it is not the required value of 111. It is
tempting to assume that this test case provides coverage for all three fields because it
tests values in each of the field’s invalid spaces. This assumption would be a mistake
however. If the SUT were to immediately drop any message with 000 in the first
field, the effects of placing 011 in field C would not be known. Likewise, if the SUT
immediately drops messages without the terminating 111 string, the effect of placing
000 in field A would not be known. Without knowledge of the SUT’s behavior,
this test case provides no first order coverage. It would however provide third order
coverage as will be discussed later.
This example gets at a fundamental idea about fuzzing. Inputs must be valid
enough to be processed by the SUT, but invalid enough to trigger a vulnerability.
These inputs are termed semi-valid inputs and are discussed in depth in [26]. Because
of this observation, in order for a test case to provide coverage for a first order
vulnerability, all included fields but one must have a value in their fields valid space.
In addition to this requirement, a test case will not provide any first order coverage if
it contains a series of fields whose values, when taken together, are considered invalid.
These combinationally invalid fields are called Invalid in Combination field sets, or
IIC sets, and are discussed with examples later in this chapter. For now, it is enough
to know that if one exists in a test case, the test case cannot provide first order
coverage.
A test case could also consist of only valid values. By axiom four of fuzz testing,
presented in Section 2.2.3, this test case cannot increase the coverage of the test set.
Therefore, only the test cases where one and only one field is invalid provides first
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order coverage.
Another important consideration is that any field with no invalid space cannot be
assigned a field coverage value per the method presented in Section 3.1. Without an
invalid space, a vulnerability space cannot exist, so these fields are not included in
the test set coverage calculation.
These limitations on which test cases and fields may provide first order coverage
can be summarized by the following two limitations:
 First Order Test Case Limitation: A test case may provide first order
coverage if and only if it contains exactly one field with an invalid value and
contains no Invalid in Combination (IIC) sets.
 First Order Field Limitation: A field is assigned a coverage value and
incorporated into the final first order coverage metric, C1, if and only if the
cardinality of its invalid space is non-zero, |I| 6= 0.
Considering only the test cases and fields that meet these limitations, the coverage
a test set provides can be computed. This can be done by following these steps:
1. Identify the field with an invalid value for every test case in the test set
2. Sort the test cases into groups based on which field is invalid
3. For each group, calculate field coverage using the appropriate field coverage
equation; see Table 2
4. Combine field coverage values to find first-order coverage
The first two steps are self explanatory. For step 3, the appropriate field coverage
equation must be selected from Section 3.1 based on any special information known
about the field. Table 2 shows which field coverage equation to used based on the
characteristics of the field.
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Table 2. Field coverage equation lookup table
Is the field numeric? Does the field contain weighted values? Then use eq. on page
no no (29) 47
yes no (38) 55
no yes (50) 59
yes yes (52) 60
To implement step four, an approach had to be found that combined field coverage
values in some way to produce a coverage value for the entire test set. To determine
the appropriate way to do this, the definition of test set coverage was analyzed. Per
the definition, the final metric needed to be a measure of the expected percentage of
first order vulnerabilities found by test cases in the test set. This metric, C1, was
derived as follows:
Let F be the number of fields in a protocol where the size of the invalid space,
|I| 6= 0.
Let Ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , F be the coverage of i
th field where |I| 6= 0.
Let Ni be the number of vulnerabilities present in field i, and:
NTotal =
F∑
i=1
Ni (53)
Let Li be the number of vulnerabilities in field i discovered by the test set. Then
by the definition of field coverage shown in (3):
Ci =
E [Li]
Ni
(54)
The expected total number of vulnerabilities found, VFound, can then be shown to
be:
E [VFound] =
F∑
i=1
E [Li] =
F∑
i=1
CiNi (55)
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Therefore, test set first order coverage C1, the expected percentage of all first
order vulnerabilities can be found as:
C1 =
E [VFound]
NTotal
=
1
NTotal
F∑
i=1
CiNi (56)
This definition of test set coverage depends on knowing exactly how many vulner-
abilities exist and what fields they are in. If this was known, the fuzz test would be
unnecessary, so the dependence on Ni must be removed. Equation (56) shows that
the proper calculation of first order test set coverage is an average of field coverage
values weighted by the number of vulnerabilities present in each field. To remove this
dependence, Ni can be replaced by the expected number of vulnerabilities present,
E [Ni]:
C1 =
1∑F
i=1E [Ni]
F∑
i=1
CiE [Ni] =
1
E [NTotal]
F∑
i=1
CiE [Ni] (57)
This value depends instead on what is known about the field: at least the size of
its invalid space, and potentially any more information the tester manually enters into
a fuzzer about the field. E [Ni] can be estimated by considering all of the information
available about a field and by analyzing the distribution of vulnerabilities in tested
protocols.
In the simplest case, the fuzzer has no information about the nature of any field
that would cause E [Ni] to be different for any two values of i. In this case E [Ni] =
E [N1] for all i so:
C1 =
1∑F
i=1E [N1]
F∑
i=1
CiE [N1] =
E [N1]
F · E [N1]
F∑
i=1
Ci =
1
F
F∑
i=1
Ci (58)
Which is simply the average of the field coverage values. If more information is
provided to the fuzzer about the nature of a specific field that increases the likelihood
67
of a vulnerability being present, a weighted average can be used. For example, if
a tester believes field six is four times as likely to have a vulnerability because she
has knowledge of how other similar systems have handled this field, she can assign
E [N6] = 4. Then by default, E [Ni] = 1 for all i 6= 6. In this case the weighted defi-
nition for first order test set coverage in (57) is used instead of the simple unweighted
one in (58).
3.2.2 Nth Order Coverage.
3.2.2.1 Types of Multi-Order Vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities are not always confined to a single field. For example, consider two
fields, A and B, each 5 bits. Field A is an indicator of the priority of the information
contained in field B. The values 0 to 20 are valid, with 0 being the lowest priority and
20 being the highest. Values above 20 are invalid. Field B is the field from Figure 4,
with the same vulnerable inputs. In this example however, the application receiving
the message with these two fields is only interested in the value of B if its priority is
19 or 20. Therefore, the vulnerabilities laid out in Section 3.1.1 for field B are not
discovered unless the value of A is 19 or 20. Since the presence of this vulnerability
is dependent on two fields, it is said to be a second order vulnerability.
A second order vulnerability, or, more generally, a multi-order vulnerability, exists
in the invalid space of a field combination, instead of the invalid space of a field. These
spaces can be depicted in a similar manner to the first order spaces, but in these spaces
each element represents a unique combination of values, rather than a single unique
value. The spaces associated with this example are shown in Figure 11.
In this depiction of a second order space, each value, or square, actually represents
a set of two values: the value of field A and the value of field B. Any value set where
at least one value is invalid is in the invalid space of this field combination. The
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Figure 11. A representation of the second order spaces associated with two five bit
fields
vulnerability described is comprised of value pairs where field A is always valid (either
19 or 20) and field B is always invalid.
There is also the possibility a vulnerability lies in the space where field A is
greater than 20 and field B is invalid so that both fields are invalid. If a vulnerability
is triggered only if both fields have a value of 31 then it would lie in this part of the
invalid space.
Another important case to consider is two values for two different fields that are
valid on their own, but become invalid when combined. As a simple example, consider
two fields where the first, a four bit field, represents the month of the year and the
69
second, a five bit field, represents the day of the month. Obviously month values
of 0, 13, 14 and 15 are invalid, and the day value of 0 is invalid in the single field
case. When combined however, February 30th and 31st are invalid, even though each
value is valid for its field. This combination is shown in Figure 12. The tester will
generally have to enter these types of invalid combinations manually in the protocol
data model. These pairs of fields and values will be called invalid in combination
(IIC) pairs and make up another type of multi-order vulnerability.
Figure 12. A representation of the second order spaces associated with day and month
fields
The possible types of second order vulnerabilities are summarized as:
 One field invalid, one field valid. Ex: When field A is 19 or 20 and field
B is any invalid value a vulnerability is triggered.
 Two invalid fields. Ex: When field A is 31 and field B is any invalid value
a vulnerability is triggered.
 Two valid fields that are IIC. Ex: A month field denoting February and a
day field with a value of 30 or 31 trigger a vulnerability.
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It is important to note that a vulnerability may combine types. Consider if the
same vulnerability shown in figure 11 was also triggered when field A had a value of
21. Then some triggering inputs would have one valid and one invalid input while
others would have 2 invalid inputs.
Multi-order vulnerabilities may exist as any of the types presented here or as
combinations and extensions of them. Perhaps a vulnerability is triggered only when
field A is 19 or 20, field B is invalid and the reported month and date are IIC. Since
this vulnerability depends on the values of four different field, it is a fourth order
vulnerability.
3.2.2.2 Computing Multi-Order Coverage.
To compute second order test set coverage C2, the same formulas used for C1 can
be applied with some modification. For first order coverage, coverage values for each
field were found and then combined to reach a test set coverage value. Instead of using
fields, second and higher order coverage is found by looking at field combinations. For
example, consider a protocol with three fields, A, B, and C, each with a non-empty
invalid space. The coverage of fields A, B and C would be combined using (57) or (58)
to find C1. The coverage of field combinations AB, AC, and BC would be combined
in a similar manner to find C2. Third order coverage, C3, would be the same as the
coverage of field combination ABC.
The process to determine the Rth order coverage of a test set, CR, is very similar
to the process to find C1. As in that process, there are limitations on the test cases
and fields, in this case field combinations, which are considered. For the case of order
R:
 Rth Order Test Case Limitation: A test case may provide Rth order coverage
if and only if there exist some combination of R fields which has an invalid value
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set and contains all the invalid fields and Invalid in Combination (IIC) field sets
present in the test case.
 Rth Order Field Combination Limitation: A field combination is assigned
a coverage value and incorporated into the final Rth order coverage metric, CR,
if and only if the cardinality of its invalid space is non-zero, |I| 6= 0.
Considering only the test cases and field combinations that meet these limitations,
the Rth order coverage a test set provides can be computed. This is done by following
a similar set of steps to that used for first order coverage.
1. For each test case in the test set identify the field or fields with invalid values
and all IIC values sets
2. For each combination of R fields, collect all test cases where every invalid field
and IIC value set are entirely contained in fields in that combination
3. For each group, calculate field combination coverage
4. Combine field combination coverage values to find Rth order coverage
The first two steps simply involve arranging the test cases to identify which test
cases provide coverage to which field combinations. It should be noted that, unlike
for first order field coverage, test cases can contribute to the coverage of multiple field
combinations. If within a test case field A is the only invalid field and it appears
with a valid field B and a valid field C, then both field combinations AB and AC are
invalid in this test case and receive some coverage. Table 3 summarizes the first and
second order coverage a test case can provide based on the number of invalid fields
and IIC value pairs it has.
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Table 3. Possible coverage contributions for test cases with different arrangements of
invalid fields and IIC pairs.
If a test case has:
Then it provides:
First order coverage Second order coverage
One invalid field For one field For many pairs of fields
Two invalid fields For one pair of fields
No invalid fields
and no IIC pairs
No invalid fields
For one pair of fields
and one IIC pair
No invalid fields
and 2+ IIC pairs
The third step is achieved by treating the field combination and its associated
spaces like a first order field and finding coverage using (29). The numeric cover-
age equations are not directly applicable since multi-order spaces are not linear as is
required for numeric spaces, but in the future, field combination coverage for combi-
nations of numeric fields may be developed. The PMF applied in the field coverage
equation can be modified to reflect the fact that a multi-order field’s coverage is be-
ing computed. The proper PMF to use would have to be determined by studying
multi-order vulnerabilities. For this thesis the PMF that was already derived for first
order spaces was simply applied to multi-order spaces as well.
The fourth step is also similar to the first order steps on page 65, but the derivation
of the equation used to combine field combination coverage values is a bit trickier.
This is because the number of fields with an invalid space, F , now needs to become
the number of field combinations with an invalid space, a slightly more challenging
figure to find.
The number of field combinations with non-empty invalid spaces, call this M , can
be computed using F , the total number of fields in the protocol, FI , the total number
of fields with invalid spaces in the protocol, and FCIICR the number of order R field
combinations that contain IIC values, but have empty first order invalid spaces for all
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fields in the combination. Notice that the number of field combinations with at least
one field with an invalid space is the same as the total number of field combinations
minus the valid only combinations. Adding in the IIC containing field combinations,
M can be computed as:
M =
(
F
R
)
−
(
F − FI
R
)
+ FCIICR (59)
Upon implementation of this equation, it was found that it counted one case that
should not have been. In some more complex protocols, certain fields may never
validly appear in the same message. The field combinations of these sets of fields
can never exist with all other fields being valid, so their field combination should not
be included in the number of total combinations. Let the total number of such field
combinations for an order R be QR. Then (59) becomes:
M =
(
F
R
)
−
(
F − FI
R
)
+ FCIICR −QR (60)
To help notate the equations related to multi-order coverage, a function G is
defined. G maps every possible combination of R fields — i1, i2, . . . , iR — to a unique
integer p. So G(i1, i2, . . . , iR) = p. An inverse function H is also defined that maps
the integer p back to a set of R fields, H(p) = {i1, i2, . . . , iR}. Using this H function
and assuming no weighting of any field combination, Rth order coverage can be found
as the average of all Rth order field combination coverage values:
CR =
1
M
M∑
p=1
CH(p) (61)
Note here that CH(p) or equivalently C{i1,i2,...,iR} is a field combination coverage
computed in step three above. Similarly for weighted field combinations with NH(p)
representing the number of vulnerabilities present in the field combination defined by
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H(p) = {i1, i2, . . . , iR} for some fields i1, i2, . . . , iR:
CR =
1
E [NTotal]
M∑
p=1
CH(p)E
[
NH(p)
]
, where NTotal =
M∑
p=1
NH(p) (62)
3.2.3 Structure Fields.
As they did in Section 3.1, structure fields require special attention with regard
to multi-order spaces. The two, yet unmentioned, types of structure fields used in
this thesis are very similar and relate to the choice element presented in Chapter
IV. When combined with the repeating relation field described in Section 3.1, they
require special definitions of their valid and invalid field combination spaces.
3.2.3.1 Choice Relations.
The first type of structure field is called a choice relation. This type of field is
a custom peach pit extension and uses the relation element that is also used by the
repeating relation structure field. The value in a choice relation dictates the choice
that some choice element in the data model will make. For example, consider three
fields, A, B and C. Field B represents a distance in feet; field C represents a distance
in meters. Field A is a single bit; if it is a 0, distance should be represented in feet
and if it is a 1, distance should be represented in meters. The data model describing
this example would have fields B and C within a choice and field A outside of this
choice with a relation to the choice.
It is tempting to assume that “distance” should be represented by only one field
whether it is interpreted as feet or meters, negating the need for a choice at all.
However, a field that represents distance in feet may have a different invalid space
than one that represents it in meters, so only by treating them as separate fields
can coverage be accurately computed. In this example, the coverage of the choice
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relation field, field A, can computed in the same way as non-structure fields. It
requires mentioning here however because it behaves differently when it is part of a
field combination with a repeating relation field.
3.2.3.2 Token Fields.
The second type of structure field is called a token field. This field resides inside a
choice, and has a fixed value that indicates the selected choice. Each possible choice
contains its own token field with a unique fixed value. For example, consider an eight
bit block of code that can be defined in two different ways; either field A - 2 bits,
field B - 4 bits and field C - 2 bits, or field D - 2 bits, field E - 6 bits. In order for the
SUT to determine which interpretation of these 8 bits to apply, it looks at the first
two bits. If they are 01, then the fields A, B, C interpretation is used, if they are 10,
then the fields D, E interpretation is used.
In this example fields A and D are token fields. Notice that only 01 is valid for
field A and only 10 is valid for field D. Further, field A can never take a value of
10, because if it did it would be interpreted as field D by the SUT. Likewise, field D
cannot take on the value 01, or it would be interpreted as field A. If those two bits had
a value of 00 or 11, it would be impossible to claim that the field was either field A or
D. However, all bits must belong to a field for this coverage criterion, so for purposes
of the coverage calculation, one token is assigned the title of the leading token. Any
value that does not match a token is considered an invalid instance of the leading
token, and the fields that follow (B and C in this example) are ignored for purposes
of calculating coverage. This leading token definition causes each non-leading token
to have an empty invalid space, excluding it from the coverage calculation. Thus, all
first order coverage of a token field is done through the leading token, and can be
found in the same way as any non-structure field coverage is found since the invalid
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space is structured in the same way.
Data models that use token fields can often represent the same protocol by using
choice relations instead. The only time when it may be easier to use token fields is
when the token field is not the first field in the choice, but this is rarely the case.
Token fields are included in this thesis because, unlike choice relations, they are a
part of the peach pit language, and were the only type of structure field that can be
associated with a choice before support was added for choice relations in the modified
peach pit [10].
3.2.3.3 Combining Structure Fields.
A unique situation arises in a data model when a choice element is inside a repeat-
ing block. The result is the choice gets made multiple times and there are multiple
instances of token or choice relation fields. In these cases, a protocol often defines
rules about which choices can be made when in the sequence of repeats. These rules
can be captured by the Rule Set extension to the peach pit language which is dis-
cussed in Chapter IV. The Restaurant Locator Protocol (RLP), which is described
in Section B.3, provides an example of this.
The RLP states that Word 1 must be the first word, and Words 2 and 3 must exist
in a pair. The meeting or breaking of these rules is determined by a combination of
the value of the token field choosing the word and its place in the repeating sequence.
These limitations can therefore be thought of as affecting the field combination of the
repeating relation field and the token (or choice relation) field. A sequence of choices
that violates these rules would not contain any invalid values, and it should therefore
be treated as an IIC field set.
To visualize the valid and invalid spaces of a field combination between a repeating
relation field and a choice relation or token field, a simple case can be looked at.
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Consider a repeating relation field only 2 bits long which relates to a block that
repeats 1 to 4 times. The adjustment of this relation is +1 so that a value of 0 in the
field means the block repeats 1 time. There are only two possible choices, A and B,
represented by a 1 bit token in each choice. A rule set is defined that says all choice
A’s must come before B’s. The valid and invalid spaces for this field combination
are shown in Figure 13. The size of the invalid space in this case would be 106
combinations of values.
Using this unique representation of an invalid space when a field combination is
of the repeating choice type, and using the previously described method for all other
field combinations, multi-order coverage can be computed for a test set. Once all the
desired multi-order coverage calculations are performed, it is time to combine these
coverage values into a final coverage metric for the entire fuzz test.
3.2.4 Combining Coverage Orders.
Given a test set and a protocol, the coverage of the test set for each order, 1
through the number of fields, F, can be found. A single coverage value for the entire
Figure 13. The valid and invalid space associated with a repeating choice field combi-
nation
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test set has not been found yet however. To get this, the coverage values for all
vulnerability orders must be combined. To do this, either the number of vulnerabilities
present of each order (NR) needs to be known, or this figure needs to be estimated
using the expected number of vulnerabilities of each order. This leads to the following
definition of coverage for a test set:
CFuzz Set =
1
E [NTotal]
F∑
r=1
CrE [Nr] , where NTotal =
F∑
r=1
Nr (63)
This definition of coverage is of little practical use however because the higher
order space sizes are huge compared to the first and second order sizes. This leads
to infeasibly large test sets being needed to provide much coverage of these higher
order field combinations. To mitigate this issue, higher order vulnerabilities can be
assumed to be very rare or not of interest since they are so hard to find by either a
tester or an attacker. Therefore, the weight of higher orders, or the expected number
of higher order vulnerabilities can be assigned a value of 0, simplifying the coverage
calculation considerably.
The expected number of lower order vulnerabilities present in a protocol imple-
mentation can be found by studying real protocols and figuring out the ratio between
the number of first, second and third order vulnerabilities. Without any of this
research into these ratios, this thesis proposes using one of two fuzz set coverage
calculations. The first assumes all vulnerabilities of order four and higher are either
non-existent or not important to the fuzz tester. This coverage calculation also as-
sumes that 40% of all vulnerabilities are first order, 40% are second order and 20%
are third order. This reflects the fact that many fields in common protocols have
a dependence on one other field (latitude and longitude, priority and value, validity
and value) and fewer have a dependence on two other fields (hour, minute, second).
This simplified coverage equation is therefore:
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C1Fuzz Set =
2
5
C1 +
2
5
C2 +
1
5
C3 (64)
The second simplified coverage equation is for fuzz testing where testing for third
and higher order vulnerabilities is infeasible due to the number of fields, the size of
the fields, or the speed at which the test cases can be applied. Since testing for these
vulnerabilities is infeasible, the coverage calculation assumes that such vulnerabilities
do not exist. This may be a logically poor assumption, but if the tester with the
automated fuzzer cant find these higher order vulnerabilities, the attacker likely faces
equal difficulty in finding them. This equation assumes that first and second order
vulnerabilities are equally likely to exist in the protocol.
C2Fuzz Set =
C1 + C2
2
(65)
3.3 Approximating Vulnerability Distributions
Section 3.1, estimating field coverage, introduces a probability mass function,
fX(x), which models the nature of vulnerability spaces. This function is used to find
field coverage in (29), (38), (50), and (52). For basic, non-numeric, fields, the PMF
maps vulnerability sizes to the probability any given vulnerability is exactly that size.
For example, fX(5) = 0.25 is equivalent to saying that 25% of specific vulnerability
spaces have a cardinality of 5. For numeric fields, a 2-dimensional PMF is used in
a similar manner. To reach an accurate coverage value, these functions, what they
represent, and how they are calculated needs to be understood. This section describes
the development PMFs which were then implemented in the coverage calculator.
The true nature of these PMFs is essentially unknowable. To find it testers would
need to discover every vulnerability in every protocol, an accomplishment that would
make fuzz testing obsolete. An educated guess can be made instead however. The
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closer this guess is to the real nature of the function, the more accurate the coverage
calculation will be.
3.3.1 Open Source Protocol Analysis.
The best method of estimating this PMF would be to do a comprehensive study of
vulnerability discovery in protocol implementations and to identify the nature of those
found vulnerabilities. Unfortunately this would have been a massive undertaking and
the time-line for this thesis project would not allow for it. Instead, four open source
protocols were looked at, the invalid spaces of many of their fields were identified, and
groups of inputs which seemed most likely to cause an issue for a poorly implemented
receiver were recorded. The protocols were:
 Global Positioning System — Standard Positioning service (GPS-SPS)
 Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol (BNEP)
 Open Smart Grid Protocol (OSGP)
 Ethernet POWERLINK
For each protocol, fields were selected for inclusion in the PMF estimation effort
based on these criteria:
 The protocol specification clearly indicates some values are not valid. This
allows the field to have an invalid space and potentially vulnerabilities.
 The meaning of the values of the field are clear and understandable so that
reasonable inferences may be made about potential vulnerabilities.
 The field is distinct from other, already documented fields. Often fields are re-
peated in different contexts throughout a protocol. To avoid over-representation
of some fields, these duplicates were avoided.
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Descriptions and metrics collected from fields in these protocols are listed in Ap-
pendix D. Each field was classified as either standard or numeric and the size of
the invalid space of the field was recorded. For each field one or more potential vul-
nerabilities were identified and described along with the size of their vulnerability
space.
3.3.2 Standard Field Vulnerability Distribution.
For basic, non-numeric fields, the distribution of vulnerability sizes is essential to
the coverage calculation, (29). To estimate this distribution, the vulnerabilities in
standard fields in the collected sample were each placed into one of six categories
based on their size. A large portion of vulnerabilities covered the entire invalid space,
or just one value in the invalid space. Because of this, these two cases were each given
their own categories. The remaining vulnerabilities were categorized based on their
size relative to the invalid space, |V |/|I|. These remaining four categories were:
 0% < |V |/|I| ≤ 25%
 25% < |V |/|I| ≤ 50%
 50% < |V |/|I| ≤ 75%
 75% < |V |/|I| < 100%
This distribution is shown in Figure 14.
Vulnerabilities that occur when any invalid input is applied, that is, vulnerabilities
where |V | = |I|, were a common occurrence in the protocol analysis. It tended not to
matter if the field had many or few invalid values; sometimes it just seemed like any
invalid value might cause an issue. In a similar manner, many times one specific value
appeared problematic. These two vulnerability sizes were unique in their increased
rate of occurrence and independence from the size of the field’s invalid space.
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Figure 14. The estimated distribution of vulnerability sizes among non-numeric fields.
Data was collected from four open source protocols and is listed in Appendix D.
For these reasons, the model for vulnerability sizes in general assumes that vul-
nerabilities of size |V | = 1 and size |V | = |I| occur at a fixed rate, independent of
the value of |I|. For the model, these occurrence rates were set at the same levels as
observed in the open source protocols. That is single input vulnerabilities, |V | = 1,
comprise 18.518% of all vulnerabilities and all input vulnerabilities, |V | = |I|, com-
prise 38.889% of all vulnerabilities. This leaves 42.593% of vulnerabilities that have
a different size.
To model the distribution of vulnerabilities with sizes between 1 and |I|, the four
range categories of vulnerability sizes from figure 14 were considered. These appear
to suggest that small vulnerabilities, those between 0% and 25% of the invalid space,
83
make up the largest portion, while larger vulnerabilities, those between 75% and 100%
of the invalid space, make up the second largest portion. This observation suggests
that the trend of vulnerability size to rate of occurrence is not linear. Rather, a
second order polynomial fit was found to apply quite well to these data points. This
fit is shown in figure 15.
The distribution of vulnerability sizes can be modeled as a smooth function with
the exception of special cases |V | = 1 and |V | = |I| by applying this fit. This
function can then be sampled and scaled to form a valid PMF for any value of |I|.
As an example for how this can be done, consider a field with an invalid space of size
5. The probability a vulnerability in this space has a size of less than one, or greater
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Figure 15. A second degree polynomial least squares fit to the vulnerability size ranges
from Figure 14, excluding a size of one and a size of |I|
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than five is clearly zero.
fX(x) = 0 when x < 1 (66)
fX(x) = 0 when x > 5 (67)
The probability a vulnerability is of size 1 or size 5 is fixed per the previous
discussion.
fX(1) = 0.18518 (68)
fX(5) = 0.38889 (69)
The probability a vulnerability is an intermediate size is determined by a sampled
and scaled version of the polynomial fit to the reference data. The unscaled equation
for the fit is:
funscaled(|V |) = 0.75926
( |V |
|I|
)2
− 0.90370
( |V |
|I|
)
+ 0.30920 (70)
Applying this to the remaining vulnerability sizes, |V | = 2, 3, and 4, unscaled
rates of occurrence for these sizes are found:
funscaled(2) = 0.0692 (71)
funscaled(3) = 0.0403 (72)
funscaled(4) = 0.0722 (73)
To form a valid PMF, all values must sum to 1. With the lowest and highest
values set, the intermediate values must sum to 0.42593. The scale factor K to make
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the middle values sum to this figure can be found using this equation:
K =
0.42593∑|I|−1
x=2 funscaled(x)
(74)
For this example the scale factor works out to be K = 2.344. Applying this factor
to each unscaled rate of occurrence, the proper PMF value is found. For this example
the resulting PMF is:
fX(1) = 0.18518 (75)
fX(2) = 0.16224 (76)
fX(3) = 0.09451 (77)
fX(4) = 0.16918 (78)
fX(5) = 0.38889 (79)
In general this procedure can be applied to compute the proper PMF when |I| > 2
using this formula:
fX(x) =

0.18518 x = 1
K
(
0.75926
(
x
|I|
)2
− 0.90370
(
x
|I|
)
+ 0.30920
)
1 < x < |I|
0.38889 x = |I|
0 otherwise
(80)
The PMF in the special case where |I| = 1 is trivially:
fX(x) =
 1 x = 10 otherwise (81)
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And in the case of |I| = 2, |V | = 1 and |V | = |I| consume the entire PMF. Since
their set values do not sum to 1, they are scaled so that they do sum to 1 while
maintaining the same relative proportions.
fX(x) =

0.32258 x = 1
0.67742 x = 2
0 otherwise
(82)
3.3.3 Numeric Field Vulnerability Distribution.
Data was also collected on numeric fields. Of the fields selected from the four open
source protocols, 28% of them were numeric. This meant there was less information
to work with than for the standard fields, but the same general method was applied
to this data. The major difference between building the PMF for a numeric field
and a standard field is that the numeric field PMF is 2 dimensional. As described
in Section 3.1, the numeric PMF has a dimension representing length (analogous to
size in standard fields) and a dimension representing position in the invalid space. To
build an adequate PMF for numeric fields, the length and position of vulnerabilities
in the data set were documented and a PMF was built based on those findings.
The distribution of vulnerability lengths were categorized in the same way as
vulnerability sizes were in the standard case. The numeric field distribution of vul-
nerability lengths is shown in Figure 16.
The distribution of vulnerability position was a bit more difficult to quantify. This
was mainly because of a lack of vulnerabilities that did not either start on the lowest
value in the invalid space or end on the highest value. It was clear from looking at the
vulnerability positions that vulnerabilities tend to either start at the bottom of the
range, or end at the top with few residing completely in the middle. This lack of data
on middle range vulnerabilities prevented the identification of trends like, for example,
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Figure 16. The estimated distribution of vulnerability lengths among numeric fields.
Data was collected from four open source protocols and is listed in Appendix D.
“vulnerabilities are more concentrated higher in the range than lower”. This led to
the lumping all these middle position vulnerabilities into one category along with
a category for vulnerabilities that contain the lowest value and vulnerabilities that
contain the highest value. Vulnerabilities that cover 100% of the invalid space must
include both the lowest and highest values, so these are included in both categories.
The vulnerability position distribution is shown in Figure 17.
As was done with the interior categories for vulnerability size in a standard field,
a fit was applied to the range categories for numeric field vulnerability length. There
appeared no reason to use a polynomial fit again based on the available data, so a
linear least squares trend-line was calculated and applied to the four range categories.
88
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Lower Middle Upper
Fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
V
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ti
e
s
Vulnerability Location
Figure 17. The estimated distribution of vulnerability positions in numeric fields.
Lower indicates the vulnerability includes the lowest value in the invalid space, higher
indicates the vulnerability includes the greatest value, and middle indicates the vul-
nerability contains neither extreme value. Data was collected from four open source
protocols and is listed in Appendix D.
This fit is shown in Figure 18, and the equation for this line is shown in (83); l is
the length of the vulnerability, which is analogous to |V | in standard fields and is
introduced in Section 3.1.
funscaled(l) = 0.14286
(
l
|I|
)
+ 0.01786 (83)
Incorporating the proportions of vulnerabilities with l = 1 and l = |I| based on
the collected data, a complete, unscaled function, fU1(l) can be arrived at for the
distribution of numeric vulnerability lengths:
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Figure 18. A linear least squares fit to the estimated distribution of vulnerability length
ranges in a numeric field from Figure 16, excluding a length of one and a length of |I|
fU1(l) =

0.07143 l = 1
0.14286
(
l
|I|
)
+ 0.01786 1 < l < |I|
0.57143 l = |I|
0 otherwise
(84)
To incorporate position into this function, a modifier, based on the rate of lower,
middle, and upper, vulnerability occurrences, is applied. From the data that is shown
in Figure 17, the modifier is set as shown in (85). The conditions in the function
identify four unique situations. First, if the vulnerability consumes the entire space,
then l = |I| and an average of the lower and upper positions is used. Second is a
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vulnerability that starts at the lowest value, third is a vulnerability that does not
contain the lowest or highest value, and fourth is a vulnerability that contains the
highest value.
M(v, l) =

0.75000 l = |I|
0.71428 v = 1 and l 6= |I|
0.14286 v > 1 and l <= |I| − v
0.78571 l = |I| − v + 1 and l 6= |I|
(85)
The modifier can then be applied to the length distribution function to reach a
two dimensional unscaled distribution function, fU2(v, l) covering both length and
position:
fU2(v, l) = M(v, l)fU1(l) (86)
To properly scale the function to make it a PMF, the scale factor must be found
by finding the inverse of the sum across all values of v and l.
K =
1∑|I|
v=1
∑|I|−v+1
l=1 fU2(v, l)
(87)
The final, valid, PMF for the distribution of vulnerabilities among numeric fields
is shown in (88). This PMF is used in the coverage calculator’s implementation of
(38) and (51).
fX(v, l) = KfU2(v, l) (88)
3.3.4 Other Special Field Types.
Ideally, for the most accurate coverage calculation possible, these PMFs would
account for everything a tester knows about the nature of vulnerabilities. One addi-
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tional way these PMFs can be improved is by developing seperate functions for special
field types that the tester may have some insight into, or that may have an obviously
different distribution of vulnerabilities than the two previously described. Due to
time constraints and a limited number of fields analyzed from open source protocols,
these special PMFs were not pursued for this thesis. Developing these special PMFs
may improve the quality of the coverage calculator, so it should be considered for
future work.
Some specific field types that likely have real vulnerability distributions that differ
from the standard ones estimated earlier in this section include:
 Repeating Relation Fields — These fields indicate how many blocks, fields,
bits or bytes follow in a message. Section 3.1.3.1 describes how the invalid space
of this field is treated as two dimensional since there are two elements that
determine this fields validity: its value, and the actual number of blocks, fields,
bits or bytes that follow. The general estimated distribution of vulnerability
sizes probably underestimates the size of these vulnerabilities since it is unlikely
that a single combination of value and repeats would trigger a vulnerability. For
example, a case where the field says 2 bytes should follow and 7 actually follow
is unlikely to trigger a vulnerability if a value of 2 with 8 bytes actually following
does not trigger one.
 Choice Tokens and Relations — These fields indicate how other bits in a
message should be interpreted. An invalid value in this field often mean that
the receiver will not be able to interpret some bits. Again the general estimated
distribution of vulnerability sizes probably underestimates the typical size of
these vulnerabilities. If a vulnerability is triggered because a receiver cannot
process some bits, it would be expected that any invalid value in this field would
trigger this vulnerability.
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 Second and Higher order Field Combinations — In this thesis, the gen-
eral PMF is applied to field combination coverage calculations as well as field
coverage calculations. Certainly the distribution of vulnerability sizes in field
combinations is vastly different than with fields. The field combination invalid
spaces tend to be orders of magnitude larger than the invalid field spaces. Vul-
nerabilities in these spaces probably rarely cover the entire space. They are
likely confined to regions where one field is invalid, and a vulnerability is trig-
gered based on a valid value in a second field, or they may be confined to
regions where both fields are invalid. For this reason, the general PMF would
be expected to overestimate the vulnerability sizes in this case. It also should
be pointed out that the coverage calculator developed in this thesis does not
handle numeric fields in a field combination any differently than basic fields. If
the time were taken to model these higher order fields with thier own PMFs,
combinations that are part or all numeric can be treated properly.
3.4 Coverage Calculation Procedure
The previous sections in this chapter developed the equations and methods nec-
essary to compute ExCov. This section takes these equations and methods and turns
them into a procedure to reach a final coverage value CFuzzSet. The procedure assumes
that the tester has a set of test cases and a model for the protocol being fuzzed.
Set-up
1. Decide which final coverage approximation value, CFuzzSet, is to be computed.
Section 3.2.4 discusses three different approaches and lists their requisite equa-
tions: (63), (64), and (65).
2. Based on the selection in step one, find the order coverage values, C1,C2, . . . ,CRMax
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that need to be calculated. For example, if C1FuzzSet (shown in (64) on page 80),
is chosen, C1,C2, and C3 all need to be calculated and RMax = 3.
3. Identify the value of each field present in each test case.
4. Of those values identified in step 3, identify which values are invalid. Values
that are invalid lie in their field’s invalid space.
5. Identify all sets of fields that are Invalid in Combination (IIC).
First Order Coverage Calculation
6. If C1 was identified in step 2, proceed to step 7. Otherwise proceed to step 13.
7. Apply the first order test case limitation in Section 3.2.1 on page 65. This
means that all test cases which have zero or two or more invalid fields as found
in step 4, or have an IIC set as identified in step 5, are no longer considered in
the first order coverage calculation.
8. Apply the first order field limitation in Section 3.2.1 on page 65. This means
that only fields with an invalid space are considered for the rest of the first order
coverage calculation.
For steps 9 to 12, the steps shown in Section 3.2.1 on page 65 are followed.
9. For each test case not eliminated in step 7, identify the one field that is invalid.
10. Sort the test cases into groups based on the fields identified in step 9.
11. For each group of test cases, calculate first order field coverage, C1, of the invalid
field using the appropriate equation. To find the appropriate equation, reference
Table 2 which is reproduced here for convenience:
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Is the field numeric? Does the field contain weighted values? Then use eq. on page
no no (29) 47
yes no (38) 55
no yes (50) 59
yes yes (52) 60
12. Combine field coverage values to find C1 using (57) if any field identified in step
8 is weighted or by using (58) if no field identified in step 8 is weighted. Note
that for each field identified in step 8, E [Ni] = 0 for (57).
Multi-Order Coverage Calculation
13. Let the current order R be 2.
14. If CR was identified in step 2, proceed to step 15. If all coverage order values
identified in step 2 have been found, proceed to step 22. Otherwise proceed to
step 21.
15. Apply the Rth order test case limitation in Section 3.2.2 on page 71. This means
that test cases with no invalid values or IIC sets are not considered for Rth order
coverage. Also any test case where the number of fields with an invalid value
and plus number of fields present in all IIC value sets is greater than R are not
considered for Rth order coverage.
16. Apply the Rth order field combination limitation in Section 3.2.2 on page 72.
This means that any field combination with no invalid space is not considered
for Rth order coverage.
For steps 17 to 20, the steps shown in Section 3.2.2 on page 72 are followed.
17. For each test case not eliminated in step 15, identify all invalid fields and IIC
value sets.
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18. For each combination of R fields, identify all test cases that have invalid and
IIC values entirely contained in the fields of the combination.
19. For each field combination of R fields, compute the coverage based on the iden-
tified value combinations in step 18. Use equation (29) on page 47 for these
multi-order spaces.
20. Combine field combination coverage values to find CR using (62) if any field
combination identified in step 16 is weighted or by using (61) if no field com-
bination identified in step 16 is weighted. Note that for each field combination
identified in step 16, E [Ni] = 0 in both equations.
21. Add one to R to advance to the next order. Go to step 14.
Combining for a Final Result
22. Compute CFuzzSet using the method identified in step 1 and the values from
steps 12 and 20.
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IV. Implementing the Criterion
To demonstrate that the approach presented in Chapter III can be successfully
implemented and used to improve fuzz test coverage, a model for protocol specifi-
cations, a coverage calculator, and a high coverage fuzz generator were developed.
These three tools were combined into one C++ visual studio project called ExFuzz.
The name ExFuzz, short for Expected Fuzz or Expected Fuzzer, was chosen as
it conveys two important characteristics of the coverage criterion on which the tool
is based. First, as can be seen throughout Chapter III, the metric relies heavily on
the expected value operator to account for uncertainty about the type and location
of vulnerabilities in a protocol implementation. Second, the criterion is designed to
output a coverage percentage that means what a tester expects it should mean. This
clarity allows the tester to use the metric effectively without knowledge of precisely
how it is calculated.
ExFuzz is comprised of three tools: DataModel, ExCov, and GenFuzz. Each tool
produces a C++ object that can be queried by the main application, ExFuzz.
 DataModel: Creates a data model object from an Peach Pit XML file with
the extensions described in Section 4.1.2. The DataModel tool is described in
Section 4.1.3.
 ExCov: Computes the coverage of a set of test cases based on the criterion
presented in Chapter III. This tool is described in Section 4.2.
 GenFuzz: Creates a set of fuzzed test cases from a data model object. The
test cases are designed to achieve high coverage per the ExCov criterion. This
tool is described in Section 4.3.
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4.1 Creating a Data Model
A protocol specification is a document that standardizes many aspects of a pro-
tocol. These specifications can cover anything from the electrical characteristics of
the signals to medium control and fragmentation. For example, the Internet Protocol
version 4 (IPv4) standard covers addressing conventions, fragmentation procedures
and IP header format [3], while Military Standard 1553B (MIL-STD-1553B) covers
the electrical characteristics of the bus, medium access control and word formats [2].
Many of a protocol’s characteristics described by such standards can be “fuzzed”
in some way. That is, the voltages on a 1553 bus could be manipulated beyond the
allowable levels to attempt to trigger an adverse reaction from a SUT. But this is a
departure from the understood definition of a fuzz test. For this thesis, a fuzz test
attempts to expose a vulnerability in the software of the SUT, not the hardware.
Another characteristic of a protocol that could be fuzzed is medium access control.
the Ethernet standard, 802.3-2015, for instances specifies how to share a medium using
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection. Aspects of this medium access
protocol could be fuzzed, bending the rules defined in the standard slightly to cause
an adverse affect on the SUT [6]. This type of fuzzing will also not be considered as
the opportunities and challenges associated with it are very different from the type
of fuzzing considered in this thesis.
This thesis considers the sections in protocol specifications that assign meaning
to sets of bits, or fields. For example, in the case of the IPv4 protocol, this would
be section 3.1, Internet Header Format, which describes the fields of the IPv4 header
and gives them meaning. Likewise for the MIL-STD-1553B standard and the Eth-
ernet standard, the sections that describe the meaning of the bits in the headers of
those messages are the target of the fuzzing described in this thesis. This fuzzing
involves sending messages that violate the specification’s limitations on the values of
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the protocol’s fields.
Protocol specifications are not written in any standard way that would allow a
software fuzzing tool to automatically and easily interpret them. Rather, the specifi-
cations rely on humans to read them and build systems or tools that follow the rules
as described. In fact, many bit maps, graphical representations of the meanings of
sets of bits in a message, are drawn using standard text characters. This is true in
MIL-STD-1553B and the IPv4 standard. In order for a software tool to understand
the rules governing an instantiation of a protocol, the protocol specifications must be
converted into a common form that can be understood by a software application.
Ideally this form is human and machine readable, and is specific enough to com-
pletely specify all the relevant rules from a protocol specification yet general enough
to accommodate many protocols. For the type of fuzzing considered in this thesis,
the model must cover all possible realizations of a message, but need not cover the
order or interactions between multiple messages. Peach provides an excellent starting
point to crafting such a model.
4.1.1 Peach Pit Modeling.
As discussed in Chapter II, Peach is a widely used fuzzing platform that has the
capability to fuzz network protocols. A fundamental element of the Peach platform
is the Peach Pit which is an XML document that defines “the structure, type infor-
mation, and relationships in the data to be fuzzed” [10]. A Peach Pit contains three
main parts, the Data Model, the State Model and the Agent.
The Agent describes the monitoring system for the SUT and is especially useful
if Peach can be installed on the SUT. For military data link fuzzing, a Peach defined
agent is not relevant as discussed in Sections 1.4 and 2.1.2.2. The State Model de-
scribes when message transmissions and receptions are allowed to occur. This section
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can be used to model the aforementioned interactions between messages or rules in-
volving medium access control. Since the scope of this thesis is limited to fuzzing
within a message, the State Model is not of use.
The Peach Pit Data Model describes the composition of a message and defines
the relationships between elements within a message. This data model is an excellent
place to start in the effort to create a generic model of a message defined by a protocol
specification. As a simple example, consider the MIL-STD-1553B command word
definition shown in Figure 19 (retrieved from [2], page 6).
Figure 19. Message standard for a MIL-STD-1553B command word
This 16 bit message can be represented as an XML data model. This is shown in
Figure 20. The Peach data model represents messages as a collection of fields. The
order, existence, and values of these fields are determined by other elements in the
model. The elements used to describe fields are Number and String. String may be
useful when the data model is for a file or ASCII based protocol, but generally in
military data links each field is best represented as a binary number using the Number
element. Each element can be further described using attributes. The attribute size
Figure 20. MIL-STD-1553B command word represented in a Peach data model
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is required for the element Number ; it sets the number of bits in the field. Other
useful elements from the Peach data model language include:
1. Block: Blocks are used to group a set of like fields together. Blocks can be
repeated allowing the same fields to appear multiple times in a message.
2. Choice: Choices are used to accommodate protocols where the value in one
field controls what fields appear elsewhere in the message. A simple example of
this would be the version field of the IP header. If this field has a value of 4, the
subsequent fields are described by the IPv4 standard. If it has a value of 6, the
subsequent fields are different and are described by the IPv6 standard. Military
data link protocols often have this quirk and require the choice element.
3. Relation: The relation element is a child of a field element and describes how
the value in one field is related to the value in another field, block, or choice.
For example, Peach uses the relation element to model checksums. This element
can also be used with fields like the Data Word Count field shown in Figure
19 by relating the value in the parent field to the number of occurrences of a
different field, block or choice.
4. Hint: The hint element is also a child of a field element. It is used to relay
more information about the field such as which values are valid and which are
invalid.
Open source protocols like those discussed thus far are too simple to illustrate
the necessity of these other data model elements. Unfortunately the standards of the
protocols that this thesis targets, military data link protocols, can not be reproduced
in this setting. For this reason, fictitious protocols were created that mimic the
features of actual military data link protocols. These protocols can be described and
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modeled freely in this setting. Appendix B describes these protocols and shows how
they can be modeled using a Peach Pit XML file with some extensions.
4.1.2 Custom Peach Pit Extensions.
The Peach data model has a number of limitations that prevented its exclusive
use in this thesis. To overcome these limitations, some additions were made to the
data model that allow more information about each field to be conveyed to a fuzzer or
coverage calculator through an XML file. Other changes were also made that allow
some structural quirks of military data link protocols to be accommodated. The
extensions made were:
1. Valid and Invalid Values: Attributes to the hint element were added that
allow for specification of all valid and invalid values of a field. Peach had already
had a valid values attribute for the hint, but it was only applicable to one peach
mutator and the syntax was inconvenient for specifying large ranges of values.
This modification allows for a complete listing of valid and invalid values in more
compact notation. Specifically, a range of values is represented, throughout the
data model, as a list of values and ranges separated by commas. for example,
the values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, and 16 can be compressed to the text
string “1-4,7-9,11,15,16”.
2. Field Type: The coverage criterion ExCov categorizes fields as either standard
or numeric based on the type of data they contained. Section 3.1.3.2 discusses
the differences between these two types. To separate them in the data model,
a type attribute was added to the hint element that can be either “Standard”
or “Numeric”.
3. Rule Set: A unique situation arises when a choice element is located within a
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repeating block element. In this case, the choice element may appear multiple
times in a single message. Protocols often place rules on which choice can be
made on which repeat. The Restaurant Locator Protocol, described in Section
B.3 provides an example of this. The coverage criterion handles this case as a
type of field combination as described in Section 3.2.3.3. To facilitate automatic
detection of rule violations, the set of rules must be included in the data model.
A RuleSet element was therefore added that appears as the immediate child of
a repeating block containing a choice. The rule set has one child element for
each rule placed on the choices. Three types of rules were found to be necessary
to cover the situations seen in military data link protocols. Support for these
three rules was added to ExFuzz; they are: 1) a position rule: for example,
choice 1 must be made during the first repeat. 2) a repeat rule: for example,
choice 2 must be made no more than three times. And 3) a sequence rule:
for example, choice 4 must always be made the repeat after choice 3. Figure
21 shows the rule set used to describe the word order rules of the Restaurant
Locator Protocol.
Figure 21. An example of the rule set extension to a Peach Pit data model. This
example is from the Restaurant Locator Protocol described in Section B.3.
4. Token as a Relation: The Peach Pit data model uses the token attribute of a
field element to convey that the value in that field determines what choice was
made. This proved to be inadequate for representing some military data link
protocols. Sometimes the field that determined which choice was to be made
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was in a different part of the message and could not act as a token field. For
this reason a new type of relation element called a choice relation was added.
To select this type of relation, the type attribute of a relation element is set to
“choice”. This allows these fields to act as token fields without being within
associated choice block as the Peach data model required.
5. Repeating Relation Adjustment: The Peach Pit data model allowed for
a type of relation element that linked the value in a field to the number of
repeats of a block. However, the value in the field had to be the exact number
of repeats of the block. In some military data link protocols, the number of
repeats was related to, but not precisely, the value in the related field. For
this reason, an adjustment attribute was added to the relation element. The
value of this element was the difference between the value in the field and the
actual number of block repeats that value represented. In the example of the
Restaurant Locator Protocol, the Num Words field has an adjustment of +1
meaning that when the field has a value of 2, 3 words actually occur in the
message.
6. Field Weighting: The data model also needed a mechanism to convey infor-
mation about which fields are more likely to contain vulnerabilities than others.
This information is incorporated into the coverage criterion in Section 3.2.1,
specifically on page 67 and in (57). The value is termed field weight, and in the
data model is an attribute, weight, that belongs to a hint element. It can take
on any numeric value.
7. Value Weighting: In a similar manner to field weighting, the data model
required a mechanism to convey the weighting of individual values within a
field. Section 3.1.3.3 is devoted to the incorporation of this type of information.
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To convey value weights a new element was created called Weighted, as a child
of a field element. The weighted element was itself given a child element, Range
that can repeat within a weighted element block any number of times. Each
range element assigns one weight value, through the weight attribute, to a range
of values for the field, using the values attribute. The same range notation is
used as when describing the valid and invalid space.
4.1.3 DataModel Tool.
The DataModel tool takes a Peach Pit with the custom extensions described in
Section 4.1.2 that models a protocol, and builds a C++ object. Figure 22 shows this
process.
DataModel
DataModel.h
DataModel.cpp
Modified 
Peach Pit
(XML)
Data 
Model 
Object
Figure 22. Inputs and Outputs associated with the DataModel tool
The DataModel tool uses an open source XML parser called Tiny XML 2 [24] to
read in the XML file. It then builds a C++ object that is designed to easily interact
with the other fuzzing tools. The object contains a number of different custom data
structures called nodes.
These nodes are related to some of the elements in a Peach pit. For example,
the C++ object defines a field node, a block node, and a choice node. Each node
has parameters unique to its type. For example, the field node has a parameter
for valid values, which contains the information presented in the valid and invalid
attributes of the hint element. The block node contains parameters called minOccurs
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and maxOccurs, to carry the values supplied by the attributes with the same names
in the Peach Pit Block element.
Each node also has at least one child and one parent node. This allows the nodes to
be conceptually connected by edges in a graph. To build or interpret a message using
the data model, start at the first node, then proceed to its child node, then to that
node’s child, and so forth. Along the way, every field node encountered represents a
set of bits in the message and all the properties associated with those bits. Traversing
the data model in this way not only places the fields in the proper order, but allows
for sets of fields to repeat, and for choices to be made that include some fields and
exclude others.
Any message for a given protocol can be created by tracing a path through this
node map, creating fields as their nodes are encountered. Similarly any message can
be parsed by following the node map, interpreting bits as their fields are encountered,
and making choice and repeat decisions based on their nodes parameters, and special
fields in the message. All the information necessary for creating and parsing messages
is contained in the data model object.
Figure 23 shows the node map for the Restaurant Locator Protocol which is
described in Appendix B. This map does not convey any information about the
parameters within each node, but simply shows how they are arranged.
4.2 Building a Coverage Calculator
The Coverage Calculator tool, ExCov, takes a data model object, and a set of test
cases in the form of a text file and returns a value between 0% and 100%. Figure 24
shows this process.
ExCov looks at the data model object to find invalid spaces and characteristics of
each field in the protocol. It then applies the field, and field combination limitations
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Figure 23. Node Map for the Restaurant Locator Protocol
(described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.2 respectively), to eliminate some fields and
field combinations from the calculation.
The input test cases text file contains one test case per line in hexadecimal. ExCov
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ExCov.cppTest Cases
(.txt)
Data 
Model 
Object Coverage 
Value
Figure 24. Inputs and Outputs associated with the ExCov tool
parses each test case by converting them to binary and then comparing them to the
data model object. Once the tool understands a test cases’s value for every field, it
applies the test case limitations (described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.2) to remove
test cases that contribute no coverage.
The tool keeps track of which invalid values have been tested as it parses test cases,
and then applies the appropriate equations to compute coverage for each order: (29),
(38), (50), (52), (57), (58), (61), or (62) depending on the type of field and the
information available. ExCov uses the simplified coverage value, C2Fuzz Set, as its final
value. This is computed using (65).
While ExCov implements almost everything described in Chapter III, there is still
work that can be done to improve the calculator. Currently ExCov does not support:
 Invalid in combination (IIC) pairs of fields.
 Numeric fields in the multi-order case
 Unique vulnerability distribution functions, fX(x), for field combinations, choice
relation fields, token fields, or repeating relation fields.
 Field combination value weights
 Field combination weights
No significant barriers to the implementation of these functions in ExCov are
foreseen. Developing unique vulnerability distribution functions would require the
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collection of significantly more protocol data than was collected for this thesis (shown
in Appendix D). Field combination weighting, field combination value weighting and
IIC pairs will require additional extensions to the Peach Pit XML data model, but
these should not be difficult to make. These functions were not incorporated into the
tool but are left as future work.
4.3 Building a Generative Fuzzer
The GenFuzz tool takes a data model object and produces a set of fuzz test cases.
Figure 25 shows this process.
GenFuzz
GenFuzz.h
GenFuzz.cpp
Test Cases
(.txt)
Data 
Model 
Object
Figure 25. Inputs and Outputs associated with the GenFuzz tool
The tool is designed to provide high coverage based on the ExCov criterion. To
do this, it focuses on first order coverage. The method creates test cases in which
every field is valid except one. The invalid value changes fields from test case to test
case so that each field with an invalid space is fuzzed at least once before any are
fuzzed twice. No invalid values repeat until the test case has achieved 100% first
order coverage. The valid values that make up the rest of each message are selected
randomly based on their field’s valid space.
To ensure that every invalid value is tested without repeating any, GenFuzz em-
ploys a simple algorithm. For each field it first finds the size of the invalid space,
|I|, from the information in the data model object. GenFuzz then generates invalid
values to test in such a way that none get repeated, and the values are well spaced
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within the invalid space.
To do this, the algorithm finds a value this thesis terms as the “jump”. The jump,
call it j, is an integer such that j < |I| and GCD(j, |I|) = 1 where GCD stands for
greatest common divisor. Since j and |I| have no common factors, the following can
be said: No multiple of j, call this kj, is evenly divisible by |I| if k < |I|. This means
that for all k < |I|, kj % |I| 6= 0, where % is the modulus operator. Further, the set
{kj % |I|; 0 ≤ k < |I|} is the complete set of positive integers less than |I|. This is
illustrated in Table 4 with |I| = 10.
Table 4. Listing of k · j % 10 result for all 0 ≤ k < 10 and all j < 10 and GCD(j, 10) = 1.
k j = 1 j = 3 j = 7 j = 9
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 3 7 9
2 2 6 4 8
3 3 9 1 7
4 4 2 8 6
5 5 5 5 5
6 6 8 2 4
7 7 1 9 3
8 8 4 6 2
9 9 7 3 1
A few key observations can be made by looking at the example in Table 4. First,
each column contains all the values between zero and nine without repeats. Second,
the central columns have somewhat scrambled the order of these values. In fuzzing
it may be undesirable to test a field’s invalid values sequentially, it would be more
effective to test them by jumping around in the space. Consider the case of numeric
fields presented in Section 3.1.3.2. This simple modulus based algorithm is therefore
the basis for generating invalid values in GenFuzz.
To implement this algorithm in practice, a random non-negative integer less than
|I| is selected. This value is the index of the first invalid test case that will be tried.
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For example, let I = {6, 7, 8, 10, 12}, so that |I| = 5. Let the randomly selected
integer be 2. Starting with an index of 0, the invalid value of 8 has an index of 2, and
thus 8 will be the first value fuzzed. If the jump was calculated to be 3, the index
of the next value to be tested would be (2 + 3) % 5, or 0. Thus 6 would be the next
value tested. This continues until the algorithm returns that 8 is to be fuzzed again,
in which case every value will have been fuzzed.
Through experimentation, it was found that jump values somewhat near 1/2 of |I|
provided a set of well spaced values. Based on this observation, two simple equations
were used to select a jump. For invalid spaces larger than 10, the tool computes,
using integer division, a jump of:
j =
|I|
2
+
|I|
7
− 1 (89)
And for spaces 10 or smaller:
j =
|I|
2
− 1 (90)
The method will only work if GCD(j, |I|) = 1 however, so the GCD(j, |I|) is
found using the euclidean algorithm [1]. If it is not 1, j is increased by one and the
tool again finds the GCD. This continues until a valid jump is found.
GenFuzz takes the invalid fuzzed value and all the random valid values and builds
a hexadecimal message based on the data model. It prints this message to a file, and
then moves on to the next field to be fuzzed. Since the output of GenFuzz and the
text file input to ExCov have the same format, the coverage provided by the test set
GenFuzz generates can be immediately found by running ExCov.
Figure 26 shows the first order coverage result for 30 test cases generated by
GenFuzz. Notice that fields 12 and up all have an invalid space which has a size of
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Computing First Order Coverage...
Field 0 (T) has 4 of 4 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%   Weight: 10
Field 1 (R) has 4 of 66 values tested. That is a coverage of 69.336%
Field 4 has 3 of 93 values tested. That is a coverage of 65.9109%
Numeric field 6 has 3 of 910 values tested with a coverage of 63.0819%
Field 10 (T) has 3 of 5 values tested. That is a coverage of 90.9702%
Field 12 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 13 has 2 of 2 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 14 has 3 of 3 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 16 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 17 has 3 of 3 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 20 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 22 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 23 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
First Order Coverage: 94.9681%
Figure 26. Partial output of ExCov with 30 test cases generated by GenFuzz for the
Restaurant Locator Protocol
three or less. These fields were completely fuzzed because in the first 30 test cases,
GenFuzz was able to fuzz each field at least three times if it needed to be. The first
two fuzzable fields each have four values tested; this shows that GenFuzz got to these
fields a fourth time. The next field, field 4, has only three values tested because
GenFuzz had not reached it a fourth time. If GenFuzz had been allowed to continue
for a 31st test case, this field would have been tested a fourth time, and coverage
would have increased.
Figure 27 shows the first order coverage result for 1200 cases generated by Gen-
Fuzz. That is enough test cases to completely cover all first order spaces, and thus
first order coverage is 100%. GenFuzz reaches 100% first order coverage in the fewest
number of test cases possible since it does not repeat invalid values.
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Computing First Order Coverage...
Field 0 (T) has 4 of 4 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%   Weight: 10
Field 1 (R) has 66 of 66 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 4 has 93 of 93 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Numeric field 6 has 910 of 910 values tested with a coverage of 100%
Field 10 (T) has 5 of 5 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 12 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 13 has 2 of 2 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 14 has 3 of 3 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 16 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 17 has 3 of 3 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 20 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 22 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
Field 23 has 1 of 1 values tested. That is a coverage of 100%
First Order Coverage: 100%
Figure 27. Partial output of ExCov with 1200 test cases generated by GenFuzz for the
Restaurant Locator Protocol
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V. Results and Discussion
In this chapter, fuzz test sets are created manually, by mutating valid messages,
and by using GenFuzz. These test sets are compared against each other using ExCov,
specifically the C2Fuzz Set metric presented in (65), to answer some questions about the
best approach to fuzzing. Since all the tools in ExFuzz are used in these comparisons,
this chapter serves as validation that the tools work, and, in the case of the ExCov
tool, that the proposed coverage criterion is implementable.
The three protocols created for this thesis and described in Appendix B are used
as the basis for these results and comparisons. Since the Restaurant Locator Protocol
is designed to be similar to military data link protocols, results regarding this protocol
may be directly useful to testers today.
5.1 Mutative Fuzzing Methods
The fuzzing framework presented in Section 1.4 describes the process of mutative
fuzzing as a mutative fuzzer operating on a protocol recording. Since the protocols
used in this section are not implemented anywhere, valid messages were generated
that can act as protocol recordings.
To generate these valid messages, spreadsheets were created in Microsoft Excel
that built hexadecimal messages with randomly selected valid fields. These messages
were then converted into their binary form and, in a second spreadsheet, bit mutations
were applied with a probability entered by the user based on the methods described in
this section. ExCov was then used to compute the coverage of the test sets, returning
coverage values that are used in analyses later in this chapter.
Two main approaches to mutative fuzz set generation will be discussed here. First
is the simple case of sending fully randomized bits. Second is the more complex case
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of sending messages with only a few bit flips.
5.1.1 Fully Random Bits.
To generate a fully randomized message, the probability of a bit flip was set to
0.5 in the mutative fuzz generation spreadsheets. In general, random fuzzing is not
very effective based on the ExCov criterion. The reason for this is straightforward.
Because of the test case limitation (Section 3.2.1, page 65) a message only provides
first order coverage if it has one and only one invalid field. Any message that has
two or more invalid fields provides no first order coverage, and any message that has
three or more invalid fields provides no second order coverage.
For long messages with lots of fields with large invalid spaces, many fully random
messages will have three or more invalid fields and provide no coverage whatsoever.
This method is more effective if a message has less fields with smaller invalid spaces.
Table 5 shows how each of the created protocols is covered by 1000 random test cases
along with the number of fields, and total invalid space in the protocol (that is, |I|
summed for all fields). Random Fuzzing works best for the Meal Protocol since it
has a much smaller total invalid space than the other protocols. It also works fairly
well for Simple Protocol compared to Restaurant Locator Protocol largely because
Simple Protocol has only 3 fields.
Table 5. A comparison of the coverage provided by the fully random mutative fuzzing
approach with 1000 test cases.
Protocol
Number of Fields
with an Invalid Space
Total Invalid
Space (all fields)
Coverage
(1000 Test Cases)
Simple Protocol 3 690 69.4%
Meal Protocol 8 330 77.9%
Restaurant Locator
Protocol
13 1091 27.7%
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5.1.2 Partially Random Bits.
A more effective method of creating fuzz cases is to change only a few of the bits,
instead of an average of half of them as in the fully random approach. There are two
basic ways this can be achieved. Either a small subset of bits are randomly selected
to flip, or a choice is made for each whether to flip or not with a low probability of a
flip.
The latter approach was chosen because it proved far easier to implement. A
random binary number is easier to generate in Microsoft Excel than a random draw
from a set without replacement. Future work may involve mutations performed in
this other way to see if it provides better coverage.
With the mutation randomization approach selected, two more questions were
studied and answered to determine the optimal way to generate mutated messages.
They were:
 When creating a series of mutated messages, which is more effective: mutating
a valid message every time, or mutating the previously mutated message?
 What is the optimal probability of a bit flip?
5.1.2.1 Mutation Basis.
A case can be made for either answer to the first question. In support of mutating
the previously mutated message, an issue with mutating a valid message every time
is that the fuzzed message never strays too far from the valid one. Consider a valid
message where the value in a four bit field is binary 0000. If the mutated messages
are created by mutating this valid message each time, it is unlikely that all four bits
will be mutated to test the value 1111. Later in this chapter the optimal bit flip
probabilities are found for each of the three protocols; they range from 3% to 22%.
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Therefore, in the most optimistic case, the odds this field will be mutated to 1111 are
0.224 = 0.0023, or about twice in 1000 test cases.
If the previous mutated message is the basis for each new mutation, the message
would morph over time into something different, and, it stands to reason, would cover
test cases that would not be covered if mutation begins from the same message every
time. This effect may provide better coverage.
The counter-argument to mutating the previously mutated message approach is
that a chain of mutated messages will quickly become invalid. Like the disadvantage
for completely random fuzzing discussed in Section 5.1.1, this approach will likely
lead to messages with three or more invalid fields providing no coverage under ExCov.
Once a few fields mutate to be invalid, every later message in the mutation change
will also be invalid in those fields unless they are randomly made valid again. In
practice this leads to long stretches of messages that provide no coverage because
they have more than two invalid fields.
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Figure 28. Coverage of test sets created using the mutation on mutation approach with
five different original valid messages.
This effect is shown in Figure 28. To generate the Figure, the same starting valid
message from the Restaurant Locator Protocol was mutated to get the first test case.
Each subsequent test case was found by mutating the previous test case. Mutations
were made on a bit by bit basis with a probability of a bit flip set such that the
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expected number of bit flips per test case was one.
The figure shows five different mutation chains, with points representing the cov-
erage of all test cases up to that point. It can be seen in the figure that at some point
for each mutation chain, the coverage jumps. This is the point where the number of
invalid fields is one, providing first and second order coverage. After the jump the
message likely becomes too invalid to register any more coverage.
If an infinite number of test cases could somehow be tested, 100% coverage would
be expected since every possible combination could be tested. However the largest
tests run, 1000 test cases each, provided about the same amount of coverage, 20%,
as test sets with 50 test cases. This pales in comparison to the coverage provided by
random mutations from one valid test case. That figure was found to be 49.4%, the
average of ten trials which ranged from 29% to 59%. This analysis conclusively shows
that if mutating one valid test case, performing a random mutation on the valid test
case each time provides more coverage than performing the mutation on the previous
mutated case.
The tester will likely have more than one valid message to mutate however. And
while it may be unproductive to mutate based on an already mutated message for
hundreds of test cases, it may be useful to mutate the mutated message a few times,
until it becomes too invalid to provide coverage. Consider this example. A tester
takes 5 valid messages and mutates each of them by changing each bit with some
probability. The tester then mutates these mutations in the same way, 9 times each,
for a total of 10 mutated messages per valid message, or 50 total messages. For this
case it can be said that the tester generated a test set using the mutation on mutation
approach with 10 mutation rounds per valid message.
In this example, the approach taken may achieve better coverage than if the
tester had taken one valid message and mutated it for 100 rounds. Not only will this
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approach avoid long stretches of mutated messages that provide no coverage since
each mutation set is capped at 10 rounds, but some diversity will also be added
to the messages by having 10 different starting valid messages. One question that
arises with this approach is “how many mutation rounds per valid messsage achieves
optimal coverage?” If the answer is 1, then the mutation on mutation approach does
no better than mutating a valid message each time.
To answer this question, 1000 valid messages were generated in the Restaurant
Locator Protocol. Some of these messages were then selected, and mutated using the
mutation on mutation approach for 1, 2, 4, 7, 10 and 15 rounds. Each number of
rounds was tested with 10 test sets of 1000 test cases each. For example, to test the
coverage of 10 rounds of mutation from random valid messages, 100 valid messages
were selected, mutated 10 times each, and then the coverage for the test set was
recorded. This was done for 10 such test sets. To test the coverage of 1 round of
mutation (so really no mutation on mutation), all 1000 valid messages were mutated
once for each of ten test sets.
The mean and standard deviation of the coverage distributions were then found for
each number of mutation rounds. This result is shown in Figure 29. They show that
even in this case, mutating the mutated message does not improve coverage. While
the standard deviations around one to four mutation rounds suggests the observed
downward trend in the means is not sure to hold at these values, certainly 10 and 15
mutation rounds provide far less coverage. There is no evidence here that any number
of mutation rounds, other one round, is optimal. One mutation round is mutating
from a valid message each time, so in this case mutation on mutation does not appear
to be a useful approach.
The benefits of mutation on mutation fuzzing have not yet been entirely dismissed
however. In mutative fuzzing the tester may not have access to randomly generated
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Figure 29. Coverage of test sets created by mutating from random valid messages 1 to
15 times. Each point is the mean of 10, 1000 test case trials. Bars denote one standard
deviation from the mean for each set of trials.
valid messages like the ones used to generate Figure 29. The tester may have only
a few, or even one valid message. If this is the case, it may yet be preferable to use
the mutation on mutation approach rather than start from a small subset of valid
messages each time.
To investigate this case, it was assumed that the tester has only one valid message.
The coverage of tests sets where the mutations were applied to this valid message every
time, and where the mutations were applied in a number rounds were compared. For
example, test sets with four mutation rounds were created by taking a valid message,
mutating it, mutating that mutation, etc. until four messages were generated. The
process then restarted with the valid message, performed four mutations for four
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more messages, and so on until 1000 messages had been created. The effect of bit
flip probability on coverage was also of interest, so different values of that probability
were tested against as well.
In all 170 test sets of 1000 test cases each were created, 10 for each of the 17
round — expected number of bit flips combinations. The average coverage of these
test sets is shown in Figure 30. It turned out that if only one bit is expected to flip
per message, 4 mutation rounds provides the best coverage. Overall however, one
mutation round, or no mutation on mutation, between 5 and 7 expected bit flips per
message provides the most coverage.
This leads to a final conclusion about the mutation on mutation approach. The
only circumstance where it provides better coverage than mutating a valid message
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Figure 30. Average coverage versus expected number of bit flips for three mutation
on mutation round lengths where all mutations start from same valid message. Each
point is the average of 10 trials, each with 1000 test cases.
121
each time is when the probability of a bit flip is low. Since the tester generally has
control over the probability of a bit flip in their mutator, the mutation on mutation
approach is not more effective than the mutation on a valid message approach in any
identifiable situation.
5.1.2.2 Optimal Bit Flip Probability.
The second question posed in this section is “what is the optimal probability of
a bit flip?” Again there is a kind of balancing act between keeping a valid message
valid by not mutating it enough, and making it too invalid by mutating it too much.
If the expected number of bit flips in a mutation is low, then odds are better that the
mutations that do occur will not render the valid message invalid. This means the
mutated test case would provide no coverage. In contrast, if the expected number of
bit flips in a message is high, the odds are better that more than two fields will become
invalid and the test case will provide no first or second order invalid coverage. This
means that there must be some optimal expected number of bit flips with respect to
coverage.
It stands to reason that this optimal value is dependent on the protocol. If a
protocol has a small amount of invalid space, it will require more bit flips to place a
message in that invalid space. In a similar fashion, If a protocol has a large amount
of invalid space, it should require less bit flips to create a message with one invalid
field. Other properties of a protocol may also influence this optimal value, such as
the number and size of the fields, and make-up of the valid messages being mutated
from.
To find the optimal number of bit flips, test sets were generated by mutating
randomly generated valid messages with varying expected number of bit flips. This
was done for all three protocols.
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Figure 31. Average coverage for a mutation based fuzz test of the Simple Protocol based
on bit flip probability. Each data point is the average of 10 trials of 1000 mutated test
cases each. Bars denote one standard deviation from the mean for each set of trials.
 Simple Protocol:
To test Simple Protocol, 70 test sets of 1000 test cases each were generated with
various expected number of bit flip values. The results are shown in Figure 31.
The points in this figure are the average coverage of 10 test sets with the listed
expected number of bit flips. The bars denote standard deviation.
Because it is so simple, Simple Protocol nicely illustrates the balancing act
when it comes to bit flip probability. The figure shows a clear improvement in
coverage as the expected number of bit flips approaches three, and a clear decline
in coverage after the expected number of bit flips passes four. Small standard
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deviations also validate these trends, and allow the assertion that an expected
number of bit flips of 3.5 produces optimal coverage for mutative fuzzing of the
simple protocol.
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Figure 32. Average coverage for a mutation based fuzz test of the Meal Protocol based
on bit flip probability. Each data point is the average of 10 trials of 1000 mutated test
cases each. Bars denote one standard deviation from the mean for each set of trials.
 Meal Protocol:
To test Meal Protocol, 80 test sets of 1000 test cases each were generated with
various expected number of bit flip values. The results are shown in Figure 32.
The points in this figure are the average coverage of 10 test sets with the listed
expected number of bit flips. The bars denote standard deviation.
The arc of this figure is similar to Simple Protocol, but has a less definitive peak.
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Higher bit flip probabilities are also more effective than in Simple Protocol,
perhaps a reflection on the relatively fewer invalid cases in Meal Protocol (see
Table 5). The standard deviation is again fairly small compared to the jumps
in the means across the figure. This again validates the observed curve, and
suggests the peak wasn’t created purely by chance. Oddly the best guess, based
on this figure, for an optimum number of bit flips is again 3.5 flips.
 Restaurant Locator Protocol: To test Restaurant Locator Protocol, 90
test sets of 1000 test cases each were generated with various expected number
of bit flip values. The results are shown in Figure 33. The points in this Figure
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Figure 33. Average coverage for a mutation based fuzz test of the Restaurant Locator
Protocol based on bit flip probability. Each data point is the average of 10 trials of
1000 mutated test cases each. Bars denote one standard deviation from the mean for
each set of trials.
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are the average coverage of 10 test sets with the listed expected number of bit
flips. The bars denote standard deviation.
In contrast to the other two protocols, the RLP does not have a clear optimal
number of bit flips. Not only are the averages all around 72% between 2 and
5 expected flips, but the standard deviations are large as well. This is surely
a result of the increased complexity of this protocol. It features more fields
and more invalid test cases than the other protocols, and also implements three
choices and a rule set. Based on the fact that the maximum is also the mid
point between 2 and 5, the apparent cut-offs for the peak of the curve, once
again 3.5 bit flips is optimal.
Despite all three protocols having the same optimal expected number of bit flips,
it is believed, based on the discussion presented earlier, that this value still depends
on the protocol. The three invented protocols just happened to share the same value
for the optimal number of expected number of bit flips.
5.2 Generative versus Mutative Fuzzing
Three methods for fuzz set generation have been presented thus far. Fully random
mutative fuzzing was presented in Section 5.1.1, partially random mutative fuzzing
with an expected number of bit flips per mutation was presented in Section 5.1.2,
and generative fuzzing using GenFuzz was presented in Section 4.3. Each of these
methods was used to generate test sets for the three protocols, and their coverage
was found.
5.2.1 Simple Protocol.
Figure 34 shows the results of the three approaches to fuzz set generation for
Simple Protocol. Like in previous figures, each point is the average of ten test sets
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Figure 34. A comparison of three fuzz generation methods for the Simple Protocol
with the exception of GenFuzz, which has little variation between test sets due to
its largely deterministic generation approach. Standard deviation is not shown for
clarity, but is less than 10% for all points and less than 1% for points at 1000 test
cases.
Not surprisingly, GenFuzz performs the best at any number of cases. The bit flip
approach, using the optimal expected number of bit flips, 3.5, performs remarkably
well also. This suggests that with the proper probability of bit mutation, simple
protocols are well covered by mutative fuzzers.
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Figure 35. A comparison of three fuzz generation methods for the Meal Protocol
5.2.2 Meal Protocol.
Figure 35 shows the results of the three approaches to fuzz set generation for Meal
Protocol. Like in previous figures, each point is the average of ten test sets with the
exception of GenFuzz, which has little variation between test sets due to its largely
deterministic generation approach. Standard deviation is not shown for clarity, but
is less than 9% for all Random results, less than 14% for all Bit Flip results, and less
than 1% for all Bit Flip results with 200 or more test cases.
Like with Simple Protocol, GenFuzz performs the best while an optimal number
of bit flips does very well compared to random messages. Coverage for Meal Protocol
is also very high. First order coverage actually reaches 100% from GenFuzz at 330
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test cases. Its slow rise beyond that is caused by test cases that contribute second
order coverage being added. Once again, an optimal number of bit flips provides
almost as much coverage as GenFuzz. GenFuzz is by no means perfect, but based on
its methodical switching between fields to fuzz, it would be very difficult to create a
fuzzer that performs better for the first 100 test cases.
5.2.3 Restaurant Locator Protocol.
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Figure 36. A comparison of three fuzz generation methods for the Restaurant Locator
Protocol
Figure 36 shows the results of the three approaches to fuzz set generation for the
Restaurant Locator Protocol. Like in previous figures, each point is the average of
ten test sets with the exception of GenFuzz, which has little variation between test
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sets due to its largely deterministic generation approach. Standard deviation is not
shown for clarity, but is less than 10% for all Random results, less than 9% for all Bit
Flip results, and less than 5% for all Bit Flip results with 50 or more test cases.
The Restaurant Locator Protocol is designed to be the most like actual military
data link protocols, so its results may have the largest impact on actual fuzzing work.
Due to the protocol’s complexity, random fuzzing is barely effective. With standard
deviations that are at times greater than the mean, the decrease in this curve at 500
test cases can be explained by random variation.
In contrast to the other protocols, the bit flip approach does not rival the GenFuzz
approach until the number of test cases exceeds 500. This suggests that in cases
where there is a limited number of test cases that can be tested against a system, a
generative fuzzer will be far preferable to a mutative fuzzer. A Generative fuzzer that
considers second order coverage (GenFuzz does not) may prove even more effective
in this region.
At the opposite end of the figure, it appears that the Bit Flip method is set to
surpass the GenFuzz method. This is expected to be the case if the methods had
been tested further. GenFuzz is set up to focus on first order coverage. It achieves
100% first order coverage after 1091 test case for RLP. The fuzzer does not generate
test cases that have more than one invalid field, so 100% second order coverage can
never be achieved. Since the other two methods are purely probabilistic, any message
is possible, therefore 100% coverage is possible with enough test cases. Bit Flips is
bound to surpass the coverage of GenFuzz eventually. A fuzzer that considers second
order invalid spaces will easily be able to out perform GenFuzz and the Bit Flip
approach.
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5.3 Generative versus Manual Fuzzing
Another way for a tester to generate test cases is to select them manually. Strictly
speaking many may not consider this approach fuzzing since inputs are not auto-
matically generated. In a way it more resembles a red-team vulnerability discovery
approach. But it is possible for a tester to analyze a protocol and select cases thought
to provide high coverage. It is also possible for the coverage calculator to compute a
coverage value for these test cases.
A generative fuzzer has access to the data model, and should theoretically have
access to all the information a tester has. For this reason, a generative fuzzer should
always be able to be designed that provides coverage that meets or exceeds the cover-
age of a manually generated test set. But generative fuzzers aren’t necessarily perfect,
and GenFuzz certainly has some flaws that would allow a manually crafted test set
to exceed its coverage.
The obvious drawback to manually crafting a test set is the time and effort required
of the tester. GenFuzz generates thousands of test cases in seconds or less; it takes
minutes to craft just a few messages manually even if the tester has some tools to
help with the task.
To compare these two approaches, some fuzz test sets were crafted manually.
Previously developed spreadsheets, created to test the various components of ExFuzz,
were used allowing the messages to be generated with ease. The spreadsheets listed
every field in a protocol and allowed entry of any desired value and include whatever
field and words wanted in a message. They automatically generated the hexidecimal
representation of each message, and some copy and pasting placed the test set into
the text file format recognized by ExCov. This section compares these test sets with
some generated by GenFuzz.
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5.3.1 Simple Protocol.
Since the simple protocol is such a straightforward protocol it wasn’t difficult to
generate cases using a spreadsheet. In fact, generating all 690 first order invalid cases
simply required using the Excel fill tool to create sequential lists of numbers. Each
test case required one invalid field and two valid fields. The valid fields were selected
using a random function, and each invalid value was tested only once.
Table 6. A comparison of manual test set generation and GenFuzz for Simple Protocol
Test Cases Method 1st ord. cov. 2nd ord. cov. Coverage
Generation
Time
690
Manual 100% 68.1% 84.1% 7 min
GenFuzz 100% 68.1% 84.1% < 1 sec
1000
Manual 100% 71.0% 85.5% 20 min
GenFuzz 100% 73.3% 86.7% < 1 sec
The top half of Table 6 shows the coverage result for this manual test set. As
designed, it achieved 100% first order coverage. GenFuzz also acheived this mark as
it was designed to do. Second order coverage was also identical. This was no surprise
since every test case contributed two invalid field combinations, the combinations that
include the one invalid field. Since no invalid value was repeated, no field combination
value was repeated either, guaranteeing equal coverage. The major difference between
these two approaches is that GenFuzz took less than a second to generate these test
cases while it took 7 minutes to craft them in Microsoft Excel.
Since these results provide little new information, another 310 test cases were gen-
erated to try to get as much second order coverage as possible. Since GenFuzz focuses
on first order test cases, it does not create messages with two invalid fields. Therefore,
in an attempt to outperform GenFuzz, a series of 310 messages with two invalid fields
were created, roughly equally divided between the three field combinations.
When ExCov was run on this test set, it was surprising to discover that GenFuzz
actually provided more coverage than the manual set did. After a little analysis it was
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discovered why. When a message in Simple Protocol has one invalid field, say field
A, it provides coverage for two field combinations, A-B and A-C. When a message
has two invalid fields say A and B, it only provides coverage for field combination
A-B. A-C and B-C are not covered because the other field not in the combination is
invalid. This is dictated in the Rth order test case limitation in Section 3.2.2.2, on
page 71.
This meant that every extra test case that was generated only provided coverage
to one field combination. Every test case GenFuzz produced provided coverage for two
field combinations unless the randomly selected pair of values happened to repeat. It
is reasonable to think that testing some messages with two invalid fields should provide
more coverage than testing more of the same valid-invalid combinations. The reason
this does not provide more coverage is that a PMF specifically for vulnerabilities
in second order spaces has not yet been developed. Such a PMF could cause the
manually created test set to provide more coverage than GenFuzz because the manual
approach created some field combinations with two invalid fields while GenFuzz did
not.
5.3.2 Meal Protocol.
Meal Protocol was not simple enough to generate all first order values in a short
amount of time as was the case with Simple Protocol. Instead each field with an
invalid space was fuzzed, one at a time. Since the protocol involves three different
words, it was simply set up so that the messages would rotate between the breakfast
word, the lunch word and the dinner word. Care was taken to fuzz each field in a
word once before repeating fields as GenFuzz did. Test set creation was stopped when
each field with an invalid space small enough to manually cover had been covered,
plus a few more cases with invalid values in the lager invalid spaces.
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Table 7. A comparison of manual test set generation and GenFuzz for Meal Protocol
Test Cases Method 1st ord. cov. 2nd ord. cov. Coverage
Generation
Time
24
Manual 80.9% 69.2% 75.0% 15 min
GenFuzz 81.3% 70.3% 75.8% < 1 sec
The results are shown in Table 7. GenFuzz performed slightly better because it
did not have a restriction on rotating between the three words. This allowed it to
more evenly cover all the fields with invalid spaces, maximizing coverage. Again,
the generation time is the major difference between the two fuzz set generation ap-
proaches.
5.3.3 Restaurant Locator Protocol.
Like the Meal Protocol, the Restaurant Locator Protocol is made up of a number
of words. Unlike the Meal Protocol, more than one word may appear in a message.
In fact, all 6 words can appear in the same message. To make the fuzz set generation
easier, every message was set at the maximum valid length which contained all 6
words. The fuzzable fields were then made invalid one at a time for each test case.
Once all fields with invalid spaces were fuzzed, each new message fuzzed a field for a
second time. This is the same procedure applied in GenFuzz.
50 test cases were created, which took about ten minutes. It was decided to stop
at this point because all the fields with smaller invalid spaces had been completely
fuzzed, and only fields with very large invalid spaces remained. The results of this
fuzzing are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. A comparison of manual test set generation and GenFuzz for the Restaurant
Locator Protocol
Test Cases Method 1st ord. cov. 2nd ord. cov. Coverage
Generation
Time
50
Manual 96.8% 67.8% 82.3% 10 min
GenFuzz 97.3% 44.1% 70.7% < 1 sec
2000 GenFuzz 100% 53.2% 76.6% 5 sec
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It was initially surprising to find that the manual test set had a higher coverage
than GenFuzz’s test set did. The number of generated test cases was increased to
2000 and GenFuzz was tested again to still find that its coverage was significantly
below that of the 50 test case manual set. It was noticed that GenFuzz actually
outperformed the manual generation method in first order coverage, but trailed far
behind in second order coverage.
It was determined after some analysis that the reason for this was the choice to
use the maximal length message every time. GenFuzz is set up to randomly select
message length along with the other valid values it selects for each test case. This
means that most messages in the GenFuzz test set are shorter than in the manual
test set.
A longer message includes more field combinations, so every test case in the manual
set guaranteed a near maximal amount of second order coverage. Since no two invalid
values were repeated, no field combination values were repeated either. Also since
each field with an invalid space was fuzzed, almost every possible field combination
was fuzzed at least once. This provided a major boost to second order coverage.
GenFuzz relies on randomly including the necessary words to test each field com-
bination. Even with 2000 test cases many field combinations went untested. This
allowed the manual generation method with 50 test cases to provide more coverage
than GenFuzz at 2000 test cases. The biggest take away here is that a generative
fuzzer ought to take advantage of long message lengths when it can to increase second
order fuzzing.
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VI. Future Work and Conclusion
6.1 Future Work
Throughout this thesis references have been made to problems that could have
been better solved with more time, or issues that could and ought to be address with
future work. A compilation of these potential endeavors that would contribute more
to this work is presented here.
 Improve Vulnerability PMFs: A theme touched on at many points in this
thesis is the ExCov criterion’s reliance on a probabilistic model of the nature
of vulnerabilities in general. The model used in this thesis, created in Section
3.3 using data from Appendix D, is developed from real world protocols, but
not real world vulnerabilities. Surveying real vulnerabilities across data link
like protocols and incorporating the information gained into the vulnerability
models and then the PMFs will greatly improve the legitimacy of the coverage
criterion as a whole.
 Develop a field combination coverage equation: In Chapter III, the equa-
tions that take a set of invalid test cases and return a coverage value are all
based on first order fields. When the calculation moves to multi-order field
combinations, the old coverage equation is used for convenience. This may not
be wrong exactly, with a unique PMF an argument could be made that this
is the proper equation, but the uniqueness of field combinations compared to
fields suggest that another derivation unique to multi-order spaces should be
derived. This may be a complex effort, deriving the equation for a single field
was no small feat, and multi-order field combinations are far more convoluted
than single fields.
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 Add capabilities to ExCov: In Section 4.2 on page 108 some capabilities
missing from ExCov are listed. Some of these exist in Chapter III and just
need to be added to the tool, others need theory to be developed and added
to the coverage criterion. Doing this for these features will improve ExCov’s
applicability and usability.
 Improve GenFuzz: In Chapter V, there are a number of mentions of the
potential to improve the generative fuzzer application GenFuzz. GenFuzz’s
main failing is that it focuses only on first order and not second order test
cases. Another generative fuzzer could be designed that focuses on both orders
to maximize coverage. Aspects of GenFuzz could also be improved, like adding
support for weighted fields or values, or unique fuzzing approaches for numeric
and basic fields.
 Investigate other mutation approaches: Mentioned in Section 5.1.2 is
the potential to study alternative methods of mutative fuzz set generation. The
method used in this thesis is to mutate each bit with some probability set such
that the expected total number of mutated bits in a message is a set value. This
means that a message may experience no mutations, or many more mutations
than intended. An alternative approach to mutation would set the number
of mutations per message at a fixed value, randomly selecting the appropriate
number of bits for mutation. Testing whether or not such an approach provides
more or less coverage could help designers of mutative fuzzing tools make better
decisions about their fuzzer’s operation.
 Test ExFuzz on open source protocols: In the unlimited distribution
portion of this thesis, ExFuzz was only ever applied to protocols crafted specif-
ically for this thesis. Testing the tool against real protocols should highlight
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its strengths and weaknesses and suggest further areas of improvement. It may
also uncover some vulnerabilities in these protocols.
 Improve the usability of ExFuzz: Since ExFuzz is currently a Microsoft
Visual Studio C++ project, it is not very user friendly or distributable. For
this tool to be ultimately useful, it needs to feature a user friendly interface and
clear documentation. These could be developed for ExFuzz, or ExFuzz could
be integrated within some other fuzzing tool. From its conception, ExFuzz was
designed to have some similarities to Peach, namely a Peach Pit, to support
integration with that tool in the future.
6.2 Conclusion
Negative testing, specifically fuzz testing, is crucial to defending weapon systems
from cyber attacks. To implement fuzz testing effectively across all weapon system
components, a way to measure the effectiveness of any test is needed. This thesis
proposed such a metric, called a coverage criterion.
Chapter II looked at the state of the art in fuzz testing and a few attempts to
apply some sort of metric to a fuzz test. The chapter concluded that none of these
efforts produced a metric that could be easily understood by a tester without intricate
knowledge of the criterion’s construction. In this chapter some open source fuzzing
frameworks, Peach and Sulley, were investigated to see how their strengths might be
leveraged to create a tool that can measure coverage.
Chapter III developed equations and procedures that allow computation of the
coverage of a set of fuzz test cases using this thesis’s proposed definition for coverage:
the expected percent of existing vulnerabilities discovered by a set of test cases. The
method was named ExCov, short for expected coverage, because it relies heavily on
probabilistic expectation, and also because it means what a tester would expect it to
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mean.
With the criterion developed, a suite of tools built around the method was pre-
sented in Chapter IV. This tool suite was called ExFuzz. ExFuzz consists of three
main parts: a data model parser called DataModel that interperates a Peach Pit
data model with some custom modifications; a coverage calculator called ExCov that
implements the new criterion; and a generative fuzzer called GenFuzz that produces
a high coverage test set for any data model based on the coverage criterion.
Finally, Chapter V used ExFuzz to compare a variety of fuzz test set generation
approaches. By doing this, some questions were answered regarding which generations
methods are the most effective and by how much. These results can be used to develop
and execute better fuzz tests. By exercising the ExFuzz tool, the implementability of
the ExCov criterion was verified. This chapter also demonstrated how the tool can
be used to create high coverage test sets with GenFuzz.
Fuzz testing is in many ways a very imprecise science. The possible number of
inputs nearly always borders on infinite and despite the amount of testing done,
there is almost always the possibility that a vulnerability has been missed. Without
an effective way to measure the quality of a set of fuzz test inputs, this technique
will remain imprecise, leaving testers with a great amount of uncertainty despite the
number or quality of fuzz tests they apply. By introducing such a method, fuzz testing
techniques may be improved so that they may be used with confidence to defend or
most critical systems.
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Appendix A. Terms and Definitions
This appendix contains two tables. The first lists some acronyms used throughout
the thesis,and their meaning. The second table lists a variety of terms used throughout
the thesis that have a non-obvious meaning, or may require a precise definition. These
terms are accompanied by a description of the term, its importance and a precise
definition if necessary.
Table 9. A list of the acronyms used throughout this thesis and their definitions
Acronym Description First Mention
GCD Greatest Common Divisor Sec. 4.3, Pg. 110
GPS-SPS Global Positioning System - Standard Positioning Service Ch. I, Pg. 18
IIC Invalid in Combination Sec. 3.2.2, Pg. 70
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4 Sec. 4.1, Pg. 98
MIL-STD Military Standard Sec. 4.1, Pg. 98
PMF Probability Mass Function Sec. 3.1.2, Pg. 45
RLP Restaurant Locator Protocol Sec. B.3, Pg. 149
SUT System Under Test Ch. I, Pg. 14
SVCov Semi-valid Input Coverage Sec. 2.2.2, Pg. 29
Table 10. A list of key terms used throughout this thesis and their definitions
Term Description Reference
Adequacy
Criterion
The thing or things that are measured to determine the
adequacy of a test
Sec. 2.2.1,Pg. 28
Agent
An entity responsible for monitoring the SUT for any un-
expected behavior during a fuzz test.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 17
Choice
An XML element used in a Peach Pit that allows the value
in one field determine which set of fields appears elsewhere
in the message.
Sec. 2, Pg. 101
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Term Description Reference
Choice Relation*
A type of field in a Peach Pit data model that dictates the
result of a choice elsewhere in the model using a relation
child element.
Sec. 4.1.2, Pg.
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Coverage
A term generally understood to mean the extent to which a
test set covers the space of inputs in a fuzz test. This thesis
proposes a specific definition for this term as: the expected
percent of existing vulnerabilities discovered by a set of test
cases.
Sec. 1.5, Pg. 20
Coverage
Calculator*
An application that computes the effectiveness of a fuzz
test set based on a coverage criterion.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 17
Coverage
Criterion
An adequacy criterion that uses a measurement of coverage
to determine the adequacy of a test.
Sec. 1.3, Pg. 14
DataModel (C++
tool)
The C++ tool developed as part of ExFuzz that builds a
data model object from a modified Peach Pit XML docu-
ment
Sec. 4.1.3, Pg.
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DataModel
(XML)
A Peach Pit XML file that is modified with the extensions
shown in Section 4.1.2.
Sec. 4.1, Pg. 98
Discover*
A test case is said to discover some vulnerability V if it is
the first test case in a test set to trigger V .
Sec. 3.1, Pg. 34
Disjoint*
A numeric field is disjoint if the values of its invalid space
is not contiguous.
Sec. 3.1.3.2, Pg.
52
ExFuzz*
Expected Fuzzer. This is the C++ project that combines
the three tools created to demonstrate the ExCov coverage
criterion.
Ch. IV, Pg. 97
ExCov*
Expected Coverage. This term can refer to either the cov-
erage criterion presented in this thesis, or the coverage cal-
culator that implements the criterion.
Ch. III, Pg. 33;
Sec. 4.2, Pg.
106
Field
The fundamental element of a protocol. Every bit in a
message belongs to a field, and every field has a length (in
bits) and a valid space.
Sec. 3.2.1, Pg.
63
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Term Description Reference
Field
Combination*
A set of two or more fields. Vulnerabilities reside in field
combinations instead of fields when they depend on the
values of multiple fields.
Ch. III, Pg. 33
Field Coverage*
A measure of coverage for a single field in a protocol. This
is an intermediate result in the computation of the cover-
age of a test set. Field Coverage is explicitly defined as
The expected percentage of existing vulnerabilities in a field
discovered by a set of test cases.
Sec. 3.1, Pg. 34
Fuzzing
A method of vulnerability discovery where little is known
about the inner workings of the system under test. Accord-
ing to [22], “Fuzzing is the the process of sending intention-
ally invalid data to a product in the hopes of triggering an
error condition of fault.”
Sec. 1.3, Pg. 14
Generative
Fuzzing
A method of test set generation where invalid messages are
generated based on a protocol model or data model.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 16
GenFuzz*
Generative Fuzzer. The C++ tool developed as part of Ex-
Fuzz that generates a set of test cases from a data model
that acheives high coverage as measured by the ExCov cri-
terion.
Sec. 4.3, Pg.
109
Invalid in Combi-
nation (IIC)*
A set of values for a field combination that are valid inde-
pendently, but invalid when combined.
Sec. 3.2.2.1, Pg.
70
Invalid Space*
The set of values that do not meet the requirements of the
protocol specification for a field or field combination
Sec. 3.1.1, Pg.
36
Mutative Fuzzing
A method of test set generation that involves taking a valid
message and changing some of the bits to make it invalid.
Mutative fuzzing does not require a protocol model or, in
some cases, any knowledge of the protocol whatsoever.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 16
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Term Description Reference
Numeric Field*
A type of field where invalid values have an implied numeric
meaning. An important characteristic of this field type is
that vulnerabilities are assumed to always be contiguous in
the invalid space.
Sec. 3.1.3.2, Pg.
50
Order*
The number of fields being assessed or fuzzed. An N th
order vulnerability spans N fields, and N th order coverage
refers to the coverage of N th order vulnerabilities.
Ch. III, Pg. 34
Protocol Model
A general term for what is referred to as a data model in
this thesis. See data model (XML)
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 16
Repeating
Relation
A type of field in the Peach Pit data model that sets the
number of times a block of fields repeats.
Sec. 3, Pg. 101
Specific
Vulnerability
Space*
A set of values that trigger one specific vulnerability. A
specific vulnerability space is always a subset of a field’s
vulnerability space.
Sec. 3.1.1, Pg.
37
Structure Field*
A field that contains information about how a message is
structured or interpreted. There are three types of struc-
ture fields used in this thesis, the repeating relation field,
the choice relation field, and the token field.
Sec. 3.1.3.1, Pg.
48
System Under
Test (SUT)
The system that is being tested for vulnerabilities. In fuzz
testing, this system receives the fuzzed messages and is
monitored for faults.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 17
Test Case
One message, or instance of a protocol, applied to the SUT
during a fuzz test.
Sec. 3.2.1, Pg.
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Test Set
A set of messages, or test cases, to be applied to a SUT in
a fuzz test. The coverage calculator computes to coverage
of this set of messages.
Sec. 1.4, Pg. 16
Tester The human designing, running, and observing the test. Sec. 1.3, Pg. 14
Token
A type of field in a Peach Pit data model that dictates the
selection made by a choice block. Token fields are always
within their choice block in contrast to choice relation fields.
Sec. 3.2.3.2, Pg.
76
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Term Description Reference
Valid Space*
The set of values that meet the requirements of the protocol
specification for a field or field combination
Sec. 3.1.1, Pg.
36
Vulnerability
According to Microsoft, a vulnerability is “a weakness in
a product that could allow an attacker to compromise the
integrity, availability, or confidentiality of that product.”
This definitions suits this thesis’s needs fine, with the prod-
uct being the SUT.
[20]
Vulnerability
Space*
A set of values that is the union of all specific vulnerability
spaces of a field. A vulnerability space is always a subset
of an invalid space.
Sec. 3.1.1, Pg.
37
* Denotes terms created in the context of this thesis.
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Appendix B. Protocol Examples
This appendix describes the fictitious protocols that were written to faciliate devel-
opment of a coverage criterion, and provide insight into different methods of fuzzing.
The protocols were designed with varying levels of complexity. The simplest proto-
col, termed Simple Protocol, was used to confirm basic coverage calculations by hand.
Two, more complex, protocols included some features that were more difficult for
the ExFuzz suite to handle, and were designed to closely resemble military data link
protocols. In order of complexity, these are Meal Protocol and Restaurant Locator
Protocol.
In this appendix, each protocol will be described as it might appear in a protocol
standard document. Then the Data Model, presented in section 4.1, that describes
the protocol will be presented. These data models have been supplied as inputs to
the ExFuzz tools to produce the results in Chapter V.
B.1 Simple Protocol
The simple protocol consists of three, eight bit fields. All three fields have the
same rules and meaning. They must contain an ASCII uppercase letter, that is a
value between decimal 65 (A) and 90 (Z). This means that the decimal values 0 to 64
and 91 to 255 are invalid. This protocol could be imagined as part of a larger system,
perhaps passing three letter error or status codes, or maybe domestic airport codes.
Figure 37 shows the bit map for the Simple Protocol.
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24 bits
Each field contains an 8-bit ASCII capital letter
Field 1 Field 2 Field 3
8 bits 8 bits 8 bits
Figure 37. Bit map for the Simple Protocol
This protocol is represented by the modified Peach Pit Data Model shown here:
<DataModel name=”SimpleProtocol”>
<Number name=”LTR1” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”65-90”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”LTR2” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”65-90”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”LTR3” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”65-90”/>
</Number>
</DataModel>
B.2 Meal Protocol
The meal protocol is imagined as a protocol that transfers a meal order, perhaps
from a customer to the kitchen. The protocol is organized into bytes, and a message
is 2 to 8 bytes long. The message structure is shown in Figure 38.
1 - 7 Data Bytes
8 - 56 bits8 bits
16 - 64 bits
Initial Byte
Figure 38. The structure of a message in the Meal Protocol
The first byte in every message is called the initial byte and carries meta data
about the order such as the order number, the meal, (breakfast, lunch, or dinner) and
the number of people served by the order. The remaining bytes convey the drink,
meal, and dessert orders. Since the food is different depending on which meal is being
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served, the definition of these data bytes depends on the meal in the initial byte field.
The bit maps for the initial and data bytes are shown in Figure 39. Table 11 describes
each field and lists their valid values.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Drink
Initial Byte
Meal DessertDinner
Lunch
Breakfast
Data Bytes
Meal
Drink Meal
Drink
bits :
Order # Meal Num_Items
Figure 39. Bit maps for the bytes in the Meal Protocol
Field Name Description
Length
(bits)
Valid Values
(decimal)
Order # An identification number for the order 3 0 - 7
Meal (Initial Byte)
Selects the type of meal, Breakfast (0), Lunch (1),
or Dinner (2)
2 0 - 2
Number of Items
(Num Items)
Indicates the number of data bytes in the message.
This can be thought of as the number of customers
on the order.
3 1 - 7
Drink (Breakfast) Water (0) or Coffee (1) 1 0 or 1
Meal (Breakfast)
There are 15 breakfast items on the menu. The value
here indicates which item is requested.
7 1 - 15
Drink (Lunch) Water (0), Soda Pop (1), or Juice (2) 2 0 - 2
Meal (Lunch)
There are 21 lunch items on the menu. The value
here indicates which item is requested.
6 1 - 21
Drink (Dinner) Water (0), Soda Pop (1), or Juice (2) 2 0 - 2
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Field Name Description
Length
(bits)
Valid Values
(decimal)
Meal (Dinner)
There are 16 dinner items on the menu. The value
here indicates which item is requested, with item 16
being represented as decimal 0.
4 0 - 15
Dessert
There are 4 desserts on the menu. The value here
indicates which dessert is requested, with dessert 4
being represented as decimal 0.
2 0 - 3
Table 11. A description of the fields in the Meal Protocol
This protocol is represented by the modified Peach Pit Data Model shown here:
<DataModel name=”MealOrder”>
<Number name=”OrderNumber” size =”3” value=”0”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Choice name=”MealTypeChoice”>
<Block name=”Breakfast”>
<Number name = ”BreakfastType” token=”true” size=”2” value=”0”>
<Hint priority=”5”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”BNum Items” size=”3”>
<Relation type=”count” of=”BreakfastItem” adjustment=”0”/>
<Hint valid =”1-7”/>
</Number>
<Block name=”BreakfastItem” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”7”>
<Number name=”BDrink” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”BMeal” size=”7”>
<Hint valid =”1-15”/>
</Number>
</Block>
</Block>
<Block name=”Lunch”>
<Number name = ”LunchType” token=”true” size=”2” value=”1”/>
<Number name=”LNum Items” size=”3”>
<Relation type=”count” of=”LunchItem” adjustment=”0”/>
<Hint invalid =”0”/>
</Number>
<Block name=”LunchItem” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”7”>
<Number name=”LDrink” size=”2”>
<Hint invalid =”3”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”LMeal” size=”6”>
<Hint valid =”1-21”/>
</Number>
</Block>
</Block>
<Block name=”Dinner”>
<Number name = ”DinnerType” token=”true” size=”2” value=”2”/>
<Number name=”DNum Items” size=”3”>
<Relation type=”count” of=”DinnerItem” adjustment=”0”/>
<Hint invalid =”0”/>
</Number>
<Block name=”DinnerItem” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”7”>
<Number name=”DDrink” size=”2”>
<Hint invalid =”3”/>
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</Number>
<Number name=”DMeal” size=”4”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”DDessert” size=”2”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
</Block>
</Block>
</Choice>
</DataModel>
B.3 Restaurant Locator Protocol
Restaurant Locator Protocol (RLP) is imagined as a protocol that delivers infor-
mation about restaurants anywhere in the world. A RLP message consists of one to
six words. The first word must always be the same word, called Word 1. Following
Word 1, Words 2, 3, and 4 may appear in any order with the following caveats:
 Word 2 must always be immediately followed by Word 3, and Word 3 must
always be preceded by Word 2. This is because these words convey latitude and
longitude, and it would not make sense for one to exist without the other.
 Words 2 and 3 may not appear more than once in a message. A restaurant can
not be located at two different points.
 Word 4 may not be repeated more than 3 times.
Each word is 16 bits long. Since a message may be from one to six words in
length, it may be from 16 to 96 bits in length. Figure 40 shows the structure of an
RLP message.
The first three bits of each word define which word it is. The remaining 13 bits
convey some information about the restaurant associated with the message. Word
4 also can be one of three different types, depending on the value bits 3 - 5. The
remaining fields in the word depend on this value. Word 4 type 3 has another quirk
where some fields depend on the value of bit 6. If bit 6 is a 0, bits 7 - 14 are one field
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Starting word (Always word 1) 0 - 5 follow on words (Some combination of words 2, 3 and 4)*
* Words 2 and 3 must always appear together in that order
…
16 bits
Word X
16 - 96 bits
Word 1
16 bits 16 bits
Word X
Figure 40. The structure of a message in the Restaurant Locator Protocol
representing a name. If bit 6 is a 1, bit 7 indicates a gender (either male or female)
and bits 8 - 14 are a field representing a name. Figure 41 shows a bit map of the fields
in all the words of RLP. Table 12 describes each field and lists their valid values.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 ug op 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 GI m/f*
Spr
Word 4
Type 3 Name / Name (LSBs)
bits :
Spare
Word 4
Type 2
Mng (MSBs)
SpareManager (LSBs)
Word 3
Longitude (MSBs)
Longitude (LSBs)
Word 4
Type 1
Health
Type A Type B
Word 2
Latitude (LSBs)
Latitude (MSBs)
Word 1
Num_Words
Restaurant
bits :
Figure 41. Bit maps for the words in the Restaurant Locator Protocol
Field Name Description Length (bits)
Valid Values
(decimal)
Number of words
(Num Words)
Describes the number of words following Word
1 in the message
3 0 - 5
Urgent Flag (ug) Indicates if the message is urgent 1 0 or 1
Open Flag (op) Indicates if the restaurant is open 1 0 or 1
Restaurant
Indicates the restaurant name. This would in-
volve a table (not included) that might start,
0 – Unknown, 1 – Einstein Bagels, etc.
8 0 - 162
Latitude
Indicates the latitude in 2’s compliment and
increments of 90/4095 degrees. The polar re-
gions (above 80◦)are considered invalid and
shall not be used
13 455-7736
Longitude
Indicates the longitude in 2’s compliment and
increments of 180/4095 degrees.
13 0-8191
Healthiness
(Health)
Indicates the healthiness of the food on a scale
from zero to three
2 0-3
Type A
0 – Fast food
1 – Casual sit down
2 – Upscale
2 0-2
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Field Name Description Length (bits)
Valid Values
(decimal)
Type B
0 – No Type
1 – American
2 – Itallian
3 – Mexican
4 – Chinese
5 – Japanese/Korean
6 – Mediterranean
7 – Middle Eastern
8 – Indian
9 – French
10 – German
11 – Pizza
12 – Sandwiches
13 – Buffet
4 0-13
Manager
A name for the manager of the restaurant. As
with the restaurant field, this may involve a
table.
8 0-254
Gender Indicator
Determines which fields appear next. If a 0,
the 8 bit name field appears, if a 1, the 1 bit
gender field, and the 7 bit gendered name field
appear.
1 0 and 1
Name
A name of a restaurant employee, as with the
manager field, this may involve a table.
8 0-254
Male or Female
(m/f)
A male (0) or female (1) name follows 1 0 and 1
Gendered Name
A name of a restaurant employee, as with the
manager field, this may involve a table.
7 0-126
Spare (spr) Unused bits varies 0
Table 12. A description of the fields in the Restaurant Locator Protocol
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This Restaurant Locator Protocol is represented by the modified Peach Pit Data
Model shown here:
<DataModel name=”Restaurant Locator”>
<Block name=”OuterRepeatingBlock” minOccurs=”1” maxOccurs=”8”>
<RuleSet block=”OuterRepeatingBlock” choice=”Word Choice”>
<Position token=”0” present=”yes” position=”1” />
<Repeats token=”0” precision=”exactly” times=”1” />
<Repeats token=”1” precision=”no more than” times=”1” />
<Repeats token=”2” precision=”no more than” times=”1” />
<Repeats token=”3” precision=”no more than” times=”3” />
<Sequence token=”1” token2=”2” present =”yes” bora=”after” proximity=”immediately” />
<Sequence token=”2” token2=”1” present =”yes” bora=”before” proximity=”immediately” />
</RuleSet>
<Choice name=”Word Choice”>
<Block name=”Word1”>
<Number name = ”Word Type1” token=”true” size=”3” value=”1”>
<Hint weight=”10”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Num Words” size=”3”>
<Hint valid =”0-5”/>
<Relation type=”count” of=”OuterRepeatingBlock” adjustment=”+1”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Urgent” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Open” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Restaurant” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”0-162”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name=”Word2”>
<Number name = ”Word Type2” token=”true” size=”3” value=”2”>
<Hint weight=”10”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Latitude” size=”13”>
<Hint valid =”455-7736” type=”numeric”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name=”Word3”>
<Number name = ”Word Type3” token=”true” size=”3” value=”3”>
<Hint priority=”5”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Latitude” size=”13”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name=”Word4”>
<Number name = ”Word Type4” token=”true” size=”3” value=”4”>
<Hint weight=”10”/>
</Number>
<Choice name=”label choice” >
<Block name =”Word4a”>
<Number name=”Labela” size=”3” token =”true” value =”0”>
</Number>
<Number name=”Healthiness” size=”2”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”TypeA” size=”2”>
<Hint invalid =”3”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”TypeB” size=”4”>
<Hint valid =”0-13”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Spare” size=”2”>
<Hint valid =”0”/>
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</Number>
</Block>
<Block name =”Word4b”>
<Number name=”Labelb” size=”3” token =”true” value =”1”>
</Number>
<Number name=”Manager” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”0-254”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Spare” size=”2”>
<Hint valid =”0”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name =”Word4c”>
<Number name=”Labelc” size=”3” token =”true” value =”2”>
</Number>
<Number name = ”Gender inc” size=”1”>
<Relation type=”choice” of=”Word4cChoice” links=”0,1”/>
</Number>
<Choice name=”Word4cChoice”>
<Block name=”NoGender”>
<Number name=”StaffName1” size=”8”>
<Hint valid =”0-254”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name=”Gender”>
<Number name=”Manager” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”StaffName2” size=”7”>
<Hint valid =”0-126”/>
</Number>
</Block>
</Choice>
<Number name=”Spare” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”0”/>
</Number>
</Block>
</Choice>
</Block>
</Choice>
</Block>
</DataModel>
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Appendix C. Coverage Calculator Application Example
In this appendix, the equations and procedures presented in Chapter III will be
applied to a simple protocol and test set in order to demonstrate how they are properly
applied.
The protocol used in this chapter was created to illustrate all the major elements
a data model may contain, while still being short enough to present in this form. The
protocol consist of six fields, named fields A through F, and can be represented by
the diagram in Figure 42.
A B C
D
F
E
Repeat based on 
value in B
Figure 42. Diagram of the fields in the example protocol
Field B is a repeating relation field that says how many times the block of fields
C, D, E, and F can repeat. Field C is a choice relation field that determines whether
fields D and E, or F are included. Details of the fields are shown in Table 13. Since
there is a choice within a repeating block, a set of rules may be applied that restrict
what choice can be made when in a sequence of repeating choices. For this protocol
the only rule is that a choice of 0, or fields D and E must follow field C, must always
be the first choice in a sequence of repeated choices. After that either choice may be
made.
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Field Length (bits) Valid Values Additional Information
A 6 0 – 14 This field is numeric and weighted by 5 times
B 2 1 – 3
This is a repeating relation field with no adjust-
ment. Its value is the number of times C must
appear.
C 1 0 or 1
This is a choice relation field. If it is 0, fields D
and E follow, if it is 1, field F follows. This field
must always be 0 the first time it appears in a
message.
D 1 0 or 1
E 2 1 – 3
F 3 0 – 2
Table 13. A description of the fields in the example protocol
The modified Peach Pit Data Model for this protocol is shown here:
<DataModel name=”SimpleProtocol2”>
<Number name=”Field A” size=”6”>
<Hint invalid =”15-63” type=”numeric” weight=”5”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Field B” size=”2”>
<Relation type=”count” of=”Repeating Block”/>
<Hint valid =”1-3”/>
</Number>
<Block name=”Repeating Block” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”3”>
<RuleSet block=”Repeating Block” choice=”Choice Block”>
<Position token=”0” present=”yes” position=”1” />
</RuleSet>
<Number name=”Field C” size=”1”>
<Relation type=”choice” of=”Choice Block” links=”0,1”/>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Choice name=”Choice Block”>
<Block name=”Choice 1”>
<Number name=”Field D” size=”1”>
<Hint valid =”all”/>
</Number>
<Number name=”Field E” size=”2”>
<Hint invalid =”0”/>
</Number>
</Block>
<Block name=”Choice 2”>
<Number name=”Field F” size=”3”>
<Hint invalid =”3-7”/>
</Number>
</Block>
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</Choice>
</Block>
</DataModel>
In this appendix, coverage of the set of test cases shown in Table 14 will be
computed.
Test case number Hexadecimal Binary
1 0F78A 00001111011110001010
2 AF4A 1010111101001010
3 0E8A 0000111010001010
4 3D7 0001000101111010
5 167B 0001011001111011
6 CD4 110011010100
Table 14. A set of test cases for the example protocol.
The coverage calculation can be divided into two major steps: finding first order
coverage and finding multi-order coverage. For simplicity the calculation will use test
set coverage C2Fuzz Set which is shown in (65) on page 80. This test set coverage value
only relies on first and second order coverage. Therefore the first step will be to find
the first order coverage of the 6 test cases (done in Section C.1), and the second step
will be to find those same test case’s second order coverage (done in Section C.2).
Finally the two results will be combined to find C2Fuzz Set in Section C.3.
C.1 First Order Coverage
The first step in computing first order coverage of a set of test cases is to apply
the first order limitations shown in Section 3.2.1 on page 65. The first limitation
says that a test case may provide coverage if and only if it contains only one invalid
field. To determine which test cases contain only one invalid field, they all need to be
parsed and each field’s validity needs to be checked. This is done in Table 15. Notice
that since some of the fields repeat; values for them may appear multiple times in the
same test case.
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Test Case
Fields
# Invalid
A B C D E F
1
Values 3 3 0 1 1 1 3 0 2
0
Invalid
2
Values 43 3 0 1 1 0 2
3
Invalid X X X
3
Values 3 2 1 1 0 2
2*
Invalid X X
4
Values 15 1 0 1 3
1
Invalid X
5
Values 5 2 0 1 1 3 3
1
Invalid X
6
Values 51 1 0 1 0
2
Invalid X X
* Breaks repeating choice rule, first choice must be 0
Table 15. Parsing the test cases for the example protocol
Only test cases 4 and 5 pass the first order test case limitation, so they are the
only ones that will contribute coverage. The second limitation applies to fields. Fields
A, B, E and F all have invalid spaces. This can be found by comparing the values
considered valid with the length in bits of each field shown in Table 13. This means
that fields C and D are not considered for first order coverage. The sizes for fields
A, E, and F are simply the number of possible invalid values that can be entered.
Since field B is a repeating relation field, its invalid space is calculated in a special
way described in Section 3.1.3.1 on page 48.
With the limitations applied, the procedure listed in Section 1 on page 65 can
now be followed. The first step was already achieved during the parsing, the invalid
fields of test cases 4 and 5 are fields A and F respectively as shown in Table 15. The
second step, sorting the test cases based on their invalid fields is trivial since there
are only two test cases and two fields. Field A has one test case, test case 4, and field
F has one test case, test case 5. The third step is to apply the appropriate coverage
calculation for the test cases for each field.
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Field A is a numeric field with no value weighting, so by Table 2, the equation
to be used is (38) on page 55. Field B is not numeric, nor does it contain weighted
values, so the equation to be used is (29) on page 47. Field coverage equations can
require an input of the invalid space set of values and a set of test case values. The
necessary inputs to the two equations and their result for this example are shown in
Table 16.
Field Equation Inputs Result
A (38)
min(I)= 15
19.85%
max(I)= 63
|I| = 49
m = 1
ti = 15
F (29)
m = 1
68.29%|I| = 5
Table 16. Inputs and results from applying the applicable field coverage equations.
The final step is to combine field coverage values into a singular value for first
order coverage. One of the fields in this protocol, field A, is weighted. That is, the
tester expects this field is 5 times as likely to contain a vulnerability than the other
fields. Since field weighting is present, equation (57) on page 67 is used. If field
weighting had not been present equation (58) on page 67 would have been used.
The inputs to (57) are:
 F , the number of applicable fields. This is 4, fields A, B, E, and F.
 E[Ni] for i = 1, . . . , F . This is the expected number of vulnerabilities. Since this
figure is normalized by E[NTotal], it is not important that the actual expected
number of vulnerabilities is supplied, only that the ratio between the expecta-
tions of different fields is accurate. By default all fields receive E[Ni] = 1 except
for the weighted field, E[N1] = 5.
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 Ci for i = 1, . . . , F . This is the field coverage of each field. C1 = 19.85% and
C4 = 68.29%. All other Ci = 0 since no test cases tested those fields.
With these inputs, (57) returns a first order coverage value of C1 = 20.94%.
C.2 Second Order Coverage
The first step in computing second order coverage of a set of test cases is to apply
the Rth order limitations shown in Section 3.2.2.2 on page 71 with R = 2. The first
limitation says that a test case provides second order coverage if and only if there is
some combination of 2 fields that has at least one invalid value set and contains all the
invalid fields and IIC pairs present in the test case. That is a very wordy statement,
but it can be simplified to “the test case must have at least one invalid field but
no more than two invalid fields”. Unfortunately this simple language doesn’t mean
exactly the same thing as the limitation when complex test cases are considered, so
it can not be substituted for the language in the limitation in all cases. In this case
however, this statement is an equivalent limitation.
Test cases 3, 4, 5 and 6 all pass this limitation. Test case 1 fails because it does
not have at least one invalid field and test case 2 fails because it has more than 2
invalid fields. This can be seen in Table 15.
The second limitation says: “A field combination is assigned a coverage value and
incorporated into the final 2nd order coverage metric if and only if |I| 6= 0.” This
means that it needs to be determined which field combinations in this protocol have
an invalid space. This is done using (60) on page 74 reprinted here:
M =
(
F
R
)
−
(
F − FI
R
)
+ FCIICR −QR
The FCIICR term can be eliminated right away, it is 0, because the only IIC pair in
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this protocol is between fields B and C because of their repeating choice relationship.
Since field B has an invalid space, this combination is not included in FCIICR . F is 6,
there are 6 fields in the protocol, and FI is 4, fields A, B, E, and F have invalid spaces.
R is 2 since this is for second order field combinations. Lastly, QR, the number of
field combinations with invalid spaces that cannot exist in the same message needs
to be found.
It might be tempting to initially think that QR = 2 because the combinations of
fields D and F and E and F cannot appear together if field C does not repeat. This
would be correct if there was no chance for these blocks to repeat, but they can, so
fields D and F and fields E and F may appear together in a message (and do in test
cases 1, 2 and 5). Therefore QR = 0. Applying (60):
M =
(
6
2
)
−
(
2
2
)
+ 0− 0 = 15− 1 = 14
There are 14 field combinations with invalid spaces. It also can be noted that there
are 15 field combinations total, but the combination of fields C and D has no invalid
space. This combination does not meet the limitation and is therefore dropped.
With the limitations applied, it is time to move on to applying the procedure
in Section 3.2.2 on page 72. Like in the first order case,the first step was already
completed during the parsing shown in Table 15. The next step involves looking
at each field combination and collecting the test cases that make this combination
invalid, but have no invalid fields outside of this combination. This is done in Table
17.
Next, in step 3, the field combination coverage for each field combination needs
to be calculated. This is easy for combinations B–D, B–E, C–E, and D–E since they
have no applicable test cases, their coverage is zero. For the remaining test cases
the field coverage equation, (29) is used. While this equation was designed for field
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Field Combination Applicable test cases
A – B 4
A – C 4
A – D 4
A – E 4, 6
A – F 5
B – C 3
B – D none
B – E none
B – F 5
C – E none
C – F 5
D – E none
D – F 5
E – F 5
Table 17. Test cases that contribute to coverage of each field combination
coverage, it is used for field combination coverage as well until a better method for
computing coverage over multi-order spaces is found. Since this equation assumes
no relation between values, and multi-order invalid spaces can be represented as first
order spaces like shown in Section 3.2.2.1 on page 68, this equation can be used with
decent results. One way to improve this equation would be to include a PMF that is
tailored to second order spaces. For now the generic PMF derived in Section 3.3 is
used.
Equation (29) requires only the number of applicable test cases, m, and the size
of the invalid space |I| to compute coverage. m is trivial to obtain from Table 17, it is
just the number of test cases that appear in the second column for each combination.
|I| is more difficult to find.
The invalid space of a second order field combination is the set of value pairs that
are invalid. For a value pair to be invalid, one of the values in it must be invalid or
they must be IIC. Section 3.2.2 describes these types of fields. Said more simply, the
number of invalid pairs is simply the total number of pairs less the valid ones.
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Most fields may take on a number of values equal to 2 raised to the number of bits
in the field. The exception to this is, field B, a repeating relation field. The number
of distinct values it can take on are calculated using the method in Section 3.1.3.1 on
page 48. The number of value pairs between two fields is simply the product of the
number of values each field can take on.
Ignoring the field combination B – C which has IIC value pairs, for any value pair
to be valid, both values must be valid. The total number of valid pairs for a field
combination can therefore be found by finding the product of the number of valid
values in each field. The total number of pairs, minus the total number of valid pairs
is logically the total number of invalid pairs, or |I|; Total Combined Size − Valid
Combined Size = |I|. All this is shown in Table 18 for the field combinations without
IIC value pairs.
Field Total Size Valid Size |I|
Combination Field 1 Field 2 Combined Field 1 Field 2 Combined
A–B 64 16 1024 15 3 45 979
A–C 64 2 128 15 2 30 98
A–D 64 2 128 15 2 30 98
A–E 64 4 256 15 3 45 211
A–F 64 8 512 15 3 45 467
B–D 12* 2 24 3 2 6 18
B–E 12* 4 48 3 3 9 39
B–F 8* 8 64 2 3 6 58
C–E 1** 4 4 1 3 3 1
C–F 1** 8 8 1 3 3 5
D–E 2 4 8 2 3 6 2
D–F 2 8 16 2 3 6 10
E–F 4 8 32 3 3 9 23
* For some number of repeats fields may not exist, or may break rules if they do exist.
This number reflects the possible values this repeating relation field can take that validly include the other field.
** For some fields to appear, this choice must be a certain value
Table 18. Calculating |I| for field combinations without IIC value pairs.
To find the second order invalid space for field combination B–C, a combination of
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two structure fields, the approach described in Section 3.2.3.3 on page 77 needs to be
applied. Figure 43 shows the adaptation of figure 13 to this specific field combination.
The size of the invalid space for field combination B–C is found to be 53.
Actual 
Repeats
Repeating 
Relation 
Value
Number of 
Permutations 
(with 
replacment) Valid Invalid
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1
0 2 1 0 1
0 3 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 2 0 2
1 1 0 1 2 1 1
1 2 0 1 2 0 2
1 3 0 1 2 0 2
2 0 00 01 10 11 4 0 4
2 1 00 01 10 11 4 0 4
2 2 00 01 10 11 4 2 2
2 3 00 01 10 11 4 0 4
3 0 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 8 0 8
3 1 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 8 0 8
3 2 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 8 0 8
3 3 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 8 4 4
Valid Total: 60 7 53
Value of Field C
Figure 43. Calculation of the spaces associated with the B–C field combination
Now that |I| has been found for every field combination, (29) can be applied in
each case to get coverage values for all M combinations. With these coverage values,
step 4 can be completed using (61). Had any field combination been weighted, the
wighted version of this equation, (62), would be used instead. This returns a second
order coverage value, C2 = 41.96%.
C.3 Combining for Final Result
Using the simple method for arriving at coverage of a test set presented in Section
3.2.4, C2Fuzz Set can be calculated using (65). With C1 = 20.94% and C2 = 41.96%,
the final coverage value for this test set is C2Fuzz Set = 31.45%.
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Appendix D. Open Source Protocol Vulnerability Data
A table of data on the invalid spaces of fields in a few open source protocols. This
data is used to determine the PMF that describes the distributions of vulnerabilities
in a variety of field types. This data and its implications are described in Section 3.3.
Table 19. Characterization of the spaces associated with some fields from select open
source protocols
Protocol* Field Name Type |I| |V | Description
GPS-SPS Eccentricity Numeric 4× 109 2× 109
Eccentricity above 0.25 causes a
computational error
GPS-SPS Reference Time Numeric 27736 27736 Reference Time exceeds one week
GPS-SPS Day Number Numeric 1 1 Day number of 0 causes an error
GPS-SPS Day Number Numeric 248 248 Day number above 7 causes error
GPS-SPS
Satellite Configu-
ration Code
Standard 6 6
The receiver cannot process any
invalid satellite types
GPS-SPS Spares Standard 30 30
The receiver attempts to process
the spares field because it does
not contain alternating 1’s and
0’s
GPS-SPS SV ID Standard 63 43 A valid ID but on the wrong page
GPS-SPS SV ID Standard 63 19 An invalid ID
GPS-SPS
Special Message
Character
Standard 211 32
Receiver cannot handle a control
character
GPS-SPS
Special Message
Character
Standard 212 21
Receiver cannot process a com-
mon, but excluded, character
GPS-SPS
Special Message
Character
Standard 213 1
The ASCII delete character
causes an issue
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Protocol* Field Name Type |I| |V | Description
BNEP BNEP Type Standard 122 122
The receiver cannot process in-
valid word types
BNEP BNEP Type Standard 122 96
The receiver is not designed to
handle anything other then 0x0
or 0x7 for the first 4 bits
BNEP UUID Size Standard 2 1
A value of zero for message
length causes a divide by zero er-
ror
BNEP UUID Size Standard 2 2
Any invalid value for message
length causes an error
BNEP
Response Mes-
sage
Standard 65531 65280
A non-zero first byte causes an
issue
BNEP List Length Standard 65395 63488
A non-zero first four bits causes
an issue
BNEP List Length Standard 65395 1540 Valid range, not divisible by 12
BNEP List Length Standard 65395 140
Divisible by 6, not 12. (contains
start but not end word)
OSGP Time Zone Offset Numeric 65509 65487
A greater than 24 hour time zone
adjustment causes an error
OSGP
Response Error
Codes
Standard 244 3
Response Error codes 0x07 - 0x09
are processed since they fall be-
tween valid error codes, causing
an error
OSGP
Response Error
Codes
Standard 244 244
Any invalid error code causes an
issue when processed
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Protocol* Field Name Type |I| |V | Description
OSGP Integer Format Standard 3 3
data type format other than
two’s compliment causes error
OSGP Frequency Standard 5 2
Receiver designed to reject values
above the maximum of 4, but still
accepts the undefined values of 0
and 1 for this field
OSGP ID Code Standard 212 212
Any undefined ID code causes is-
sue
OSGP ID Code Standard 212 3
Undefined phase angle ID code
causes issue
OSGP Day of Week Standard 1 1
A value of 7 is undefined (0 =
Sunday, 1 = Monday, etc.)
PWL Size Numeric 64045 64045 Too many Payload data octets
PWL Priority Standard 6 6 Invalid priority
PWL
Requested Ser-
vice ID
Standard 155 2
Small segment of reserved bits
causes error
PWL Service ID Standard 155 1 Edge case undefined causes issue
PWL Service ID Standard 155 1 Edge case undefined causes issue
PWL Segment Size Numeric 256 3
Shorter than possible with re-
quire fields
PWL Segment Size Numeric 64079 64079
Longer than allowed by Ethernet
frame
PWL Command ID Standard 116 25
Range between two types causes
issue
PWL Command ID Standard 116 15
Range between two types causes
issue
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Protocol* Field Name Type |I| |V | Description
PWL Command ID Standard 116 61
Range between two types causes
issue
PWL Command ID Standard 116 15
Range between two types causes
issue
PWL Command ID Standard 116 116 Any invalid type causes issue
PWL
Offset Payload
data
Numeric 2 2 Too short
PWL
Offset Payload
data
Numeric 64073 64073 Too long
PWL Sub-index Standard 65281 65281 Invalid sub-index
PWL Sub-index Standard 65281 1
Invalid sub-index still less than
28
* GPS-SPS — Global Positioning System — Standard Positioning Service
BNEP — Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol
OSGP — Open Smart Grid Protocol
PWL — Ethernet POWERLINK
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